VZCZCXRO5853
OO RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #0933/01 0701759
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111759Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3894
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0461
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 5897
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0115
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000933 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2021 
TAGS: PREL EINV PNUC PTER IR IQ IS AE
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER MBR TELLS AMBASSADOR "DUBAI PORTS 
WORLD WILL NOT AFFECT OUR RELATIONSHIP" 
 
REF: ABU DHABI 850 (NOTAL) 
 
ABU DHABI 00000933  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b and d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, UAE Vice 
President/Prime Minister and Dubai Ruler, told Ambassador and 
CG Dubai March 11 that the recent furor related to Dubai 
Ports World "will not affect our relationship at all."  The 
U.S.-UAE relationship was excellent in all fields -- 
military, business, intelligence cooperation -- and "nothing 
is going to change that," MBR emphasized.  He also provided a 
readout on his recent meeting with visiting Iranian deputy FM 
Mostafavi, who had warned that Iran would not give up its 
"peaceful" nuclear program, and would "damage a lot of 
places" if it was "hit."  Expressing surprise at the Iranian 
president's speech several months ago about "wiping out" 
Israel, MBR noted that Israeli delegations, including a 
recent one from the Israel MFA, visit Dubai regularly. 
Following the meeting, DPW Executive Chairman Sultan bin 
Sulayim told Ambassador and CG that DPW intends to divest 
itself fully of P&O's North American operations, possibly a 
"long process."  Sulayim said he was hesitant to state that 
publicly out of fear it could lead to pressure for an 
immediate sale. In the short term, DPW would look for an 
American company to which it could transfer control of 
day-to-day operations (para 9). End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The office of UAE Prime Minister/Vice President (and 
Ruler of Dubai) Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid (MBR) contacted 
ConGen Dubai March 11 afternoon to request an urgent meeting 
with Ambassador.  Ambassador opened the 1630 meeting by 
expressing appreciation for MBR's reference to the "strong 
relationship" with the U.S. in announcing the DPW would 
transfer control of P&O's North American operations to a U.S. 
entity. (Prior to MBR's entering the room, his staff had 
advised Ambassador and CG Dubai that it was MBR himself who 
had penned those words.)  Nodding, MBR told the Ambassador 
that for his part, he greatly appreciated President Bush's 
statement that "the UAE is our ally."  MBR advisors Sultan 
bin Sulayim (DPW), Mohammed Gergawi (UAE Minister of State 
for Cabinet Affairs adn Chairman, Dubai Holdings), and SSO 
Director Al-Qemzi also attended. 
 
Military, Intel, Business Relationship Unchanged 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3. (C) MBR said he had asked to meet the Ambassador in order 
to "tell you that this (DPW) will not affect our relationship 
at all -- everything is going to remain the same."  The 
decision to back down on DPW's bid to run U.S. ports had been 
taken "in order to save the (U.S.) President from 
embarrassment, and because of the strong partnership." 
Turning to his State Security Director Mohammed Al-Qemzi, MBR 
asked in Arabic: "How are things with the Americans?"  Qemzi 
said, "Cooperation is excellent and detailed a recent 
interdiction effort and joint counterproliferation task force 
meeting." MBR welcomed the news. 
 
¶4. (C) Later in the conversation, MBR reiterated that "we 
have a good relationship, and nothing is going to change 
that."  Ambassador replied "That has been my message back to 
Washington, that U.S.-UAE bilateral cooperation is not a 
relationship that would be challenged by one transaction -- 
we know that nothing will change at Jebel Ali for the U.S. 
Navy or Al Dhafra for the U.S. Air Force; we are in this 
partnership for the long term.  We couldn't ask for a better 
ally in our regional stability or counterterror efforts." 
Agreeing enthusiastically, MBR (who also holds the title of 
UAE Minister of Defense) added "nothing will change on other 
levels, either -- the business, airplanes, engines, weapons 
-- everything should stay the same."  He added that the UAE 
wants "to set ourselves as an example" to other countries in 
the region. 
 
Iran's Nuclear Program 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) MBR said that in his March 6 meeting with Iran's 
visiting Deputy FM Mostafavi (reftel), Mostafavi had brought 
a letter "claiming that the Bushehr reactor was not a threat" 
because it was based on "first German, and now Russian" 
technology and was therefore safe enough to be located "in a 
European city."  The Iranians had said they were "not going 
 
ABU DHABI 00000933  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
to give up, but were going ahead with their nuclear program 
for peaceful purposes."  They ("just like Secretary Rice") 
had predicted that the UN would split, with Russia or China 
not backing the U.S.; in any event, the Iranians argued, the 
world could not boycott Iran because doing so would "cause 
the price of oil to shoot up."  Mostafavi had expressed 
concern that "the U.S. would get Israel to hit Iran," and had 
threatened that "if they hit us, we will damage a lot of 
places." MBR said he had told them they should back down, and 
that "if you hit anyone else, you yourself will be gone." 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador told MBR that "we do have serious concerns 
in Iran, as the Secretary outlined to you during her February 
23 visit, and there is growing international concern over 
Tehran's nuclear ambitions." The Iranians needed see the 
weight of the international community; the pressure was not 
coming from just one or two countries. MBR said, "We do not 
want Iran to have a nuclear program, and we do not want you 
to fight them, because we would be affected." 
 
Solidly With The U.S. 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) MBR intimated that the Iranians were "crazy" for 
saying that Israel must be wiped out at "at a time like this, 
when all the Arabs, including the Palestinians, agree that 
there must be peace with Israel."  MBR noted that Israeli 
delegations came to Dubai regularly, that a delegation from 
the Israeli MFA had just been to see DPW Executive Chairman 
Sultan bin Sulayim a few days ago. 
 
¶8. (C) Reiterating that "we believe in the relationship, with 
the U.S., and want it to be stronger than ever," MBR 
recounted some of the UAE's own experience with terror 
attacks, mostly from the early 1970's, including the 
assassination of the UAE Foreign Minister at the Abu Dhabi 
airport, and the hijacking of a Japanese airliner in Dubai, 
which MBR himself (as Minister of Defense) had been involved 
in handling.  SSD Chief Al-Qemzi summed up by noting that "we 
also are victims of terrorism, and we are still solidly with 
you; no one is immune, but we are doing our best to make 
Dubai a safe place." 
 
Dubai Ports World 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Although MbR noted during the meeting that DPW was 
working with Treasury to implement the transfer decision, he 
offered no details.  In subsequent phone conversations with 
CG and Ambassador, DPW's Sultan bin Sulayim clarified that 
DPW's "intent is full divestiture." DPW would find potential 
buyers for its North American operations, and would then 
consult with Congress as to which ones might be acceptable. 
That could be a "long process," however; so in the short term 
DPW was looking for an American company to which it could 
transfer control of day-to-day operations. (Congress would be 
consulted on that, too, he said.) "We do not want to be 
forced to sell in a hurried or stressful way," Sulayim 
emphasized.  The danger, as he saw it, was that a public 
declaration could lead to pressure to "sell immediately." 
That would not be acceptable to DPW, Sulayim declared. 
SISON