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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 000767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR RIES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR CY TU BAKOYANNIS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER BAKOYANNIS' 
         VISIT TO WASHINGTON 
 
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Classified By: Ambassador Charles P. Ries.  Reasons 1.4(b/d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Thank you for agreeing to see Greek Foreign 
Minister Dora Bakoyannis in Washington on March 23.  This 
will be her first trip to Washington as Foreign Minister 
since assuming her post on February 15 of this year. 
Bakoyannis' objective will be to establish her credentials 
with you as a close partner of the United States.  She will 
undoubtably raise her desire to see Greece admitted to the 
Visa Waiver Program.  Our objective for this meeting is to 
get Greece to take on more responsibility in Afghanistan and 
the broader Middle East, as well as play a role in European 
gas security.  We also want Greece to engage more actively in 
its neighborhood, specifically in support of Kosovo's final 
status and with Turkey.  During her March 23-24 Washington 
visit, FM Bakoyannis will also see NSA Fran Townsend and DNI 
John Negroponte, and attend the Greek National Day reception 
at the White House.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
NEW FOREIGN MINISTER BRINGS NEW ENERGY TO GOVERNMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2.  (C) FM Bakoyannis ("Dora") takes over the Foreign 
Ministry at a time when the New Democracy (ND) government, 
led by PM Karamanlis, is facing a midterm slump at the polls, 
general strikes against ND's economic policies and an 
eavesdropping scandal that has prompted a parliamentary 
investigation and toxic press coverage.  Foreign Minister 
Bakoyannis assumed her post February 15 as a result of the 
first Cabinet reshuffle since the Government took office in 
¶2004.  She joins new ministers of Public Order (Polydoras) 
and Defense (Meimarakis).  The PM retained his (top-notch) 
economic team.  Despite domestic troubles, the Karamanlis 
government is not in jeopardy, and we believe the new foreign 
policy team brings with it new energy, and shared goals with 
us. 
 
¶3.  (C) Born in 1954, Dora Bakoyannis was the first female 
mayor of Athens (2002-2006), and arguably its most popular 
mayor ever.  Her first husband, parliamentarian Pavlos 
Bakoyannis, was assassinated by the domestic terrorist 
organization "17 November" in 1989.  Dora owes her headstart 
in politics to her father, Constantine Mitsotakis, who led 
the New Democracy party for nine years, and was Prime 
Minister from 1990-1993.  Following ND's electoral defeat in 
1993, the party split into two major factions: one led by 
Dora's father, the other by current PM Karamanlis.  For this 
reason, Bakoyannis has been an outsider in the Karamanlis 
camp, and is widely seen as Karamanlis' chief rival for 
political power and a possible future PM.  Provided they can 
manage their personal and political rivalries, Bakoyannis' 
legendary energy and desire to shape events will help Greece 
cut a wider swath in the Balkans, in Brussels and 
internationally. 
 
¶4.  (C) Bakoyannis has made no secret of her intention to 
work closely with us, and considers herself (as do we) a good 
friend of the United States.  Although without any real 
diplomatic experience, she could turn out to be "our kind" of 
diplomat -- energetic, results-oriented, and a polished 
practitioner in the public diplomacy arena.  You will find 
her to be forceful, engaging and decisive.  She also has told 
me she wants her visit to achieve results, so that she can 
deploy her own brand of transformational diplomacy in order 
to change attitudes about America here in Greece. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Government of Greece has been bogged down in a 
phone-tapping scandal since February 2, when government 
officials confirmed press reports that the cell phones 
belonging to high-ranking officials, including the Prime 
Minister, had been tapped by unknown agents from just before 
the Olympics through March 2005.  Opposition parties, 
scenting a cover-up, have blasted the government for its 
year-long silence after March 2005 (the government says it 
was conducting a secret investigation into the 
phone-tapping).  There is widespread belief, and much 
purported evidence in the press, to the effect that the U.S. 
is the perpetrator.  Karamanlis seems determined not to let 
this belief impede our bilateral cooperation.  Bakoyannis is 
unlikely to raise this issue with you; we have not commented 
on the allegations or the ongoing investigation. 
 
------ 
ISSUES 
------ 
 
TRANSFORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
¶6.  (C) Under former FM Molyviatis, Greece took several 
 
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significant steps to support the Global War on Terrorism and 
our broader Middle East agenda, including Afghanistan, but 
there is room to do more: 
 
-- Greece has an engineering unit in Kabul building roads and 
schools.  Greece also runs security for the Kabul 
International Airport, and staffs ISAF's most advanced 
medical unit.  This unit is a particularly compelling success 
story -- having won kudos from SACEUR for its efficiency, and 
praise from Afghans whom Greek doctors have also treated. 
Greece should get more credit (and take more credit) for this 
good news story.  Still, Greece plans to, and should, do 
more.  Greek troops are preparing to lead the ISAF HQ 
battalion in Kabul in 2008 (a deployment that the government 
should approve formally this May).  We are also pushing the 
Greeks to venture outside Kabul and have hopes they might 
lead a PRT in Afghanistan.  Even if NATO is not currently 
looking for a lead nation for one of the PRTs in the north of 
the country (where the relatively reduced threat level 
matches Greek force protection capabilities and appetite for 
risk), you can emphasize the importance of making a political 
commitment to be a full partner in NATO's expanding role in 
Afghanistan, in Kabul and beyond. 
 
