VZCZCXRO4472
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #0703/01 0690708
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100708Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9482
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 2750
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000703 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, D, IO/PSC 
PARIS: PLEASE PASS TO AMB. RANNEBERGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2016 
TAGS: KPKO NATO PREL SF SU AU
SUBJECT: AMIS RE-HAT: SOUTH AFRICAN PERMREP SUGGESTS 
DECISION MAY OCCUR AFTER MARCH 10 
 
REF: A. STATE 036548 
 
     ¶B. PRETORIA 977 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. JANET WILGUS.  REASON: 1.4 (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  South Africa's ambassador and permanent 
representative to the AU Baso Sangqu notes that the January 
10 Peace and Security Council meeting endorsed the transition 
of AMIS to a UN operation "in principle."  As a member of 
both the AU and the UN, and as a troop-contributing country, 
South Africa sees "no inherent contradiction" between the two 
organizations, but recognizes that consultations are required 
to address outstanding "modalities."  Amb. Sangqu said South 
Africa appreciates the role the United States is playing in 
Sudan, but asked that the USG consider whether it could "open 
the door" for further engagement and consultations.  Amb. 
Sangqu's remarks echo those of other PSC members that suggest 
that a decision on AMIS transition to a UN operation may not 
be finalized by March 10.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Charge, accompanied by deputy pol/econ counselor, 
presented ref A points on March 9 to South African PermRep to 
the African Union Amb. Baso Sangqu and First Secretary for 
Peace and Security Fefe Dwabayo.  Charge highlighted the need 
for a clear decision to be made on the future of the AU 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) at the March 10 AU Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) meeting, as AMIS had been originally envisioned 
as a rapid reaction force, not a long-term peace-keeping 
operation.  It was important for transition to occur 
expediently, before the situation in Darfur deteriorated 
further; while the USG recognized the accomplishments of 
AMIS, a more experienced peace-keeping operation with a 
stronger mandate was needed.  Such a force could even assist 
the GNU address false accusations of culpability for attacks. 
 While Sudan had expressed reservations about UN and NATO 
forces, both were already playing a role in Sudan, e.g., 
providing training and airlift.  Charge noted that the USG 
sought to ensure that the mission retain its African 
character, and did not oppose having the mission be led by an 
African force commander.  Defining an "end state" for AMIS 
would also enhance the ability of the United States to fund 
AMIS, she added. 
 
¶3. (C) South Africa was approaching the March 10 PSC meeting 
with "a high sense of responsibility," Amb. Sangqu said. 
Foreign Minister Zuma would lead South Africa's delegation, 
as President Mbeki was in Portugal.  Amb. Sangqu said he had 
met on the previous day with Ethiopian MFA Africa Affairs 
Director Amb. Konjit, and earlier in the day with Sudan's 
charge.  The January 12 PSC had discussed strengths and 
weaknesses of AMIS outlined by the Joint Assessment team, and 
had asked the AU to contact the UN to work out the 
appropriate "modalities" for transition.  There was consensus 
that transition would require nine months, but further 
discussions were needed to work out such modalities, Sangqu 
said.  No decision had been made yet on whether a 
strengthened mission should be mandated under Chapter VI or 
VII (peace-keeping vs. peace enforcement) of the UN Charter, 
he said.  The AU Permanent Representatives Committee had 
wisely recommended the such decisions be made at the 
ministerial level, he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
"NO INHERENT CONTRADICTION" BETWEEN AU AND UN 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) As a member of both the AU and the UN, South Africa 
saw "no inherent contradiction" between the two 
organizations, but believed that the (African) "character of 
the force must be maintained."  Citing the example of AMIB's 
transition to ONUB in Burundi, Sangqu said that South Africa 
did not view the UN taking over from AMIS as a "failure for 
Africa," but recognized the need to manage the political 
nature of such a transition.  He noted that a UN team had met 
with AU Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit and 
representatives of troop-contributing countries (including 
South Africa).  A UN delegation had also traveled to South 
Africa, making it "clear that the UN wants to move in this 
direction."  Noting that he had been involved in drafting the 
communique issued at the January 12 PSC, which had expressed 
support "in principle" for a transition from AMIS to a UN 
operation, Amb. Sangqu underscored the importance of properly 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000703  002 OF 002 
 
 
"formulating" any decision issued by the PSC. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
APPEAL FOR USG TO "OPEN DOOR" FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶5. (C) South Africa recognized the importance of donor views, 
especially since "major resources" for AMIS came from outside 
Africa.  On the other hand, one needed to contribute to a 
positive solution, not advocate "hard-core positions."  "The 
long and short of it is that it is very difficult to say what 
will be the outcome of the meeting," Amb. Sangqu said.  While 
South Africa appreciated the role the United States had 
played in raising the international profile of the situation 
in Sudan, the United States needed to "open the door for 
further engagement" and recognize "realities on the ground," 
Amb. Sangqu said.  He explained that South Africa was "not 
necessarily tied" to March 10 "as an end date," and that 
additional consultations for one to two weeks may be 
required.  He stressed the importance of including Sudan as a 
partner, rather than an opponent, in the process:  "We would 
not wish to leave out Sudan in a solution, so it may take 
time."  Timeliness depended on how fast the AU could resolve 
such issues, he said.  Sangqu questioned what the United 
States would do if no clear decision were reached on March 
¶10.  Charge responded that as the USG was committed to 
finding a solution and to protecting the people of Darfur, it 
sought an expedient decision. 
 
¶6. (C) Noting that the Abuja peace talks had "not yielded 
satisfactory results," Amb. Sangqu said that Sudan's charge 
had earlier raised the GNU's concern that the Abuja talks not 
be jeopardized.  According to Sudan, he said, rebels had 
taken a "lackluster stance," awaiting the arrival of a new 
international force. 
 
¶7. (C) In a separate meeting on March 9 with Charge, UK DCM 
observed that the UK had identified South Africa as a key 
player in the AMIS re-hat decision and that London had been 
advised to contact South African FM Zuma. 
WILGUS