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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000960 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2026 
TAGS: PREL ETRD ECON ENRG USUN PINR CH JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN-CHINA: CHINA TRYING TO "WALL OFF" YASUKUNI? 
 
REF: A. BEIJING 2461 
 
     ¶B. TOKYO 00775 
     ¶C. BEIJING 2981 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer.  Reason: 1.4 (b)(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  A flurry of political exchanges between 
China and Japan and initiatives arising out of the Dai 
Bingguo-Yachi "comprehensive policy dialogue" suggest that 
China's President Hu Jintao has decided to leave the Yasukuni 
issue aside for the time being and to move ahead on multiple 
fronts, MOFA China Division Director Izumi told us February 
¶22.  While mindful of domestic Chinese constraints on moving 
too fast, Hu recognizes the importance of the bilateral 
relationship and is now confident enough in his own position 
to proceed forward.  During the February 10-11 Dai-Yachi 
talks, the two sides agreed to Director General-level talks 
on UN reform, on cooperation in Africa and on East China Sea 
exploration and development, among other initiatives.  End 
summary. 
 
Dai in Niigata:  "I Don't Want to Leave" 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The February 10-11 Japan visit by Executive Vice 
Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo yielded a number of results, 
MOFA China Division Director Hiroyasu Izumi told us February 
22 in follow-up to his February 13 preliminary readout of the 
visit (ref b).  In addition to 15 hours of talks with Vice 
Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi, Dai met separately with FM 
Aso, Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe, Lower House Speaker Kono, 
Finance Minister Tanigaki, METI Minister Nikai, Komeito 
leader Kanzaki and others. 
 
¶3. (C) Atmospherics for the off-site segment of the visit on 
February 11 could not have been better, Izumi observed. 
Unable to find a suitably impressive hot springs resort in 
his home prefecture of Toyama, Vice Minister Yachi, 
reciprocating for a Dai-hosted visit last year to Dai's 
native province of Guizhou, hosted Dai at a mountain hot 
springs in neighboring Niigata.  While not all of the Chinese 
delegation took advantage of the communal bath, many from 
Beijing did -- and loved it.  They particularly enjoyed the 
experience of soaking in a hot outdoor pool in the falling 
snow.  Although Dai did not avail himself of the communal 
bath, Izumi reported that Dai loved the mountain scenery and 
the picturesque inn and proclaimed that he did not want to 
leave.  Niigata, Izumi added, has traditionally been friendly 
toward China. 
 
¶4. (C) Despite the fact that much of the discussion over the 
two days of talks revolved around the Yasukuni Shrine issue 
(reftels), China appears to be trying to "wall off" the 
Yasukuni issue from the broader relationship, Izumi reported. 
 It was evident that the Chinese had met with as many 
politically prominent Japanese as possible in hopes of taking 
a series of positive messages back to Beijing, he explained. 
Reiterating his February 13 remarks, Izumi noted that Dai's 
February 10-11 visit was sandwiched between high-level 
December meetings in Beijing regarding Japan-China relations 
and the convening of the National People's Congress (NPC) on 
March 5.  Izumi further speculated that President Hu Jintao 
is moving forward with consolidation of his position prior to 
the 17th Party Congress in 2007; Hu recognizes the 
importance, on multiple levels, of maintaining sound 
Japan-China relations, but mindful of his political rivals 
and an increasingly nationalistic populace, he cannot appear 
to be caving in to Japan. 
 
Contending Schools of Thought 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  Simply put, Izumi explained, there are two broad 
schools of thought in China on how Beijing should handle 
relations with Japan.  One believes that relations between 
the United States and China are the best they have ever been 
and that China will be able to manage the Taiwan issue. 
Consequently, relations with Japan are not particularly 
important.  So if Koizumi or other Japanese leaders visit 
Yasukuni and are thus isolated (including, in the view of 
some, from the United States), it really didn't matter a 
whole lot.  Japan, in their view, would at some point 
recognize that it needs to mend fences and try harder.  The 
other school of thought believes that China needs the 
assistance of not only the United States, but also of its 
neighbor Japan, to help China overcome difficulties in a 
variety of areas, including energy and the environment. 
 
TOKYO 00000960  002 OF 003 
 
 
Japan is too important to ignore.  Hu subscribes to the 
latter school of thought, Izumi believes. 
 
Strained Ties: A Legacy of Jiang Zemin 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Hu inherited the strained state of bilateral ties from 
Jiang Zemin, Izumi asserted.  According to the analysis of 
several Chinese academic acquaintances of Izumi, Jiang made 
two fundamental mistakes that continue to hobble bilateral 
relations.  First, during a period when historical issues, 
Taiwan and territorial issues were the primary sources of 
tension, Jiang emphasized historical issues.  Second, it was 
Jiang who first linked Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visits to 
high-level meetings.  Now, Hu Jintao has to deal with the 
mess.  (Izumi allowed that PM Koizumi has also done his fair 
share to complicate the issue.)  Now that Hu has been able to 
acquire enough influence to assert authority in a number of 
areas, he is looking for ways to do the same in China's 
relations with Japan.  To that end, Izumi continued, Hu sent 
Dai, whom the Japanese regard as a reliable direct channel to 
Hu, to Japan with a mandate to bring back a "positive 
message" prior to the preparatory meetings for the NPC. 
 
