VZCZCXRO3957
RR RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0112/01 0440049
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130049Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2379
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
INFO RUEHNZ/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND 0640
RUEHAP/AMEMBASSY APIA 0187

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 WELLINGTON 000112 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/ES-O/CMS/ EAP/EX AND EAP/ANP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CASC AMED KFLO AEMR
SUBJECT:  AVIAN INFLUENZA:  POST CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND TRIPWIRES 
 
REF: A) 05 STATE 219189; B) 05 Apia 00150 
 
WELLINGTON 00000112  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1.  In response to reftel, Embassy Country Team met to discuss New 
Zealand Government (GNZ) preparations against Avian Influenza 
pandemic. 
 
¶2.  Llywelyn Graeme will input tripwire data into the Tripwire 
Reporting and Integrated Planning System (TRIPS). 
 
¶3.  New Zealand's Ministry of Health (MOH) will take the lead if 
there is a pandemic in-country.  The MOH has a national pandemic 
plan, and District Health Boards have local plans.  An intersectoral 
group from other Government Ministries is considering non-health 
issues that are directly affected by a pandemic, such as potential 
school closures, border management, and the maintenance of critical 
infrastructure, including supply of food and water and law and 
order. 
 
The GNZ is considering setting a target of 3 weeks for persons to be 
reasonably (not completely) self-reliant during an advanced event or 
outbreak.  This 3-week period would be one in which persons made 
only limited trips to restock food items, water supplies and things 
of that nature -- i.e. not sustained social contact.  This target 
figure may change depending on New Zealand's ongoing assessment of 
risk and readiness. 
 
- New Zealand is not on the regular migratory pathways of any 
waterfowl.  The small number which do reach New Zealand mostly 
originate from southern Australia.  Other migratory birds visit 
estuaries along the Asian coastline, Philippines and Australia on 
their annual migrations south from arctic Russia.  However, they are 
not "waterfowl" and are not regarded as a high risk for introducing 
avian viruses into New Zealand.  The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry (MAF) is currently undertaking surveillance in wild birds 
to assess the influenza status of waterfowl and shore birds. 
 
- The New Zealand Government (GNZ) is following the advice of the 
WHO by stockpiling anti-viral medicine for use in a volume 
equivalent to approximately 20% of the population.  No decision on 
the best use of the stockpile will be made until the nature of the 
pandemic is known. 
 
The MOH has set up a Pandemic Influenza Technical Advisory Group 
which advises the Ministry on the international situation and 
provides recommendations on the appropriate nature of New Zealand's 
responses. 
 
In the event of a pandemic, public announcements would be made 
through TV, the radio, and other media channels.  Some workplaces 
and schools may close. 
 
- Available host country medical treatment facilities in the event 
of an outbreak:  In the event of an outbreak, hospitals and primary 
care practitioners may not be able to deal with the potential large 
numbers of affected individuals.  The MOH is considering and 
planning for other possible options, such as community assessment 
centers or calling a national free health advice number staffed by 
registered nurses and designating specific quarantine stations. 
Citizens could be expected to care for themselves and others at 
home. 
 
The Ministry of Health has a formal arrangement with Australia's CSL 
Ltd--the only influenza vaccine manufacturer in the Southern 
Hemisphere--which should give New Zealand a supply if they need a 
pandemic vaccine.  However, the vaccine is currently not available 
since the manufacture of a vaccine can only start once the strain of 
the virus causing the pandemic is known. 
 
Mission facilities have adequate emergency food and water supplies 
to allow American employees and family members to shelter in place 
for approximately 1-2 weeks.  Small stockpiles are distributed at 
centrally-located residences in neighborhoods with large 
concentrations of Embassy staff. 
 
¶4.  Preparedness Measures Taken/To Be Taken 
------------------------------------------- 
(a)  Briefings:  In November, the Embassy distributed to Mission 
personnel the Department's cable on "Frequently asked questions on 
Avian Influenza."  An Avian Flu Warden Message is posted on the 
Embassy web site and includes hyperlinks to WHO, CDC, State Dept, 
and GNZ web pages. 
 
(b)  Medical Expertise:  Mission New Zealand has no in-house health 
unit operation but depends on a local Post Medical Advisor for all 
medical assistance.  We virtually have no staff with medical 
background and skills; our canvassing identified one employee with a 
general nursing background at ConGen Auckland. 
 
(c)  Tamiflu/PPE:  Post has no/no supply of Tamiflu on hand as we 
 
WELLINGTON 00000112  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
were not among the initial high-risk post identified for first 
shipments.  Post currently has disposable gloves, soap, and bleach 
on hand.  A supply of masks, soap and gloves are available at ConGen 
Auckland, primarily for consular personnel.  To be Done:  We need to 
determine amounts of Tamiflu and other supplies needed if tripwire 
number 2 is reached. 
 
