VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1122/01 0900843
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310843Z MAR 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9458
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4992
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6185

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001122 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC BARBORIAK 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
 
TAGS: PREL TA KPAO TW
 
SUBJECT: TAIWAN PUBLIC OPINION AFTER KMT CHAIRMAN MA YING-JEOU'S 
U.S. TRIP 
 
 
¶1. Summary: KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou just concluded a ten-day, 
five-city whirlwind tour to the United States, which has garnered 
extensive media coverage in Taiwan.  A horde of Taiwan media 
accompanied Ma on the trip and glamorized Washington's views of him 
as a promising candidate for Taiwan's presidential election in 2008. 
 Media coverage also suggested that Ma successfully allayed the 
United States' fears that he may be anti-American and pro-China. 
Local observers are now watching closely Ma's next steps, Beijing's 
reactions, DPP's comments, and how Washington will work with Ma to 
"rein in" Chen during the latter's remaining term.  End summary. 
 
¶2. Pan-Blue commentators generally gave high marks to Ma's U.S. tour 
saying he was granted a "diplomatic favor" of unprecedented- and 
publicly acknowledged - meetings with high-ranking American 
officials during his two day stay in Washington, D.C. A "China 
Times" news analysis said "Washington was very pleased with the 
KMT's pledges and was willing to cast a vote of confidence in Ma 
during its formal 'first contact' with him."  Analysts also 
concluded that Ma's pledge to maintain the status quo and ensure 
peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, not pursuing permanent 
separation or immediate reunification with China, has dispelled U.S. 
concerns that Ma might be tilting toward China.  Chen Feng-hsing, a 
senior journalist and TV commentator, also said "Given Ma's fluent 
command of English, congenial manner, and oratorical skills, he has 
effectively introduced himself to elite American officials and 
scholars, convincing them that neither he nor his party will be as 
'unpredictable' as President Chen." 
 
¶3. Pan-Green commentators, however, defined Ma's trip as an official 
prelude to his presidential campaign, adding that Ma has patronized 
his U.S. audience with a mix of carefully structured evasions and 
mistruths.  "Liberty Times" Journalist Wang Yu-chong said Ma's 
presidential aspirations obviously outweighed the need to speak up 
for Taiwan's democracy and national interests.  "Ma has obviously 
gotten carried away by his success and the high-profile reception 
granted by the United States," Wang said, "and his call on China to 
face the choice between two devils - namely, the Republic of Taiwan 
and the Republic of China - has again revealed his pro-China stance 
and let people see more clearly his ultimate goal." 
 
¶4. Commentators made special note that in his speech entitled "A 
Vision for Peace and Prosperity," which was delivered at Harvard 
University March 21, Ma mentioned that over the next ten years, 
Taiwan should play the role of a "responsible peacemaker" rather 
than a "regional troublemaker."  This statement, they suggested, has 
been taken as an implicit message to the U.S. and China that, if 
elected president, he will use his two terms to transform Taiwan 
into a "peacemaker."   Ma's policy statement is particularly 
significant since Chinese President Hu Jintao, whose term of office 
will last until 2012, will visit the United States in April. 
 
¶5. Judging from his remarks in the United States, Taiwan 
commentators say that Ma considers cross-Strait relations Taiwan's 
most urgent problem and that Ma believes the best place to start 
solving the problem is with the United States.  Ma, however, is also 
aware that winning Washington's trust will not by itself guarantee a 
resolution to the island's tense standoff with China.  Thus, when Ma 
pledged to maintain the cross-Strait status quo and regional 
stability, some observers said he was reassuring Washington.  But 
other analysts say that Ma was actually speaking to Beijing, 
especially when proposing to forge a "modus vivendi" to create more 
space for Taiwan in the international community. 
 
¶6. Blue analysts argue that Ma was smart to take old (and accepted) 
ideas from the Lien-Hu communiqu and repackage them together as a 
new initiative. Detractors seized the opportunity to point out that 
Ma's U.S. statements contained no new ideas.  They also noted that 
Ma waited until he got to Stanford to speak of Taiwan's tragic 
history and Beijing's squeezing of Taiwan's space in the 
international community.  Observers said Ma did not publicly protest 
China's suppression of Taiwan until he left Washington, in order to 
minimize the "American factor" that Beijing cares about most. 
 
¶7. Most critics viewed Beijing's silence about Ma's trip as a 
goodwill gesture to the KMT.  Critics generally agreed that Beijing 
has shown more tolerance of  Ma than Chen, particularly when one 
compares Beijing's reactions to Chen's cessation of the NUC and the 
NUG and to the KMT's ad in the "Liberty Times" in February, in which 
Taiwan independence is included as a possible option for Taiwan 
people.  Some Taiwan pundits say the KMT ad could have a bigger and 
more lasting impact on Taiwan than Chen's decision to "cease to 
function/apply" the NUC and NUG. 
 
¶8. Commentators posit that the reason Beijing sees Chen as a foe 
while regarding Ma as a friend is not simply because of the 
difference of their policies but because of 'trust.'  Beijing has no 
faith in Chen, so every move the Chen administration makes, even 
 
when following in the KMT's footsteps (pushing to join the WHO and 
the UN), is seen by Beijing as pushing for "Taiwan independence." 
Beijing's tolerance of Ma partially stems from the mutual trust 
built during the Lien-Hu meetings last spring; it was also partially 
due to the fact that Beijing has no other choice but to define the 
KMT as its friend instead of foe.  On the other hand, some observers 
in Beijing have started to show concerns about the so-called "Ma 
Ying-jeou phenomenon."  They are worried that Ma may be a tougher 
rival to deal with than Chen because Ma, who supports the Falun Gung 
and students' movements in China, might threaten the stability of 
the Chinese Communist Party's regime. 
 
¶9. The DPP, too, has started a heated discussion about the "Ma 
Ying-jeou phenomenon."  KMT Legislator Sun Ta-chien has said 
publicly that some DPP members, especially those interested in 
running for president, are trying to raise their visibility by 
attacking Ma.  Others, said Sun, are stunned to discover how easily 
Ma erased the 'anti-U.S. and anti-Japan' image of the KMT that the 
DPP has tried for six years to implant in the consciousness of the 
U.S. administration. 
 
¶10. As the media coverage of Ma continues unabated after ten days, 
Taiwan's public is anticipating next steps from all parties.  How 
will Ma consolidate his gains and follow up on the ideas he raised 
during his visit?  How will Chen and the possible DPP presidential 
candidates respond to Ma's effort to build bridges between the KMT, 
the United States, and China?  The answers to these questions may 
shed some light on the course of Taiwan's political development over 
the next two years. 
 
YOUNG