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DE RUEHKO #0709/01 0390846
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 080846Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8430
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0487
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0860
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 6670
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 4501
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 7563
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 5703
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000709 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016 
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC JA KS KN CH
SUBJECT: JAPAN-DPRK TALKS CONCLUDE WITH ZERO SERIOUSNESS 
 
REF: A. TOKYO 433 
     ¶B. TOKYO 644 
     ¶C. BEIJING 2089 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOSEPH R. DONOVAN.  REASONS: 1.4 
 (b),(d). 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY:  North Korea showed "zero seriousness" about 
resolving its bilateral issues with Japan during February 4-8 
Japan-DPRK bilateral talks in Beijing, MOFA Asia DG Sasae 
told visiting CSIS Senior Advisor Robert Einhorn and 
Political Minister Counselor Michael Meserve on February 8. 
PM Koizumi remains unlikely to invoke unilateral sanctions 
over the abduction issue, but Japan will continue to apply 
its own "defensive measures," Sasae offered.  Japan's 
normalization talks team made it clear that only a "package 
deal" that resolves the abduction, nuclear and missile issues 
would bring about normalization of relations.  During their 
security talks, the DPRK failed to articulate a new position, 
while complaining about the U.S.-Japan Alliance, BMD, and 
U.S. defensive measures.  Analyzing Kim Jong-il's January 
2006 trip to China, Sasae said the North Korean leader most 
likely used the visit to obtain economic assistance from 
Beijing.  Sasae expressed pessimism over prospects for the 
Six-Party Talks, cautioned the United States and Japan are 
losing leverage over the situation to China and the ROK, and 
urged that the U.S. Government consider engaging in direct 
talks with the DPRK.  END SUMMARY 
 
Outcome of Japan-DPRK Talks 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) The North Korean delegation to the February 4-8 talks 
with Japan had "nothing new to offer" and showed "zero 
seriousness" about resolving bilateral issues with Japan, 
MOFA Asia Director General Kenichiro Sasae told visiting CSIS 
Senior Advisor Robert Einhorn on February 8, 2006.  Instead, 
Sasae said, the DPRK delegation "demanded something new" (the 
turnover of Japanese NGO officials reported reftel B). 
Confirming that Japan's delegation would be returning to 
Tokyo later in the day, Sasae summed up the talks with the 
following comments. 
 
¶3.  (S) On Abductions: 
 
-- Japan told the DPRK it may invoke unilateral sanctions if 
the abduction cases are not resolved.  In fact, however, 
while the Koizumi government must "accommodate the emotions 
of the Japanese public" (70 percent of whom support 
sanctions) it does not intend to implement sanctions because 
it is convinced the move would not work and would worsen the 
atmosphere surrounding the Six-Party Talks. 
 
-- The Japanese government will continue to apply its own 
"defensive measures" in response to the abduction issue. 
Sasae cited implementation of the insurance requirement 
imposed on DPRK vessels in March 2005 and the withdrawal 
earlier this month of tax-exempt status of the pro-Pyongyang 
General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon). 
 
¶4.  (S) On Normalization: 
 
-- Japan made it clear it is ready to begin normalization 
talks but made it equally clear it will not normalize 
relations until the abduction issue and its concerns about 
the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs are fully resolved. 
In the end it is a "package deal," Sasae said. 
 
¶5.  (S) On Security Issues: 
 
-- The DPRK had "nothing new to offer" on the nuclear or 
missile issues and did not articulate positions on those 
subjects.  Instead, they focused on their concerns regarding 
the U.S.-Japan Alliance and our effort to develop a ballistic 
missile defense. 
 
-- The North Koreans also complained about defensive measures 
taken by the United States in the Banco Delta Asia case. 
Japan's response was to point out that those were law 
enforcement matters to be dealt with separately from the 
Six-Party Talks, Sasae said. 
 
Analysis of KJI's Trip 
 
TOKYO 00000709  002 OF 002 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Asked what to make of Kim Jong-il's January 2006 trip 
through China, Sasae replied that while it is possible that 
Kim would like to follow China's path toward economic reform, 
it is more likely he used the visit to obtain economic 
assistance from Beijing.  For the moment, it appears the DPRK 
is focusing on trade with China, South Korea and Thailand. 
At the same time Japan-DPRK trade figures are in sharp 
decline.  Sasae acknowledged that China and the ROK appear to 
be competing for attention from the DPRK and that Pyongyang 
is using this competition to its advantage.  What is clear is 
that U.S. and Japanese leverage over North Korea is 
decreasing, Sasae cautioned. 
 
Plea for Direct Talks 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Sasae said that "frankly speaking" he is pessimistic 
about prospects for the Six-Party Talks because "both sides 
appear to be waiting for the other to do something" and 
distrust is on the rise.  Even if the Six-Party dialogue 
resumes, it "will be very difficult for both sides to please 
each other."  Alternatively, ratcheting up pressure on the 
North could illicit dangerous, undesirable, or at best 
unclear results.  While pressure from China could be most 
effective, Beijing appears unwilling to go that route, Sasae 
added.  He concluded the meeting by repeating an earlier plea 
for the United States to engage in direct talks with the 
DPRK.  "They won't give us anything; it is you they want to 
talk to.  That is why I encourage your government to meet 
with them." 
SCHIEFFER