VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0889/01 0760914
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170914Z MAR 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9152
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4887
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6083

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000889 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC BARBORIAK 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
 
TAGS: PREL TA KPAO TW
SUBJECT:  CHEN SHUI-BIAN'S STRATEGY AND THE NUC/NUG 
 
REF: TAIPEI 744 
 
¶1. Summary: This cable is one of two looking at the local media and 
commentators' take on Taiwan's current political environment.  This 
one focuses on reactions to Chen's announcement in his January 29 
Lunar New Year's Day speech that he "is seriously considering [the 
options] to abolish the National Unification Council (NUC) and 
National Unification Guidelines (NUG)."  The earlier cable (reftel) 
focused on Ma Ying-jeou's recent discourse. This cable is an 
analysis by one of AIT's senior local employees in the Press Section 
of Taiwan media commentary over the last month.  End summary. 
 
¶2. The controversy over whether President Chen might abolish the NUC 
and NUG set off a political firestorm domestically, across the 
Taiwan Strait, and between Taiwan and the United States.  One of the 
many reasons given by Chen's aides to explain his move was that it 
was aimed primarily at rebutting KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's comment 
in an interview with "Newsweek" last December, in which Ma revealed 
that the KMT's ultimate goal is to seek "eventual unification with 
China."  Deputy Editor-in-Chief Tsou Jiing-wen of Taiwan's biggest 
daily, the pro-independence "Liberty Times," described Chen's 
motives vividly in a February 17 front-page story entitled "[The 
Decision to] Abolish the National Unification Council and National 
Unification Guidelines Will Be Moved Ahead and Made Within 
February."  According to the article, last December's 3-in-1 
elections in Taiwan marked an important watershed for Chen. 
 
¶3. "Ma's unification comment worried Chen deeply," Tsou wrote. 
"Chen was concerned that Ma's comment would mislead on the direction 
of Taiwan's public opinion and slowly dissipate the Taiwan-centered 
consciousness formed and consolidated over the past six years. 
Likewise, Chen believes that such a development will confuse the 
international community and lead it to believe that once Ma wins the 
presidential elections in 2008, both sides of the Taiwan Strait will 
move gradually from the moderate route of maintaining the status quo 
to eventual unification," Tsou added.  Chen thus decided that as a 
national leader, he needed to come out to correct the distorted 
situation and consolidate the people's democratic right to freedom 
of choice.  Most DPP members agreed that Chen's preemptive approach 
has reaped the results he desired to achieve.  They believe that the 
heated island-wide discussions over the past few weeks sparked by 
Chen's proposal have again put Taiwan-centered values back in a 
clear and new light; even Ma was forced to modify his unification 
comment by announcing in a KMT advertisement that Taiwan 
independence is included as a possible option for Taiwan people to 
decide their future. 
 
¶4. The pan-Blue camp, however, viewed Chen's motives differently. 
KMT Legislator Sun Ta-chien said on a TV talk show that Chen has at 
least three strategic schemes in mind behind his move.  First, the 
proposal could serve as a smoke screen for Chen to divert the media 
and Taiwan people's attention away from the DPP's corrupt image and 
various scandals.  Second, Chen wants to garner relevant resources 
in an attempt to replace former President Lee Teng-hui as the 
paramount leader of the pan-Green camp.  [NOTE: Lee proclaimed the 
"special state-to-state relationship" doctrine in 1999, one year 
before he stepped down, in an apparent attempt to consolidate his 
post-presidential leadership of pro-independence. End NOTE.]  Third, 
Sun argued, Chen wants to play the martyr to show the Taiwan people 
how strenuously he has been trying to fight the overwhelming 
pressure from both Washington and Beijing in an attempt to win back 
the support of deep-Green followers.  Some analysts also speculated 
that Chen wants to use this move to keep incumbent Premier Su 
Tseng-chang, his potential competitor in the last two years of his 
 
SIPDIS 
presidency and the most promising DPP candidate for the 2008 
presidential election, on a short leash.  It is generally believed 
by pan-Blue-inclined commentators that Chen's strategy is to 
position himself on the high ground of Taiwan independence, which 
would assist him in avoiding criticism of his political ethics and 
capabilities by those within his party. 
 
¶5.  Pro-Green academic commentators, on the other hand, believe 
Chen's decision to do away with the NUC and NUG was aimed at 
establishing a legacy for his eight-year presidency.  Lo Chih-cheng, 
Director of the Taipei-based Institute for National Policy Research 
(INPR), said at an academic forum that "Chen is seeking to leave his 
mark on the state of cross-Strait relations after his eight-year 
term, and that if he cannot push for Taiwan's independence as he 
wants to, at least he can rule out the possibility of unification." 
Chao Chien-min, Chairman of National Chengchi University's Sun 
Yat-sen Graduate Institute of Social Sciences of Humanities, said 
"Chen's cross-Strait policy has shifted from a middle-of-the-road 
position back to a more radical stand for reasons including his 
quest to leave a presidential legacy, and his wish to gain control 
of the issues platform to consolidate his power to eradicate a 'lame 
duck image,' following a series of political defeats of his DPP 
administration."  Chen's core aides emphasized that the abolition of 
the NUC and NUG, a card hidden in Chen's sleeve all the time, could 
be accomplished by Chen quickly because it is within his power to do 
so.  Chen allowed the topic to brew for a period of time because he 
wanted Taiwan and the international society to understand that 
"people's power and decision" is the most essential safety mechanism 
for the island.  This is also one of the mantras of "justification" 
the Chen Shui-bian administration has been chanting to convince 
Washington, Chen's core aides added. 
 
¶6. Jaw Shao-kang, a well-known pro-Blue TV/radio commentator, said 
Chen has shown that he can succeed with his plan if he remains firm 
and unbending, as evidenced by his determination in holding Taiwan's 
first-ever defensive referendum in March 2004 in the face of 
overwhelming pressure from Washington. 
 
¶7. Most commentators had speculated that Chen would choose to 
announce his decision to abolish the NUC and NUG on February 28, 
when the local stock market would be closed for the national holiday 
in commemoration of the 1947 February 28 Incident;  the announcement 
would thus have a smaller impact on Taiwan's stock trading.  Chen 
did, as expected, announce following a National Security Council on 
February 27 that the NUC would "cease to function" and the NUG 
"would cease to apply."  Despite the repercussions caused by the 
wording with regard to the NUC and NUG, both pro-Blue and pro-Green 
commentators said they believe that Chen's announcement has shown 
the world that Taiwan's leader can not only participate in, but can 
also dominate, the process that defines the status quo in the Taiwan 
Strait.  Moreover, as journalist Hsiao Hsu-tsen pointed out in a 
news analysis in the "China Times," Chen has directly challenged 
Taiwan's Constitution in terms of unification with China and has 
successfully made the unification/independence argument a major 
topic for the campaigning of the presidential election in 2008. 
 
¶8. Most critics assess that 2006 will not be a calm year for 
cross-Strait relations as a number of major cross-Strait events are 
due to occur, including: the first anniversary of China's passage of 
the "Anti-Secession Law" (March 14); the 10th anniversary of the 
1996 Taiwan Strait crisis (March 8-23); the first anniversary of 
Taiwan's major demonstration in protest of China's passage of the 
"Anti-Secession Law" (March 26); the DPP's grand debates on the 
party's cross-Strait policy slated for March and April; the meeting 
between U.S. President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu 
Jintao in April; large-scale U.S. military exercises in the Pacific 
this summer; and the DPP's plan to introduce a draft constitution 
for Taiwan in June. 
 
KEEGAN