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C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000224 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/MAG FOR LAWRENCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KPAO KMPI TS
SUBJECT: MOVEMENT OF 18 OCTOBER COMPLAINS OF GOT ABUSE, 
DEFENDS ISLAMIST COMPONENT 
 
REF: A. 05 TUNIS 2548 
 
     ¶B. 05 TUNIS 2420 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William Hudson for Reasons 1.5 b & d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Committee of 18 October, an alliance of 
disparate opposition political groups and activists which 
grew out of the Movement of 18 October hunger strike (ref a), 
reported that plainclothes police "violently" blocked a 
committee meeting in Tunis on January 24. The following day, 
the committee was allowed to hold a press conference to 
discuss this development and the goals of the organization. 
Responding to GOT allegations that the movement was 
sympathetic to Islamists, opposition party Democratic Forum 
for Labor and Freedoms (FDTL) Secretary General and Committee 
of 18 October spokesperson Mustapha Ben Jaafar said that the 
movement of 18 October had room for "all Tunisians that 
shared the demands of freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a general amnesty for political prisoners." 
According to Ben Jaafar, this included Islamists with 
peaceful and productive political goals, but not extremists 
with "other ideas."  Nejib Chebbi, leader of opposition party 
PDP and an architect of the Movement of 18 October has 
recently been subjected to a media campaign alledging that he 
has allied with Islamists, and that he met with leaders of 
the Muslim Brotherhood during the hajj.  Chebbi has denied 
meeting the Muslim Brotherhood. The Movement of 18 October 
may have limited potential as a cohesive political party, but 
its goals remain valid and closely aligned to our own. End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  HROff attended a press conference by the Committee of 
18 October, held at FDTL headquarters in Tunis.  Despite a 
heavy plainclothes police presence around the building, all 
participants were freely allowed to attend the meeting. 
According to Ben Jaafar, the previous evening, police had 
allegedly violently prevented members of the Committee of 18 
October from entering the same location for a non-public 
meeting.  At the press conference Ben Jaafar, who presided 
over the event, explained that several members of the 
Committee, including Hamma Hammami, spokesperson for the 
Communist Worker's Party of Tunisia (POCT) and Lotfi Hajji, 
president of the unauthorized Tunisian Journalists' 
Syndicate, were pushed and shoved by plainclothes police. 
Ben Jaafar accused the GOT of "responding to all political 
challenges with security solutions," and, with fellow 
committee member Khemais Chammari, emphasized that the 
Committee of 18 October sought only a peaceful forum to 
address solutions to their demands. 
 
¶3. (C) Responding to a question on the role of Islamists in 
the movement, Ben Jaafar said that the Movement of 18 October 
included "all Tunisians who are concerned about the future of 
their country, and who support the demands of the Movement of 
18 October: freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and the release of all political prisoners."  Ben Jaafar 
explained that this included Islamists, as it included all 
political parties sharing these goals.  He differentiated, 
however, between Islamist groups that had legitimate, 
political goals for the future of the country, and 
"extremists" that had "other ideas," and once again 
highlighted the peaceful nature of the group.  Ben Jaafar, 
and other movement leaders acknowledged the significant 
ideological differences among the political parties and 
individuals in the Committee of 18 October.  He explained 
that the group was united now, under the three demands, and 
that in the future, should these demands be met, the group 
would be able to democratically determine the most 
appropriate path for Tunisia. 
 
¶4. (C) The fact that the Committee of 18 October includes 
known Islamists such as Mohamed Nouri of the International 
Association for the Support of Political Prisoners, lawyer 
Samir Dilou, and former En-Nahdha member Zied Daoulatli 
(recently released from prison) has in part led to a division 
in opposition parties in Tunisia. On January 4, the former 
Tunisian Communist Party Ettajdid, along with two small 
unauthorized leftist parties (the Patriotic and Democratic 
Labor Party and the Democratic Communists) and some 
independent intellectuals formed what they termed the 
"Democratic and Progressive Coalition".  The coalition was 
formed around the rejection of any role for Islamists in 
Tunisian politics.  The Committee of 18 October's inclusion 
of Islamists has provoked the GOT to launch a media slander 
 
campaign to portray Nejib Chebbi, President of the opposition 
Progressive Democratic Party  (PDP) and a primary leader of 
the 18 October Movement, as an Islamic fundamentalist. 
(PDP's politics have been in the past secular and leftist.) 
The campaign has included allegations that Chebbi met with 
members of Muslim Brotherhood and En-Nahdha while 
participating in the hajj in early January, as well as the 
publication in a mainstream magazine of clearly-doctored 
photos of Chebbi wearing a turban and with a Islamic-style 
long beard.   At the January 24 press conference, Chebbi 
flatly denied any allegation of ties to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and said he was planning on taking legal action 
against Al-Mustaqbal and al Liwa the Lebanese papers that 
printed the allegation, Middle East Online, an Internet 
journal and the Tunisian daily As-Sabah, which also carried 
the allegation and refused to print a letter from Chebbi 
denying the story. (NB: Local activists alleged that the 
Lebanese papers and website were influenced by the Tunisian 
Embassy in Beirut to carry the allegations.) 
 
¶5. (C) At the press conference, Chebbi did not comment on the 
allegations that he met with exiled En-Nahdha leader Rachid 
Ghannouchi while at the hajj. (NB: En-Nahdha is the banned 
Tunisian Islamic party.) Rachid Hachana, PDP member and 
editor of the party's newspaper Al-Mawkif, confirmed that 
this meeting did take place, and commented that meetings 
between PDP and En-Nahdha members outside of Tunisia were not 
rare occurrences, and that it was the right of any Tunisian 
to meet with any other Tunisian.  (A senior advisor to PM 
Ghannouchi told us privately February 1 that although the 
meeting with the an-Nahda leader was frowned by the GOT, the 
real concern was the broad inclusion of disparate opposition 
groups, including Islamists, in the October 18 Movement, of 
which Chebbi is the most visible member.) 
 
¶6. (C)  Comment: While the structure of the Committee of 18 
October solidifies, its support outside of a limited circle 
of opposition politicos and intellectuals is minimal. 
Attendance at the press conference was much smaller than 
during the original hunger strike, and the international 
spotlight the group enjoyed around November's UN World Summit 
on Information Society has faded.  While the movement may not 
be able to mobilize widespread support given the constrictive 
political climate in Tunisia, their demands are valid, and 
track with USG goals for political reform in Tunisia. 
HROff's attendance at the press conference was positively 
noted, both in person, and in online opposition journals 
which have wide readership among the small Tunisian activist 
community.  We will continue to engage Tunisians, via 
high-level dialogue such as the Ambassador's meeting with the 
FM on the 18 October hunger strike (ref b), public statements 
and our presence as observers at symbolic gatherings such as 
the Oct 18 meetings to encourage the creation of political 
space and freedom of expression in Tunisia. 
HUDSON