VZCZCXYZ0012
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #0615/01 0601054
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011054Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9347
INFO RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0877

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 000615 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016 
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT:  DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TEKEDA ASKS FOR 
CONSULTATION PRIOR TO EEBC 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 542 
 
     ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 385 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON.  REASON: 1.4 (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.  Ethiopia's State Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Tekeda and Charge had a good exchange on 
the question of Ethiopia's attendance at the March 10 EEBC 
meeting with Tekeda promising to consider responding 
favorably to the EEBC invitation but with a caveat that the 
final decision would be made after consultations with 
Washington.   Tekeda asked that DAS Yamamoto or AS Frazer 
visit prior to the EEBC and lay out a more detailed road map. 
 Tekeda accepted Charge's assurances that we understood and 
intended to meet Prime Minister Meles' three bottom lines, 
namely:  technical discussion on border demarcation; 
facilitation by General Fulford; and a dialogue on 
normalization of relations.  Charge argued that Ethiopia 
should attend the EEBC because there the demarcation 
discussions would be decided in accordance with international 
practice, e.g. Nigeria/Cameroon and Fulford would become the 
facilitator.  We could not provide guarantees on a dialogue 
on normalization, but our full intention was to ensure that 
these talks occurred before final demarcation in order to 
ensure a lasting peace.  Although Tekeda raised first the 
condition that Eritrea allow UNMEE to return to full 
operations, Charge stated that this was not a precondition. 
The UNMEE issue would be addressed in the context of the EEBC 
meeting.  Tekeda reviewed the history of the issue in detail. 
 His major concern is that the USG might not have the process 
fully crafted and therefore there is room for failure, and 
worse the possiblity of putting Meles and Ethiopia in an 
untenable position.  A visit by Yamamoto or Frazer is needed 
to reassure Meles and to demonstrate USG good will and 
commitment.  A phone conversation between Meles and Dr. 
Frazer might suffice also. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) On February 28, Charge and deputy pol/econ counselor 
met with Ethiopian State Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. 
Tekeda Alemu.  Advisor to the State Minister Gerehiwot Redai, 
Acting Director General for Europe and North America Girum 
Abay (ambassador-designate to Italy), and Counselor for 
Europe and America Ayalew Mamo, accompanied Minister Tekeda. 
 
--------------------- 
TEKEDA MAKES HIS CASE 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) "We are not nervous; we are confused," he said. 
Tekeda asserted that the current crisis had begun with 
Eritrea's "heightening" of tensions, leading to the passage 
of UNSCR 1640.  Ethiopia had pursued a "rational response" by 
"immediately" withdrawing its troops away from the border to 
December 2004 positions, whereas Eritrea "took additional 
steps and defied" the resolution.  "Any logical person would 
have expected steps to be taken against Eritrea," he said, as 
it was "absolutely clear which party did not comply."  The 
USG's call to wait one month prior to making any changes to 
the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and 
Eritrea (UNMEE), while the United States sought to address 
the impasse between Ethiopia and Eritrea, was "a relief," he 
said, as UNSC members did not know how to respond to 
Eritrea's violations.  A request for the GOE to issue 
permanent identification to 70-80 UNMEE staff members (who 
had been expelled from Eritrea to Ethiopia) underscored 
Eritrea's continued violation of the cease-fire agreement, he 
said, adding that the GOE was concerned that issuing such 
identification would be tacit recognition of "a fait 
accompli."  Such violations were "a gun pointed at our head 
by Eritrea; that's where the confusion comes from." 
 
¶4. (C) Continued Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE posed a 
possible obstacle to Ethiopia's attendance of the next 
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC), Tekeda said: 
"Honestly speaking, it would be very difficult for us to go 
while the cease-fire agreement is in tatters."  He noted that 
UNMEE was supposed to assist in demarcation, and that the two 
Algiers accords included one on the boundary, and another on 
the cease-fire.  While UNSCR 1640 was supposed to "restore" 
the inviolability of the Temporary Security Zone, "there is 
no indication" that Eritrea intends to reverse its 
restrictions on UNMEE.  Eritrea was getting assurances that 
it could continue to violate international agreements, he 
said, as it was "being rewarded" for "insulting" the 
international community and the UN SYG.  "Ethiopia will not 
move unless we see some indication that Eritrea will move 
away from the precipice," Tekeda said.  Tekeda expressed 
concern about the GSE's February 27 public statement.  (NOTE: 
the Eritrean MFA statement at www.shabait.com states, inter 
 
alia, that Eritrea "does not recognize or accept" 
"deviations" from the EEBC's "final and binding" decision. 
END NOTE.)  Citing the February 22 Witnesses' statement, 
Tekeda said that Ethiopia wanted to see concrete actions from 
Eritrea to reverse restrictions on UNMEE, Tekeda said. 
Charge responded that as much as the United States desired 
this as well, this had never been a precondition to 
participation in the EEBC, nor had it ever been raised by the 
Prime Minister in previous discussions. 
 