(d)  Security:  When the Tamiflu arrives, it will be locked securely 
in a well-protected area within the Chancery. 
 
(e)  Emergency Stockpiles:  Management has minimum numbers of 
emergency supplies (food, fuel, water, blankets, medicines) 
pre-positioned at several locations in Wellington and Auckland. 
 
(f)  Continuity of Operations:  EAC discussed possibility of 
mini-command centers in Wellington in connection with other natural 
disasters (earthquake, land slides) that would preclude all 
personnel being able to gather at one alternate point.  These 
mini-centers would require staff to travel shorter distances, or 
work from home. 
 
With reduced staffing, ConGen Auckland would likely suspend NIV and 
IV operations; ACS services could be continued with one consular 
officer and reduced ACS staff.  If required to work from home, 
Consul would use post's emergency ACS laptop with its CD of AmCit 
names to communicate with American community.  Additional CDs would 
be positioned in ACC to ensure dissemination of info to AmCits.  RSO 
maintains up-to-date lists of staff home and cell phone numbers.  TO 
DO:  Up date personal e-mail addresses. 
 
(g)  Drawdown Planning:  Mission sections are reporting to 
Management their minimum staffing requirements to ensure continuity 
of operations.  We are working closely with Embassy Apia in the 
event that small island community were to be affected.  Given their 
limited access to travel, and limited health facilities, COM likely 
would request authorized or ordered departure for Embassy and Peace 
Corps Americans sooner than for New Zealand staff. 
 
(h)  Medical Issues:  No staff medical issues have been reported; 
but one EFM is pregnant and one dependent child has respiratory 
problems. 
 
(i)  Pre-planned Packets:  The Management Office has prepared travel 
orders for American DH staff and EFMs. 
 
(j)  Strategies for Airport Closures:  As an island nation, airport 
closing sends a fairly definitive message that no one enters or 
exits the country.  This is an option that the MOH definitely would 
consider, but we believe would require some advance notification 
before implementation. 
 
(k)  Town Hall Briefings:  In meetings with AmCits in Wellington and 
Christchurch in December, consular staff responded to avian flu 
inquiries.  ConGen will continue to address avian flu in all 
subsequent outreach visits to AmCits throughout New Zealand.  With 
the recent installation of ACS+ software, ConGen is also able to 
disseminate AI-related news and updates more easily.  CA outreach 
materials have been shared with major expat American organizations, 
such as the American Chamber of Commerce.  An AI warden message is 
posted on the Embassy website. 
 
TRIPWIRES AND RESPONSES 
----------------------- 
 
¶5.  Tripwire One: 
----------------- 
A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal 
to human cases or sustained human-to-human transmission in a 
neighboring country. 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Tripwire One Responses: 
 - EAC meets to confirm that tripwire has been crossed.  ConGen 
Auckland, USAP (U.S. Antarctic Program) Christchurch, and Embassy 
Apia participate by DVC or are notified by telephone. 
 -  Provide Mission briefings for American and LES staff and 
dependents (for Embassy and constituent posts). 
 - ConGen to notify Amcits via warden system, Embassy web site and 
local media. 
 -  Restrict official and unofficial travel to suspected areas. 
 -  Given New Zealand's island separation, and depending on the 
specific neighboring country affected, authorized departure of non- 
essential staff and family members may not be considered essential 
at this time.  Ensure travel orders for all personnel are prepared 
in event of further evacuation necessity. 
 -  Monitor public announcements from New Zealand Government. 
 
¶6.  Tripwire Two: 
----------------- 
A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal 
 
WELLINGTON 00000112  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
to human cases or sustained human-to-human transmission within the 
Auckland consular district but not on North Island (where both 
Wellington and Auckland are located), (i.e., Cook Islands, Niue, or 
South Island) 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Tripwire Two Responses: 
 - EAC meets to confirm that tripwire has been crossed.  ConGen 
Auckland, USAP Christchurch, and Embassy Apia participate by DVC or 
are notified by telephone. 
 -  Provide Mission briefings for American and LES employees and 
dependents (for Embassy and constituent posts). 
 -  Restrict official and unofficial travel to suspected areas. 
 -  ConGen to notify Amcits via warden system, Embassy web site and 
local media. 
 -  Monitor public announcements and recommended advice from New 
Zealand Government.  Consider mirroring their actions for Mission 
personnel and AmCits, as appropriate. 
 -  Consider requesting authorized departure of non- essential staff 
and family members. 
 -  In coordination with the Department, prepare press guidance. 
 -  Institute mandatory sick leave for employees who exhibit 
flu-like symptoms or has a family member exhibiting flu-like 
symptoms. 
 -  Implement use of protective equipment (gloves, masks, etc.) 
according to MED guidance for high-risk-to-exposure personnel. 
 -  AmConGen Auckland to limit consular services as necessary, such 
as instituting an appointment-based system for all non- emergency 
services so as to reduce visitors in the waiting room. 
 - Ensure that staff procure additional supplies of food and water 
for Embassy and home use.  Ensure staff with medical issues have 
adequate supplies of required medications if home quarantine becomes 
necessary. 
 
