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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
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RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON PRIORITY 0376
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO PRIORITY 0272
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY 0341
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO PRIORITY 0171
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA PRIORITY 0085
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO PRIORITY 0199
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000353 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2011 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PHSA MARR PINS PREL SNAR XL NT VE
NL 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/NAVAL EXERCISES:  DUTCH CABINET HAS 
THE BALL 
 
REF: A. A) THE HAGUE 311 B) SORENSEN E-MAIL 
 
     ¶B. 2/15/06 C) THE HAGUE 275 D) STATE 18806 
 
Classified By: CDA Chat Blakeman; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) This is an action/guidance request.  Please see para 
¶7. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary: The Dutch cabinet is seized with the issue of 
proposed carrier port calls to the Netherlands Antilles and 
is expected to discuss it, as well as the upcoming Caribbean 
Lion exercise, at the February 17 cabinet meeting.  A final 
decision, however, will all also require consultations 
between authorities in The Hague and in the islands, which 
could add a few days to the decision making process. 
National Security Advisor Rob Swartbol and MFA Western 
Hemisphere Kingdom Affairs Advisor Karel de Vey Mestdagh have 
both stressed to us the GONL's desire to strike the right 
balance in dealing with Venezuela.  On the one hand, The 
Netherlands wants to make sure the GOV is clear it has no 
veto over Dutch actions in the Netherlands Antilles; on the 
other, strong ties between the Antilleans and Venezuelans 
could cause an overly provocative approach to backfire. 
Among the options being considered would be to welcome a 
carrier visit to St. Maartens while passing, for now, on a 
Curacao port call.    End summary. 
 
Decision is with the cabinet 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) NSA Swartbol confirmed in a February 14 meeting with 
Charge that the questions of U.S. amphibious participation in 
the Dutch Caribbean Lion (CL) exercises and of the proposed 
carrier port visits were before the cabinet.  The issues were 
discussed at a cabinet meeting on February 10 but no 
conclusions were reached; the next cabinet meeting at which 
the issues could be on the agenda is on February 17. 
Swartbol said that he and several cabinet advisors would be 
travelling to the Dutch naval headquarters at Den 
Helder on February 15 for a day-long retreat, and these 
issues were likely to be raised.  Swartbol confirmed that 
there is a difference of opinion between the Dutch military 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but he hoped a closer 
understanding would emerge from the retreat.  In general, MOD 
is more comfortable with a Curacao carrier visit than is MFA. 
 
¶4. (C) Swartbol emphasized the importance of historical and 
family ties between the Netherlands Antilles and Venezuela. 
He noted that ties extend into the government of the 
Netherlands Antilles and even to some in the Dutch diplomatic 
service.  Dutch proprietary feelings about the islands run 
deep, he said:  "they are our islands," and "we think we know 
best" how to deal with them.  That said, he believed that the 
U.S. and the GONL are "almost on the same line" with regard 
to Venezuela policy.  We need a tough stance, he said, but 
the GONL does not want to unnecessarily provoke Chavez into 
taking retaliation. 
 
Consultations with Netherlands Antilles 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Swartbol noted also that the GONL would have to 
consult with the Government of the Netherlands Antilles (NA), 
before any final decision could be made.  In a separate 
meeting on February 15, MFA Western Hemisphere Kingdom 
Affairs Advisor Karel de Vey Mestdagh told poloff that there 
was a constitutional requirement to consult with the NA 
government before the cabinet could make a final decision. 
He noted, however, that such consultations could be concluded 
within a few days and should not create a significant delay 
in the process. 
 
GONL sensitivities: Constitutional Restructuring 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
THE HAGUE 00000353  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) De Vey Mestdagh underlined Swartbol's comments 
concerning historical and family ties to Venezuela.  The 
islands began a process of constituional reform in November 
¶2005.  It is likely that St. Maarten and Curacao will achieve 
a degree of autonomy similar to that of Aruba, while the 
other three islands of the Netherlands Antilles will move to 
something closer to Dutch protectorate status.  The GONL does 
not want to give Chavez any help in disturbing, or taking 
advantage of, the negotiations.  The process is officially 
scheduled to conclude in mid-2007, but both de Vey Mestdagh 
and his deputy, Anton Schellekens, expect it to take until 
2008 or 2009. 
 
Possible Compromise Proposal 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) De vey Mestdagh confirmed that one option the cabinet 
is considering would be a compromise under which the George 
Washington would be invited to visit St. Maarten, with the 
more politically sensitive port call to Curacao delayed until 
a more propitious time.  (Note:  This is consistent with ref 
b.) He noted, however, that the MFA had been informed by MOD 
that such an option would be unacceptable to the USG, and 
asked whether this was the case.  POLOFF stressed that we 
have not received guidance on this option, which, as far as 
we know, has not been formally proposed. 
 
¶7. (C) Action/Guidance Request:  The Cabinet is likely to 
discuss the port visit request on February 17 and may even 
take a preliminary decision.  If there is an agreed USG 
position with regard to the possible compromise described 
para 6, it would be useful to convey it to the GONL before it 
makes an offer we are likley to reject.  Post therefore 
requests cleared front channel guidance by COB February 16 
clarifying the the USG's likely response to such a proposal. 
End Action/Guidance Request. 
BLAKEMAN