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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000352 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016 
TAGS: PHUM KUNR EUN HPKO EAID BE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WOLFF'S FEBRUARY 21 MEETING WITH 
BELGIAN AMBASSADOR VERBEKE 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ALEX WOLFF, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: During a February 22, meeting Ambassador 
Wolff and Belgian Ambassador Johan Verbeke discussed the 
Human Rights Council, Peacebuilding Commission and U.S.-EU 
cooperation.  Both Ambassadors agreed that the U.S. and EU 
needed to cooperate more closely to avoid having our mutual 
interests undermined by the G-77 and others.  End summary. 
 
 
Human Rights Council (HRC) 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Based on a recent EU meeting with UNGA President 
(PGA) Eliasson, Ambassador Verbeke said he expected the PGA 
would release a new draft HRC text on February 23.  His 
understanding was that the text would call for 47 members to 
be elected on the basis of an absolute (vice 2/3) majority. 
He added that operative paragraph 8 on membership 
qualifications would reflect stronger language.  Verbeke 
agreed with Ambassador Wolff that Singapore's plan for 
proposed geographic distribution on the HRC would put WEOG at 
a distinct disadvantage and complicate efforts to pass 
country-specific resolutions condemning the worst national 
violations.  Ambassador Wolff noted that country-specific 
resolutions often pass by a very slim margin - sometimes by a 
single vote.  Skewing the geographic distribution toward 
non-WEOG countries would disadvantage such important votes. 
Verbeke also commented that a Swiss-backed provision in 
operative paragraph 8 to exclude HRC members ex post facto - 
that is, by a two-thirds vote after they were on board as HRC 
members - was unlikely to work in practice.  Ambassador Wolff 
concurred, adding that a two-thirds vote to exclude current 
members needed to show symmetry with a two-thirds vote to 
elect members from the GA (rather than election by an 
absolute GA majority).  Two-thirds was a far stronger number 
for election, especially as very few countries would be 
no-shows or register abstentions.  Otherwise, we risked 
designing a HRC in where it would be relatively easy to get 
voted on, but practically impossible to get voted off.  Both 
Ambassadors agreed that such an arrangement would be 
particularly unfortunate because the quality of membership 
would probably be the most important predictor of a more 
effective human rights institution. 
 
Peacebuilding Commission 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Demands for equitable geographic distribution were 
also impeding efforts to start up the Peacebuilding 
Commission, both agreed.  The resolutions that established 
the PBC did not mandate geographic distribution and their 
demands had nothing to do with the substantive work of the 
PBC, but that meant little to the blocs that were now 
demanding equal regional representation.  "This is a 
deliberate attack by some developing nations," Verbeke said, 
adding that it was "an attempt to impose the tyranny of a few 
on the majority" of UN members.  In the case of the PBC, 
Ambassador Wolff suggested that we needed to do more to get 
the Africans to speak up. 
 
¶4.  (C) Verbeke cautioned that the Africans had unrealistic 
expectations about the PBC.  Many Africans see the PBC as "an 
instrument for the mobilization of resources."  Instead, 
Verbeke clarified that the PBC would provide advisory 
guidance on how to address comprehensive issues involved in 
the complex transition from post-conflict fragility to a 
stable infrastructure, including by strengthening the private 
sector, civil society and justice mechanisms. 
 
US-EU Cooperation 
----------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Ambassador Wolff noted that the EU had not always 
been sending clear messages to UNGA President Eliasson.  He 
said that especially in some UN reform plenaries, such as on 
the HRC, loud voices were being heard from Egypt, Pakistan, 
South Africa and other G-77 states.  Meanwhile, most EU 
nations had not spoken at all.  In effect, we were leaving 
the field to the G-77 as a group and South Africa as head of 
it as well as to strong individual G-77 member states.  The 
U.S. is perceived to be isolated and the EU as a moderate 
"bridge-builder", but with no united front from the U.S. and 
EU the West was the net loser.  Verbeke agreed and said that 
in his opinion the EU had gone out of its way to be 
responsive to the G-77, noting cases on trade at Doha and 
Gleneagles, but had gotten nothing in return.  Verbeke 
concluded "we in the West need to stand up more for our own 
interests."  Ambassador Wolff concurred saying that given the 
way the G-77 was behaving in exploiting certain issues and 
 
 
assaulting our common interests, now was not the time for us 
to be divided.  To the contrary, we needed to maximize 
cooperation. 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment: In the meeting, Verbeke noted his background 
as a graduate of Yale Law School, followed by private law 
practice in New York, and earlier diplomatic service as DCM 
at the Belgium Embassy in Washington.  He has been a 
skillful, articulate co-chair of plenary sessions on ECOSOC 
reform and development, navigating divisions between the G77 
and developed nations with subtlety and a commitment to 
transparent proceedings.  Verbeke was clearly signaling his 
dissatisfaction with trend of the EU positioning itself at 
the UN between the US and the developing world.  What remains 
to be seen is whether he (and others) will be able to 
re-orient the EU in the direction of greater coordination 
with us.  End Comment. 
BOLTON