¶7.  Tripwire Three: 
------------------- 
A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal 
to human cases or sustained human-to-human transmission on North 
Island: 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Tripwire Three Responses: 
 - EAC meets to confirm that tripwire has been crossed.  ConGen 
Auckland, USAP Christchurch, and Embassy Apia participate by DVC or 
are notified by telephone. 
 -  Provide Mission briefings for American and LES staff and 
dependents. 
 -  Cancel incoming official travel to host country, except for 
personnel involved in investigative/containment efforts, or as 
otherwise deemed necessary by COM. 
 -  ConGen Auckland coordinate with CA/OCS on issuance of guidance 
(public announcement or travel warning, as appropriate) urging 
American citizens to defer all non-emergency travel to host country 
and particularly the affected regions. 
 -  In coordination with the Department, prepare press guidance. 
 -  Implement home quarantine of any staff or dependents who have 
been in contact with a person confirmed to have an AI infection and 
implement at-home monitoring procedure. 
 -  If authorized or ordered departure is not permissible, instruct 
all non- emergency American and LES staff to remain home on 
administrative leave.  Children should remain home from school. 
 -  Implement social distancing (limit movements of all personnel 
and dependents in the city). 
 -  Implement 24-hour telephone hotline to monitor health of Embassy 
staff and families.  Encourage self-reporting by employees and their 
families of illness and medical developments. 
 -  Consider relocating Embassy personnel to designated residences. 
 
 -  Depending on level of public inquiries, Embassy staffs and 
equips a situation room. 
 -  ConGen Auckland to establish a database tracking American 
citizens who have been quarantined, hospitalized, or ill at home. 
Direct American citizen community to local treatment facilities. 
 -  ConGen Auckland to reduce consular operations to emergency 
consular services only. 
 -  Divide the Marine Security Guard detachment into two separate 
and independent entities to reduce the risk of the spread of the 
disease and ensure proper coverage of classified materials. 
 -  Restrict visitor access to Mission. 
 -  Consider prophylactic Tamiflu treatment only for staff who are 
required to be in direct contact with potentially infected persons. 
 
 
 
¶8.  Tripwire Four: 
------------------ 
A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of 
animal-to-human cases of human-to-human transmission near or within 
Wellington: 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Tripwire Four Responses: 
 
WELLINGTON 00000112  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
 - EAC meets to confirm that tripwire has been crossed.  ConGen 
Auckland, USAP Christchurch, and Embassy Apia participate by DVC or 
are notified by telephone. 
 -  Provide Mission briefings for American and LES staff and 
dependents. 
 -  ConGen Auckland coordinate with CA/OCS on issuance of guidance 
(public announcement or travel warning, as appropriate) urging 
American citizens to defer all non-emergency travel to host country 
and particularly the affected regions. 
 -  In coordination with the Department, prepare press guidance. 
 -  Implement home quarantine of any staff or dependents who have 
been in contact with a person confirmed to have an AI infection and 
implement at home monitoring procedure. 
 -  If authorized or ordered departure is not permissible, instruct 
all non- emergency American and LES staff to remain home on 
administrative leave.  Children should remain home from school. 
 -  Implement social distancing (limit movements of all personnel 
and dependents in the city). 
 -  Implement 24-hour telephone hotline to monitor health of Embassy 
staff and families.  Encourage self-reporting by employees and their 
families of illness and medical developments. 
 -  Consider relocating Embassy personnel to designated residences 
or working from home. 
 -  Depending on level of public inquiries, Embassy staffs and 
equips a situation room. 
 -  ConGen Auckland to establish a database tracking American 
citizens who have been quarantined, hospitalized, or ill at home. 
Direct American citizen community to local treatment facilities. 
 -  ConGen Auckland to reduce consular operations to emergency 
consular services only. 
 -  Divide the Marine Security Guard detachment into two separate 
and independent entities to reduce the risk of the spread of the 
disease and ensure proper coverage of classified materials. 
 -  Restrict visitor access to Mission. 
 -  Consider prophylactic Tamiflu treatment only for staff who are 
required to be in direct contact with potentially infected persons. 
 
 
 
¶9.  Tripwire Five: 
------------------ 
Mission employee or eligible family member develops AI infection. 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Tripwire Five Response: 
 -  Employee or eligible family member begins Tamiflu treatment. 
 -  Medevac, if possible. 
 -  Consider Mission closure for all but essential operations. 
 
MCCORMICK