¶5. (C)  Turning to a more serious concern, Tekeda recalled 
that rather than provide the USG with a memorandum on its 
views of the border, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had raised 
Ethiopia's concern with A/S Frazer on January 20 (ref B) that 
there was "absolutely no way the boundary commission can take 
the lead" in addressing the disposition of disputed areas. 
Instead, "the lead of the parties must be fulfilled," which 
could only be done through dialogue.  Tekeda agreed that 
"technical discussions" could replace the GOE's insistence on 
"dialogue," if it meant that both parties were meeting and 
exchanging views.  Demarcation and normalization of relations 
"must go hand in hand," he said. 
 
¶6. (C) Ethiopia needed assurances from the USG that the EEBC 
would conform to Ethiopia's redlines, Tekeda said, 
particularly as the peace process was now "completely in your 
hands."  "We are absolutely beholden to you, so we must be 
clear where we are heading," he said.  Tekeda noted that 
prior to the February 22 meeting of the Witnesses to the 2000 
Algiers accord, the GOE was concerned that "it might not be 
in line with what we were hoping for."  Indeed, he added, the 
first draft of the February 22 Witnesses' statement was 
"awful":  "We came across it, and we were disappointed." 
Saying that the level of trust between Ethiopia and the EEBC 
was "extremely, extremely low," Tekeda complained that the 
GOE had received an invitation to attend the March 10 EEBC 
meeting even before the Witnesses had convened on February 
22, and that the EEBC was demanding a reply within 5 days, at 
the same time that Eritrea continued to violate the Algiers 
accord.  (NOTE: The EEBC's invitation to FM Seyoum, dated 
February 24, requests that parties reply by March 2.  END 
NOTE.)  Charge explained that the deadline was driven by the 
UNSCR convening to assess progress in response to UNSCR 1640 
on March 15. 
 
--------------------- 
CHARGE MAKES THE CASE 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Charge responded that the Prime Minister had told Dr. 
Frazer that the primary issue was not the demarcation of the 
border but the overall peace settlement.  Unfortunately, to 
some degree this was the perception that much of the 
international community had held until recently.  For this 
reason some had considered Ethiopia as going beyond final and 
binding delimitation and demarcation by calling for 
normalization of relations that was not contained in the 
Algiers Agreement.  Now, however, Ethiopia had taken a number 
of steps that were causing the "tide to change".  Foremost 
among these steps was the decision to drop the words "in 
principle" when referring to final and binding, the 
redeployment of troops in response to UN Resolution 1640, and 
the facilitation of Dr. Frazer's visit to the border.  Now, 
all that was needed to change perceptions was for Ethiopia to 
attend the EEBC.   Although the date might seem early, there 
needed to be concrete progress prior to the March 15 date for 
consideration by the UNSC of next steps on the border. 
 
¶8. (C) Charge explained that the USG is well aware of 
Ethiopia's bottom lines which are:  technical discussions 
(Meles refers to these talks as dialogue but that is 
confusing as what is meant is technical discussions); the 
facilitation of General Fulford; and a dialogue on 
normalization.  Like Ethiopia our objective was a lasting 
peace.   On the first bottom line issue: there will be 
"technical discussions".  It is our intention to proceed in 
accordance with international practice, as PM Meles had 
recommended.  We were specifically looking at border 
resolutions for Israel/Jordan and Nigeria/Cameroon, the later 
which the PM himself had noted.  In addition, we had a CD-ROM 
that indicated where the delimited border divided houses and 
towns; surely this condition must be addressed to ensure a 
lasting peace.  In our view, discussions should begin in the 
eastern sector of the border, where delimitation divided more 
than 30 villages; resolving this would certainly require 
discussions.  On the second bottom line:  General Fulford 
would be the facilitator, thereby addressing the Ethiopian 
concern that the President of the EEBC was biased.  However, 
it is our opinion that he is not biased and truly wants to 
 
