This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000189 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SNEC, EUR/CACEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AJ AM
SUBJECT: ARMENIAN BODY POLITIC: FEARING A DEAL ON N-K 
 
REF: 05 YEREVAN 583 
 
Classified By: Amb. John M. Evans for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) Despite the fact that only a handful of people in the 
GOAM have any concrete information about the state of the 
discussions on Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K), the Armenian political 
class is clearly concerned that a deal might well be in the 
works.  In contrast to senior government officials' public 
efforts to lay the groundwork for a potential settlement, 
opposition politicians, think-tankers and intelligentsia, as 
well as various N-K representatives have markedly increased 
the negative tenor of the rhetoric surrounding a possible 
settlement recently.  End Summary. 
 
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MINISTER OF DEFENSE LAYS THE GROUND FOR COMPROMISE 
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¶2. (C) In a series of public statements, including a long 
interview with the Russian-language "Golos Armenii," Minister 
of Defense Serzh Sargsian clearly underlined the need to 
compromise.  He commented, "The idea of giving up land is not 
dear to me, but peace is expensive."  Although he continued 
to note that Armenia was not placing all its hopes in a 
peaceful solution to the conflict, the overall tone of 
Sargsian's comments was clearly aimed at preparing the 
Armenian public for the possibility of a settlement, and for 
the necessity of compromise in order to achieve peace. 
(Note:  Since his first use of the word "concessions" during 
National Assembly hearings on N-K in March 2005, Sargsian has 
consistently sounded moderate, even conciliatory, notes in 
his public comments on the issue.  End Note.) 
 
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OPPOSITION MAY NOT BE WILLING TO SIGN ON 
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¶3. (C) Although in one-on-one conversations the opposition 
leaders we've met have all said that they would support, or 
at least not impede, a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict even if it meant supporting President Kocharian (and 
the only thing that unifies the various factions of the 
opposition is an almost visceral hatred of Kocharian), in 
public they've been much less temperate.  Member of the 
National Assembly and leader of the Democratic Party Aram G. 
Sargsian (not to be confused with Republic Party leader Aram 
¶Z. Sargsian) has called any settlement that might involve the 
deployment of peacekeepers "treason" because, he insists, the 
"deployment of peacekeepers presumes NATO forces" which would 
harm Armenia's interests with Iran and would harm Armenia's 
relationship with Russia.  While other opposition leaders 
construct their public arguments with a somewhat larger nod 
to reason, they nonetheless argue that the current round of 
negotiations cannot be serious because Kocharian and his 
allies "could never negotiate seriously." 
 
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THINK-TANKERS AND N-K REPS OUT OF THE LOOP 
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¶4. (C) In a series of recent public seminars and symposia, 
organized by international NGOs as well as local Armenian 
groups, think-tankers and self-appointed members of the 
intelligentsia have bemoaned the fact that they are not an 
integral part of the process.  While it might be easy to 
trivialize some of their comments (including a long diatribe 
by one prominent university professor excoriating a report he 
subsequently admitted he hadn't actually read), the fact 
remains that Yerevan's political class is, for the most part, 
not invested in any resolution in which they have not been 
involved.  The same is largely true for representatives from 
Nagorno-Karabakh, who complain bitterly that they are not 
"party" to any discussions on their fate. 
 
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NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RELEASES ITS REPORT 
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¶5. (SBU) Nearly a year after the National Assembly hearings 
on Nagorno-Karabakh (reftel), the National Assembly issued 
its final report, clearly attempting to carve out a more 
significant role for itself in any possible upcoming 
resolution to the conflict.  The report put heavy emphasis on 
the issue of the status of N-K and on the principle of 
self-determination.  In particular, the report stipulated 
that "(the) status issue was and remains the main issue of 
the conflict, its main subject.  The status must express 
utmost correctly and completely the historic, legal and 
political realities of the problem and take into account the 
character and quality of relations existing between the 
conflicting sides." 
 
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COMMENT:  FEAR OF SUCCESS 
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¶6. (C) With the increasing public activity by both Presidents 
Kocharian and Aliyev, the Armenian public, while maintaining 
a definite cynicism about the possibility for resolving the 
conflict, is clearly nervous that the status quo might 
change.  Even among those people who are most likely to agree 
that Armenia can only "fulfill its destiny" once the conflict 
is resolved, the uncertain nature of a possible resolution 
has left many Armenians prefering the current situation over 
an uncertain future with "no guarantees." 
EVANS