This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALMATY 000808 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE), PRM/ECA (R. OLSON), DRL/IRF 
(N. HEWETT); DRL/PHD (C.KUCHTA-HELBLING) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PREF PTER KZ POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: UZBEK REFUGEES UNDER RENEWED PRESSURE? 
 
REF: A. 05 ALMATY 4441 
     ¶B. 05 ALMATY 4393 
 
Classified By: DCM MARK ASQUINO FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 28 meeting in Almaty, imam 
Abidkhan Nazarov of the Tukhtaboy mosque in Tashkent told 
Poloff that he fears that Uzbek and Kazakhstani authorities 
have recently intensified their efforts to locate him and his 
followers in Kazakhstan.  Nazarov voiced his concerns three 
months after nine Uzbek UNHCR asylum seekers were arrested in 
Kazakhstan and deported to Uzbekistan without due process 
(reftels).  Days before his conversation with Poloff, on 
February 24, two of Nazarov's followers were detained in 
Almaty and questioned about Nazarov's whereabouts.  Nazarov 
told Poloff that he believes that the Uzbek National Security 
Service (SNB) is aware that Sweden has granted him refugee 
status, and, in cooperation with the Kazakhstani National 
Security Committee (KNB), has intensified efforts to locate 
and abduct him before he relocates to Sweden. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary (continued):  Narashimha Rao, an Almaty-based 
UNHCR protection officer, took a different view of the 
February 24 detentions,  telling Poloff that it didn't appear 
that the men had been targeted as followers of Nazarov, and 
that even once their identities were known, questioning on 
the subject of Nazarov's whereabouts had been brief and 
desultory.  Rao told Poloff that, while he obviously could 
not rule out the existence of an Uzbek-led campaign to locate 
and abduct Nazarov, none of Nazarov's followers had 
approached his office in recent days complaining of an 
intensified campaign against them.   Rao told Poloff that 
Nazarov's travel documents should be ready "within two 
weeks."  End Summary. 
 
Nazarov: Uzbeks Mounting a Last-Minute Campaign 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. (C) Poloff met outside the Embassy with imam Nazarov in 
Almaty on February 28.  The meeting followed email exchanges 
with SCA/CEN on Nazarov's safety.  A journalist familiar with 
Nazarov's situation briefed the DCM and Poloff  on Nazarov's 
concerns, and set-up the meeting with Nazarov. 
 
¶4. (C) Nazarov told Poloff that both the SNB and KNB were 
aware that he had recently been granted refugee status by 
Sweden, and that his departure from Kazakhstan was imminent. 
As a consequence, he said, both had intensified a campaign to 
locate his hiding place and deport him to Uzbekistan.  (Note: 
Nazarov has been in hiding in Almaty since fleeing Shymkent 
in late December, following the "arrest" there of nine of his 
followers.)  As evidence of the campaign to locate him, 
Nazarov explained that two of his followers had been detained 
on February 24, ostensibly to answer questions about a murder 
that had occurred in their neighborhood.  Once they arrived 
at the police station, however, the two men complained that 
"the murder was never mentioned again."  A KNB agent had been 
called in, and the men were questioned repeatedly about 
Nazarov's whereabouts.  Nazarov alleged that the two men had 
overheard the Kazakhstani police talking to Uzbek security 
agents during the course of the questioning.  Rao had finally 
intervened, Nazarov said, and managed to convince the General 
Prosecutor that it was illegal to detain the men further. 
After nearly 24 hours in detention, the two men were released 
on February 25. 
 
¶5. (C) Nazarov told Poloff that he was confident that neither 
the GOK nor the Uzbek authorities knew the location of his 
hiding place -- if they did, he would already have been 
abducted.  While Nazarov was reasonably confident that he 
could remain hidden until he and his family (a son, a 
daughter-in-law, and three grandchildren) were given their 
travel documents, he was concerned about his "more than 60" 
followers, including women and children, who were seeking 
refugee status from within Kazakhstan.  Most were afraid to 
go the UNHCR office, he said, for fear of being seen, and 
thus their cases were moving slowly or not at all.  Nazarov 
also said that he feared that the Uzbeks might stage a 
last-minute accident or explosion in Almaty, blame it on him, 
and thus derail his planned departure from Kazakhstan. 
Nazarov appealed to Poloff to use the Embassy's influence to 
accelerate UNHCR processing of his followers' cases. 
 
UNHCR: Detentions Not Clearly Related to Nazarov's Case 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶6. (C) On March 1, UNHCR's Rao told Poloff that he was not 
convinced that the two men detained by police on February 24 
had been targeted as follower's of Nazarov.  Rao explained 
that there had, in fact, been a murder in their neighborhood, 
and that the police had detained "all the foreigners in the 
area" for questioning.  Nor had the men placed much emphasis 
on the questions regarding Nazarov's whereabouts in their 
subsequent debriefs with Rao.  According to what the men had 
told Rao, once the police had ascertained their identities 
and asylum-seeker status, they had asked about Nazarov's 
whereabouts -- but only briefly and without urgency.  The KNB 
agent, Rao admitted, had left the two men his card and 
suggested that he would contact them again in the future to 
discuss Nazarov further, but he had not been threatening. 
 
¶7. (C) Rao told Poloff that he had kept the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs fully abreast of the status of Nazarov's 
case, and that his MFA contacts knew that Nazarov had been 
granted refugee status, and that his case was nearing a 
conclusion.  However, his GOK contacts had never pressured 
him to reveal Nazarov's location. Rao reiterated that Nazarov 
had not contacted Rao recently about heightened security 
concerns.  Rao noted that, in the past, he had secured a GOK 
commitment to grant Nazarov uniformed security if he wished 
-- an offer which Nazarov had not accepted.  Rao acknowledged 
that many of Nazarov's followers likely felt uneasy about 
approaching UNHCR's office, but denied that their asylum 
cases had been delayed as a consequence:  bureaucracy, and 
not a lack of contact with the applicants, was to blame for 
the delays. 
 
¶8. (C) Summing up his office's role in protecting Nazarov and 
his followers from extra-legal abductions like those that 
occurred in Shymkent in November, Rao said "my office can 
only guarantee them legal protection.  Nothing can protect 
them from illegal actions." 
 
¶9. (C) Comment.  Due to Kazakhstan's deportation of nine 
Uzbek refugees from Shymkent in November (Ref A) we fully 
understand Nazarov's concern for his safety and that of his 
followers.  If, in fact, the SNB is actively looking for 
Nazarov in Kazakhstan (a point which we considered unproved 
but possible), it stands to reason that any pressure they 
might be applying to his followers will diminish once he 
relocates to Sweden.  Thus, the weeks ahead are likely the 
most critical. We will maintain our contact with Nazarov's 
intermediaries, as well as with the local UNHCR office. 
ORDWAY