This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS ZAGREB 000145 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/FPP AND CA/VO/F/P 
DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO KCC 
VIENNA ALSO FOR DHS/BICE 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC HR
SUBJECT: ZAGREB QUARTERLY FRAUD SUMMARY  FIRST 
QUARTER FY2006 
 
REF: (A) ZAGREB 105  (B) ZAGREB 129 
 
COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
------------------ 
 
¶1.   Bolstered by reforms in preparation for EU 
membership and the official start of EU accession 
talks in October 2005, Croatia's economy is steadily 
improving, unemployment rates are gradually 
declining, and fewer and fewer Croatians need to 
resort to fraud or malfeasance to travel abroad. 
Development has been lopsided, with larger urban 
areas and Istria receiving a disproportionate share 
of economic gains.  Croatia's geographic position 
between the European Union and the transition 
countries of Southeastern Europe does, however, make 
it an attractive transit point for people, drugs, 
arms, and money.  Corruption is perceived as 
widespread and often whom you know still trumps what 
you know.  Reports of fraudulent Croatian passports 
surfaced in two high-profile cases in 2005; however, 
counterfeit identity documents are virtually never 
seen at the consular window.  What little fraud 
Embassy Zagreb sees is often motivated more by 
convenience than genuine malfeasance. 
 
NIV FRAUD (BY CATEGORY) 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  NIV fraud in Zagreb is low.  While outright fake 
documents are essentially non-existent, a large gray 
economy leads some B1/B2 applicants to submit job 
letters from immediate relatives or friends or, less 
often, themselves.  Fake job letters are easy to spot 
and quickly confirmed by inconsistencies in an 
interview.  Some employment-based fraud is also 
motivated by convenience; for example, two fashion 
models working in the United States who should be 
classified as H-1B submitted B1/B2 applications and, 
though well-coached, admitted in interviews that they 
were aware they needed H-1B visas but that the H-1B 
quota had already been met for FY06.  Some J-1 
applicants present approved DS-2019 forms for 18- 
month "management training" programs that often 
involve nothing more than serving food in an 
amusement park or cleaning rooms in a hotel. 
Applicants and U.S. sponsors alike know H-2Bs are 
numerically controlled and J-1s are not. 
 
¶3.  As a large C1/D issuing post, Embassy Zagreb's 
anti-fraud unit has cultivated good relations with 
local agents of large shipping companies and can 
easily confirm the authenticity of most sailors' 
employment contracts.  Employment contracts for 
sailors on private yachts or employed by agents 
outside of Croatia sometimes require more detailed 
anti-fraud investigations. 
 
¶4.  Post recently uncovered an L/B1 visa fraud ring 
in which a Croatian-Australian dual national 
recruited laborers from Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Poland for floor installation work 
in Fayetteville, GA (ref A). 
 
¶5.  Zagreb sees isolated incidents of R-1 visa fraud. 
In one instance, a part-time yoga instructor sought 
to qualify as a religious worker though not even a 
member of the religious organization; in another, a 
college student and web designer sought an R-1 visa 
for religious education in Hawaii because his 
theological school was unable to obtain accreditation 
to file I-20 applications. 
 
¶6.  Zagreb also sees modest numbers of B-1/B-2 
applicants sponsored by Croatian-American churches 
chiefly in Pittsburgh, PA and Chicago, IL who should 
be classified as P-3; often, professional musicians 
will seek to circumvent the petition process by 
applying for B1/B2 visas. 
 
¶7.  Applicants who submit obviously fake employment 
letters are generally refused under 214(b). 
Applicants who seek to circumvent the petition 
processes for H or P visas are often refused under 
221(g) pending the appropriate petition.  A recent 
B1/B2 validation study showed less than a one percent 
overstay rate (ref B). 
 
 IV FRAUD 
--------- 
 
¶8.  Embassy Zagreb is an IV processing post for 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The 
majority of Zagreb's IV workflow (60%) involves 
applicants from Bosnia.  The overwhelming majority of 
IV cases involve immediate relative petitions, 
approximately evenly split between IR-5 and CR-1/IR-1 
cases. In a typical IR-5 scenario, a Bosnian national 
who was admitted to the United States as a refugee in 
the late 1990s and naturalized in 2005 petitions for 
his or her parents.  Post is not aware of a single 
fraud case involving an IR-5 applicant. 
 
¶9.  Marriage fraud is likewise uncommon.  Most CR-1 
and IR-1 beneficiaries are female.  Our standard CR-1 
case is a Bosnian or Croatian national who immigrated 
to the United States in the mid- to late-1990s, 
established himself financially, and then returned to 
Bosnia or Croatia to find a spouse.  CR-1 
beneficiaries often do not know their spouses well 
and have seldom met them more than once or twice 
before marrying.  Often the couple's families, who 
frequently come from the same town or village, 
orchestrate the marriage.  CR-1 or IR-1 cases that 
deviate from this general narrative may prompt Post 
fraud investigations.  In one example, a former F-1 
applied as a CR-1 and told an officer that Post 
"forced" him to marry because that year's H-1B quota 
had already been filled and the applicant thought he 
could accept employment through an IV application. 
 
¶10.  Post processes very few employment-based IV 
cases and sees almost no employment-based IV fraud. 
One pending E-3 case concerns a restaurant in 
Massachusetts that appears to be recruiting cheap 
(and unqualified) labor from the former Yugoslavia. 
 
 DV FRAUD 
--------- 
 
 ¶11.  Post has not encountered any significant DV 
fraud. 
 
ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD 
---------------------- 
 
¶12.  Nothing to report. 
 
ADOPTION FRAUD 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13.  Croatian law severely restricts foreigners' 
ability to adopt in Croatia, requiring at least one 
parent to have Croatian citizenship.  Post sees 
approximately one or two adoption cases a year. 
 
 ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14.  Post processes approximately three Visas 92 and 
93 cases a year and has not encountered any 
significant fraud. 
 
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶15.   Embassy Zagreb continues to enjoy productive 
relations with key GOC officials in the Ministry of 
the Interior, police departments, customs, and border 
police.  The Croatian authorities take document fraud 
seriously.  Post's anti-fraud unit, through RSO 
channels, enjoys a strong working relationship with 
local law enforcement.  In November 2005, Post's FPM 
and anti-fraud FSN visited the busy Bregana border 
crossing between Croatia and Slovenia. Bregana is 
Croatia's biggest border with 3000 crossings daily. 
Post also has good relations with the Zagreb airport 
staff, who assist not only in cases of fraud or male 
fide travel but also emergency ACS work as well. 
 
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERNS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶16.  Post has started to discuss trafficking in 
persons with certain visa applicants at the window to 
raise awareness and encourage travelers to register 
with a Croatian Embassy or Consulate in the United 
States. 
 
STAFFING AND TRAINING 
--------------------- 
 
¶17.  Embassy Zagreb's anti-fraud unit consists of one 
officer FPM and one LES assistant.  The officer, one 
of three in the section, spends approximately 25 
percent of his time on anti-fraud work.  The LES 
assistant also does a full range of NIV processing 
and spends approximately 50 percent of her time on 
anti-fraud.  Both the FPM and LES assistant attended 
a regional anti-fraud conference hosted by U.S. 
Embassy Athens in 2005.  Post intends to nominate the 
LES anti-fraud assistant for an EUR anti-fraud FSN 
workshop in 2007. 
FRANK