resolve this issue as a legacy for his life's work.  On the 
third bottom line issue:  We do not have guarantees on a 
normalization dialogue, but we clearly understand that these 
talks must take place if there is to be a lasting peace.  The 
Prime Minister had agreed that normalization was not in the 
Algiers Accord but rather had been an idea that had in the 
end not become a reality.  The basic issue then was timing on 
the normalization dialogue that would need getting agreement 
from Isaias.  We understood Ethiopia's position that dialogue 
would have to take place before final demarcation. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
FURTHER BILATERAL CONSULTATION WITH USG NEEDED PRIOR TO EEBC 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Minister Tekeda expressed the GOE's strong desire to 
hold discussions with a senior USG principal as a condition 
to attending the EEBC.  Hailing A/S Frazer's January 20 
meeting with Prime Minister Meles, Tekeda asserted that the 
only subsequent meeting to discuss such issues had been DAS 
Yamamoto's recent meeting with Ethiopian Ambassador Kassahun 
Ayele.  "It would be difficult for Ethiopia to go to London" 
without being clear about the roadmap that would reassure 
them that the USG could resolve the border issue and not 
return it to "square zero".   Charge suggested that the GOE 
could respond favorably to the EEBC's invitation, but note 
that its final decision would depend on "pre-discussions" 
with Washington.   This would allow the GOE to remain a good 
partner in this effort.  Tekeda responded that "this is 
something we can look at," and acknowledged the utility of 
such an "ad referendum" acceptance to attend the next EEBC 
meeting.  Still Washington should be aware that Meles was 
under enormous pressure to ensure that Ethiopia got an 
equitable solution.  Tekeda concluded by noting that as Meles 
had told A/S Frazer, and as reiterated in its February 17 
memorandum to the USG (faxed to AF/E; text follows below), 
Ethiopia will "go the extra mile, but there are some things 
that cannot be overlooked."  Tekeda said that the GOE would 
make no judgment now on EEBC attendance, and would have to 
consult with Prime Minister Meles.  As the border was an 
issue over which thousands had died, Ethiopia had to proceed 
carefully, he said. 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT:  The meeting -- like that of February 22 -- 
was open and cordial.  By the end Tekeda felt somewhat 
reassured, but his bottom line is a visit from DAS Yamamoto 
or Frazer to provide a more detained road map.  This seems 
reasonable to us, and it is unlikely that Ethiopia will 
attend without a final reassurance.  END COMMENT. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
TEXT OF FEBRUARY 17 MEMORANDUM TO THE USG 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) BEGIN TEXT. 
 
ETHIOPIA'S MEMORANDUM ON THE ALGIERS WITNESSES' PEACE 
INITIATIVE 
 
Ethiopia understands that the Witnesses to the Algiers 
agreement will meet soon in support of the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
peace process and the peace initiative currently spearheaded 
by the US.  Ethiopia also understands that the Witnesses will 
issue a public statement regarding this initiative.  In order 
to maximize the initiative's chances of success, Ethiopia 
considers it important that the following points be taken 
into account concerning the Witnesses' meeting and statement: 
 
¶1.  The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia has its origins 
in Eritrea's bellicose behaviour and its unprovoked 
aggression of Ethiopia in 1998.  This central fact has been a 
matter of common knowledge since the very beginning.  This 
common knowledge has been legally re-affirmed by the Decision 
of the Claims Commission that Eritrea started the two year 
armed conflict with Ethiopia in 1998 by invading Badme and 
other areas of Ethiopia, without provocation, in violation of 
Chapter 2(4) of the UN Charter.  Eritrea's claim that it 
acted to restore control over what it considers sovereign 
territory occupied by Ethiopia was dismissed by the Claims 
Commission which reiterated the fundamental principle of 
international law that a sovereign may not settle territorial 
claims through the threat or use of force. 
 
In recent years Eritrea has used the same spurious argument 
that it used to start the war in 1998 and has been 
threatening again the use of force to settle the border 
dispute.  Ethiopia has rejected such a flagrant violation of 
the principle of international law in 1998, and continues to 
do so now.  The key to the dispute has therefore been and 
 
continues to be Eritrea's bellicose attitude to resolving 
border disputes.  Any attempt to resolve the dispute which 
does not address the central cause of the dispute which is 
Eritrea's past and present actions of resolving border 
disputes through the use or threat of force would, in 
Ethiopia's view, be misguided and unlikely to achieve 
sustainable peace in the region. 
 