-- PM Karamanlis is holding to his campaign pledge to keep 
Greek troops out of Iraq.  Greece has, however, worked within 
this limitation to contribute to Iraq's future as a peaceful, 
democratic state, by supplying equipment (refitted Russian 
APCs) and training (of Iraqi security forces in Bulgaria and 
medical personnel in Greece).  You should thank FM Bakoyannis 
for Greece's efforts, but press her to consider additional 
important steps such as removing the national caveat that 
prevents Greek officers on the NATO staff from serving in 
NTM-I and to allow the training of Iraqi security forces in 
Greece. (Greece has a PfP training center in the north that 
would be ideal for training small groups of Iraqis.) 
 
-- The Greek Government is keen to contribute to the Roadmap 
for peace in the Middle East, and has raised here and in 
Washington how Greece could use its good relations with the 
Palestinians to reach out to Hamas.  We have discouraged 
their thinking in this direction, as it does not track with 
our own policy.  It would be useful for FM Bakoyannis to hear 
this message from you, while also giving her a sense of the 
Quartet's evolving strategy for providing humanitarian 
support for the Palestinians while isolating Hamas. 
 
-- Greece has been a staunch ally opposing Iran's nuclear 
enrichment policy, both as a member of the IAEA Board of 
Governors and as a non-permanent member of the UNSC.  Senior 
Greek policymakers have been forthcoming, active and 
available to us at every step of the way from last 
September's IAEA meeting to the most recent IAEA report to 
the Security Council.  You can keep Greece firmly in our camp 
by sharing with Bakoyannis our next steps to deal with Iran 
at the UN. 
 
DEMOCRATIZATION AND DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS 
 
¶7.  (C) While Greece is a charter member of the 
BMENA-inspired Foundation for the Future, we have not yet 
taken advantage of PM Karamanlis' May 2005 offer to the 
President to host a BMENA ministerial event in Athens.  When 
I briefed Bakoyannis on the idea of using Athens, and its 
democratic heritage, to foster democratization in the Middle 
East, she was very positive.  For her part, Bakoyannis told 
me she would raise the possibility of a Greek role in a 
dialogue of civilizations. She stressed what she considers to 
be Greece's good record in absorbing the rapid growth in 
Muslim population (most are Albanians), now equal to ten 
percent of Greece's population.  Bakoyannis wants to use 
Greece's good understanding of the the Muslim world as a 
bridge to communities in the Middle East ripe for 
democratization. 
 
NON-PROLIFERATION 
 
¶8.  (C) Greece has been an active partner in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, priding itself on its 
status as a maritime heavyweight and recognizing the security 
implications therein. 
 
-- Greece was instrumental in stopping a shipment of 
materials destined for the Syrian ballistic missile 
development program, and has been extremely helpful in 
ensuring that they never reach their intended user.  For more 
than a year, this container has been sitting in a Greek port 
as Greek judicial authorities pursued possible violations of 
Greek law.  This week, the Foreign Ministry told us 
informally that the investigation is complete, clearing the 
 
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way for the diversion of the shipment to the U.S. pursuant to 
our MLAT request for it.  Bakoyiannis may give the formal 
notification that this is done; otherwise, we are optimistic 
that the shipment will be on its way back to the United 
States - and thus permanently out of Syrian hands - within 
days of your meeting. 
 
-- We are close to agreement on a bilateral Shipboarding 
Agreement, which will establish protocols for U.S. warships 
to inspect Greek-flagged vessels (Greece controls 25 percent 
of the world's total maritime commerce -- through management, 
ownership or flag) that may be transporting WMD or associated 
materials.  We have working-level agreement on a text, but 
the Foreign Minister needs to take the politically difficult 
step of selling this deal to Greece's influential shipowning 
community.  You should make clear how much attention we place 
on this issue and emphasize the importance of getting an 
agreement in place as quickly as possible -- before we 
encounter a situation in which it might be needed. 
 