Dai: Seeking Positive Feedback 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C)  As reported reftels, Dai asked all his interlocutors 
the same basic question, Izumi explained.  How does Japan 
view China's rise:  As a competitor or a cooperative partner 
or a strategic rival?  Yachi's response was unequivocal, 
Izumi stated.  Japan welcomes China's economic development 
and hopes to share with it the fruits of prosperity.  As 
Prime Minister Koizumi had said, Japan views China as an 
opportunity.  But at the same time, Yachi had stressed, Japan 
need's Chinese transparency.  All of Dai's interlocutors 
provided basically the same positive message, Izumi stated. 
Asked if even FM Aso and CCS Abe, noted hawks, had been 
positive, Izumi said they had.  He sheepishly elaborated 
that, confidentially, MOFA had been a little hesitant in 
approaching the two for appointments with Dai, who is lower 
in protocol order.  MOFA was a little concerned, he admitted, 
that they might decline.  In the event, MOFA briefed them 
both in advance on why Dai was visiting and what he hoped to 
hear.  In the end, both Abe and Aso delivered "good" messages. 
 
¶8. (C) Asked if he believed U.S. expressions of concern about 
the state of Japan-China relations had affected China's 
approach, Izumi responded obliquely by pointing to what he 
termed a "sequence of events:" 
 
-- High-level meetings in Beijing regarding the bilateral 
relationship; 
 
-- Tang Jiaxuan's February 8 comments to the LDP's Takeshi 
Noda that China had basically given up on Koizumi; 
 
-- Politburo member Li Changchun's recent remarks to Diet 
member and LDP leader Hidenao Nakagawa that China envisions 
broad prospects for future cooperation, including in the 
areas of energy, the environment and rapid transportation; 
 
-- Trade Minister Toshihiro Nikai's current visit to Beijing 
to discuss the East China Sea energy exploration dispute, 
including a meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao; 
 
-- The National People's Congress from March 5, and the 
address by Wen that will likely address foreign policy issues; 
 
-- Former PM (and friend of China) Hashimoto's late-March 
visit to China. 
 
Izumi believes the sub-text of this flurry of visits is that 
China wants to wall-off the Yasukuni issue, deal with it 
separately from the broader Japan-China bilateral agenda and 
create a political atmosphere that will lead to improved 
relations.  President Hu will be able to reassure President 
Bush during his April U.S. visit that relations between China 
and Japan are okay, he surmised. 
 
Forging Ahead 
------------- 
 
¶9. (C)  Looking ahead, Izumi previewed a series of 
initiatives arising out of the Dai-Yachi "Comprehensive 
Policy Dialogue" (called the China-Japan Strategic Dialogue" 
by Beijing).  Unable to compromise on Yasukuni and engage at 
 
TOKYO 00000960  003 OF 003 
 
 
the leaders' level, the Chinese seemed determined to engage 
on every other level during the Dai visit, Izumi remarked. 
While Dai and Yachi were holding their 15 hours of talks over 
two days, Jing Dunquan, vice chair of the China-Japan 
Friendship Association was making the rounds in Tokyo, 
drumming up support within the Japanese business community 
and elsewhere.  Separately, apparently having been given the 
green light by Hu to pursue a more active people-to-people 
exchange, Vice Minister of Culture Meng Xiaosi presented 
Japan with a three-page long list of cultural activities to 
be held in Japan this year as part of a China "culture year" 
in Japan, funded by China.  A Japan "culture year" will 
follow in China in 2007.  Already in 2006, each country will 
send over 1,000 high school students to the other for 
week-long home stays, an initiative funded earlier by Japan. 
 
¶10. (C) On the official level, the two sides agreed to pursue 
a series of Director General-level talks under the umbrella 
of the Dai-Yachi dialogue.  These will include separate 
meetings on UN reform, cooperation in Africa, and resource 
exploration and development in the East China Sea.  On the 
latter issue, both sides recognize that joint exploration and 
development is the only feasible solution, Izumi averred. 
Now that Cui Tiankai has been promoted to Assistant Foreign 
Minister, new MFA Asia Department DG Hu Zhengyao, former PRC 
ambassador to Malaysia, will lead the Chinese team.  This a 
positive development for Japan; Izumi believed.  Cui had been 
difficult to deal with; Hu appears to be more reasonable, he 
opined. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Director Izumi, a member of MOFA's "China School," 
has often presented an optimistic analysis of Japan-China 
relations and his comments noted above are no exception. 
Embassy Beijing will have its own views on President Hu's 
intentions toward Japan-China ties, but it seems reasonable 
to us that the PRC would begin working now to put in place 
the foundation for improving bilateral relations with PM 
Koizumi's successor.  The Yasukuni question and the problem 
of history will not be easily or quickly resolved, but it is 
a good sign that Beijing may have realized the drawbacks to 
letting Yasukuni monopolize the agenda with Japan. 
SCHIEFFER