¶2.  Ethiopia has stated that the Boundary Commission's 
delimitation decision are in part flawed.  It has 
nevertheless repeatedly declared its acceptance of the flawed 
delimitation decision.  Ethiopia has called for dialogue to 
implement those decisions in a manner that addresses the 
anomalies and impracticalities of the delimitation decision, 
consistent with the object and purpose of the Algiers 
Agreements which is sustainable peace.  Ethiopia's call for 
dialogue is consistent with the principles of international 
law and established practice.  One only needs to refer to the 
dialogue between Nigeria and Cameroon to indicate that 
Ethiopia's call for dialogue on the implementation of the 
Boundary Commission's decision is consistent with the 
principles of international law and established practice. 
 
Eritrea cannot use Ethiopia's call for dialogue as an excuse 
for resorting to its bellicose stance.  In calling for 
dialogue Ethiopia has done nothing that is contrary to the 
principles of international law or established international 
practice.  Ethiopia has been and will continue to be part of 
the solution not part of the problem.  Eritrea's bellicose 
stance has been and continues to be the source of the 
problem. 
 
¶3.  Ethiopia understands that the objective of the initiative 
is to achieve the object and purpose of the Algiers agreement 
- sustainable peace and stability between the parties.  This 
can only be accomplished when Eritrea's threats and use of 
force is replaced by peaceful, normal relation.  If the 
problem is to be addressed at its roots Eritrea must cease 
and desist from the use and threat of force and engage 
Ethiopia in dialogue to implement the Boundary Commission's 
decision and to normalize relations between the two countries. 
 
¶4.  Ethiopia understands that the Witnesses' initiative will 
call for two forums to address the ongoing disputes between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea.  The first forum would focus on 
achieving normalization of relations, and the second on 
demarcation of the border.  Here, what is most vital for 
Ethiopia is that the resulting normalization and demarcation 
be consistent with the agreement's object and purpose which 
is sustainable peace between the parties.  Ethiopia is 
prepared to go the extra mile in order to achieve sustainable 
peace. 
 
¶5.  In order for demarcation of the border to commence under 
the second forum, it is essential that Eritrea make a firm 
commitment to participate in good faith in the forum on 
normalization.  Demarcation and normalization have to go 
hand-in-hand if we are to achieve sustainable peace. 
 
¶6.  Ethiopia understands that the forum on demarcation will 
be under the auspices of the Boundary Commission and with the 
good offices of General Fulford.  Ethiopia believes that the 
Boundary Commission should be responsible for implementing 
the delimitation decision with respect to those areas of the 
boundary identified by the parties as no longer in dispute. 
Demarcation of these areas could commence expeditiously. 
With respect to the areas in dispute, the parties should 
determine the proper implementation of the delimitation 
decision through dialogue, with the mediation of General 
Fulford.  Resolution of areas in dispute should be the 
product of the agreement of the parties.  Once resolved, 
demarcation of these areas could commence expeditiously. 
 
¶7.  The Boundary Commission's field staff, under the 
supervision of the Boundary Commission's advisor, Mr. 
Robertson, would work under the direction of the Commission 
to complete the actual demarcation of areas no longer in 
dispute.  The field staff would also be available to work 
with General Fulford to conduct fieldwork that would be 
beneficial to the parties in resolving the areas in dispute. 
 
¶8.  Ethiopia strongly believes that it is Eritrea's 
belligerent position which is at the root of the problem and 
that in requesting dialogue on demarcation and normalization, 
Ethiopia is not seeking any favours.  It is simply requesting 
what is the internationally established practice for 
resolving border disputes.  While Ethiopia is prepared to go 
the extra mile to achieve sustainable peace, it cannot go 
forward with an initiative which places the decision making 
 
authority for implementing the delimitation decision 
regarding areas in dispute with the Boundary Commission or 
that does not include good faith dialogue to resolve 
outstanding disputes and achieve normalization.  If Eritrea 
is not committed to these principles, then Ethiopia can only 
conclude that Eritrea is not serious about restoring peace. 
 
Ethiopia is willing to cooperate with the Witnesses.  Despite 
Eritrea's egregious behaviour, it is willing to work toward a 
peaceful resolution of its dispute with Eritrea, and Ethiopia 
cannot give in to demands of an aggressor nation which has 
not yet accepted that dialogue is the only means of resolving 
border disputes.  Ethiopia cannot therefore be expected to go 
beyond the initiative as understood above. 
 
¶12.  (U) END TEXT. 
HUDDLESTON