ENERGY SECURITY 
 
¶9.  (C) Greece has found itself thrust squarely into the 
middle of European energy security issues this year, largely 
as a result of two new regional pipeline ventures.  The first 
is the Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) natural gas interconnector 
pipeline, which aims to bring Caspian gas to the three 
countries, and beyond to EU markets.  The other is the 
Burgas-Alexandroupoli (BA) Bosporus bypass oil line.  Our 
worry is that a predatory Gazprom will make attractive offers 
to fill the gas interconnector with Russian gas in order to 
prevent development of a Caspian gas export route, and that 
it will link the Bosporus bypass to seal the deal.   Our 
message on both is that Greece should take decisions on these 
energy issues based on its (and the EU,s) long-term, 
energy-security interests.  Concretely, that means the GoG 
should not make decisions that would fill the TGI with 
Russian (Gazprom) gas, and it should not allow Russia to link 
the Bosporus bypass decision (where the Greeks dearly want 
Russian old commitments) to gas issues.  You may wish to note 
that the USG is prepared to help Greece in its analysis of 
how best to proceed.  EUR DAS Matt Bryza is scheduled to 
visit Greece at the end of March.  He is to be proceeded by a 
team of senior USG energy analysts prepared to brief the 
Greeks on the full range of Caspian and regional energy 
issues. 
 
GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS 
 
¶10.  (C) Greece showed statesmanship and vision last October 
by supporting the opening of accession talks with Turkey, and 
Bakoyannis has assured me that she supports Turkey's EU 
accession.  She also seeks to improve Greece's relationship 
with Turkey.  The progress begun by then-FMs Cem and 
Papandreou has stalled, and Greece remains vexed by sea and 
airspace disagreements with Turkey.  Stung, however, by 
"Turkish provocations" in the Aegean, Bakoyannis has insisted 
"Greece needs a sign" from Turkey that it too is committed to 
the relationship in order to reinvigorate Greek-Turkish 
talks.  She may brief you on her notion that reopening the 
Halki Seminary (a Greek Orthodox school near Istanbul) would 
be a much-needed sign of Turkey's western orientation.  We 
believe there is also great scope for Greek-Turkish 
cooperation in the BMENA context, perhaps through joint 
activities under the Democracy Assistance Dialogue. 
 
¶11.  (C) Cypriot FM Iacovou was the first FM to visit Athens 
after Bakoyannis took over the MFA.  Although Bakoyannis went 
on record during Iacovou's visit to say that the Annan Plan 
"was history," she has assured me that Greece continues to 
support the meat of the Annan Plan -- a bizonal, bicommunal 
federation.  During Cypriot President Papadopoulos' March 7-9 
visit, we were dismayed by Papadopoulos' slick handling of 
the Greeks, leveraging enthusiastic support from his fellow 
Hellenes for his misleading interpretation of the February 28 
Annan-Papadopoulos meeting that laid out a proposal for 
technical talks.  For reasons of domestic political 
expediency, successive Greek governments have tended not to 
be willing to weigh in effectively with Nicosia, even when 
Nicosia hardball tactics affect Greece's broader security 
interests with Turkey.  The Karamanlis government is no 
exception. 
 
-- Therefore, we suggest (and Embassies Ankara and Nicosia 
agree) that, rather than asking Bakoyannis to weigh in now 
with Papadopoulos, we try the counter-intuitive notion of 
asking her for help with FM Gul.  She might ask Gul to 
encourage the Turkish Cypriots to participate in the 
technical talks, and advise Gul to ignore the spin put on the 
February 28 meeting between Annan and Papadopoulos.  If we 
 
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could get the Greeks to urge Turkey's support for 
Turkish-Cypriot participation in technical talks 
(notwithstanding Papadopoulos' recent stacking of the deck 
with Annan) it could set up the Greeks to weigh in later with 
Nicosia should the Cypriots misbehave. 
 
THE BALKANS 
 
¶12.  (C) Bakoyannis' first foreign trip as FM was to the 
Balkans, sending signals to Sarajevo, Belgrade and Pristina 
that Greece is sensitive to the developments in, and needs 
of, the region.  Greece wants to play a role in 
post-settlement Kosovo, particularly in terms of Serb 
majority areas and protection of religious sites.  Greece 
also shares our view that some form of independence for 
Kosovo is the likely outcome of ongoing status talks, but 
Bakoyannis said in Belgrade that she did not favor 
"constricting timeframes" for those negotiations.  She should 
hear from you (as she has heard from us) that we strongly 
believe Kosovo's status should be resolved this year, and 
that an open-ended process will not enhance regional 
security. 
 
VISA WAIVER PROGRAM 
 
¶13.  (C) I expect Bakoyannis to ask for your support for 
Greece's entry into the Visa Waiver Program.  In my first 
meeting with her on February 23, she said she "spoke from the 
heart" to urge the U.S. to admit Greece to the VWP.  It was 
"the one thing," she said, that the U.S. could do to have a 
major impact on anti-Americanism in Greece.  It's true that 
Greece has recently rolled out a new, state-of-the-art, 
high-security, biometric passport, and will soon start 
issuing more secure diplomatic and official passports. We 
understand all the old passports will be out of circulation 
by the end of the year.  As we understand it, Greece also 
comfortably meets VWP overstay and visa refusal criteria. 
Greece is the only Schengen member among VWP aspirants, which 
seems to be important to Chairman Sensenbrenner.  In my 
meeting with her in February, I told her that DHS had not yet 
begun to review possible new VWP participants, and that we 
should work closely together to achieve progress and manage 
expectations. 
Ries