This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000858 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER ECON PINR KWBG KPAL IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS COUNTERTERRORISM GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: MOD ADVISOR ON HAMAS, ABBAS, NEIGHBORS, IRAN AND 
AL QAEDA 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 0840 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz, reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  Ministry of Defense Political Advisor Amos 
Gilad told NEA DAS Dibble that Israel was on a collision 
course with a new "Hamastan."  He said the Hamas leadership 
was very clever and would seek international acceptance while 
retaining the intent to annihilate Israel.  He agreed that 
Israel and the international community should support Mahmud 
Abbas (Abu Mazen) at present, while doubting the strength of 
the Palestinian Authority President's messages to Hamas. 
Gilad highlighted the importance to Israel of stability in 
Jordan and Egypt, and commented on those countries' reactions 
to the recent Hamas election victory.  While Gilad said that 
Iran would continue to support terror activities and 
infrastructure, he said he did not believe Iran would 
underwrite the PA budget.  He mentioned an Egyptian report of 
a possible arrest of an Al Qaeda member in Gaza.   End 
summary. 
 
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ISRAEL AND HAMAS ON COLLISION COURSE 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) In a meeting with NEA DAS Dibble and the DCM at MOD 
February 23, MOD POLAD Amos Gilad said he saw Israel on a 
collision course with a "new Hamastan."  The fact that Hamas 
did not have the support of a majority of those who voted 
would "only be a comfort to historians."  Gilad said Hamas 
was being very clever in its efforts to form a coalition 
government.  Ismail Haniyeh wanted to be both prime minister 
and head of security, Gilad said.  He was not surprised at 
the political sophistication of the Hamas leadership.  Hamas 
was seeking international recognition, the support of the 
Arab world, economic assistance, and to be seen as a movement 
and not just as being "at war with the world like Bin Laden." 
 Gilad and DAS Dibble agreed that Hamas was looking to create 
flexibility for itself by hiding behind Fatah, technocrats, 
or independents who might be willing to join a coalition 
government.  Gilad thought that Fatah would resist joining a 
Hamas-led coalition, but there might be exceptions, including 
some independents.  He saw Azzam Ahmed as a potential member 
of a national unity government.  He characterized Ahmed as a 
personal friend of Saddam Hussein, a supporter of suicide 
bombers, and a symbol of the deep cooperation between Saddam 
Hussein and Yasser Arafat.  Dibble stated that "technocrat 
hood ornaments" would complicate the situation. 
 
¶3. (C) Gilad said he realized that treating Erez and Karni as 
international crossings would cause suffering for 
Palestinians.  He called the Rafah crossing "nice looking," 
but ineffective against terror.  Gilad expected that security 
arrangements within a Hamas-led PA would be complex.  Hamas 
would seek to remove nonworking Fatah members from security 
payrolls to effect good governance.  Some elements will use 
"blackmail to improve conditions of employment," saying they 
would kill someone if not put on a payroll, Gilad said.  Any 
non-Hamas security chief would be afraid of Hamas. In 
response to a question from DAS Dibble, Gilad said that Hamas 
had the capability to control Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
and the Al Aqsa Brigades, but Hamas would never accept the 
appearance of any agreement with Israel.  Gilad 
differentiated a hudna as "not an agreement", but as a 
"religious idea" open to violation whenever one of the 
parties feels strong enough.  He said a tadiya was less than 
a hudna, but as the present "pause" in violence had "worked," 
people were relatively happy.  Gilad clearly believed that 
such moves by Hamas were purely tactical, saying that Hamas 
would "never" recognize Israel.  He further said that Hamas 
considered Oslo as "subordinate to the national interests of 
the Palestinian people."  Gilad stated that Hamas did not 
want to give up its own independent terror infrastructure. 
 
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GOI SUPPORTS ABU MAZEN BUT QUESTIONS HIS MESSAGE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4. (C) Gilad said that the messages Hamas was getting from 
Abbas were not strong enough.  DAS Dibble and the DCM 
emphasized that the U.S. believed that Abbas' speech at the 
investiture of Parliament was very strong.  Gilad replied 
that when the GOI put the speech together with other "public 
and non-public" messages from Abbas, the thrust was not so 
clear.  He feared that even the speech itself gave Hamas 
"room to maneuver."  He opined that if Fatah did join Hamas 
in a coalition, that would pave the way for "at least four 
years" of Hamas rule.  Dibble noted that key Fatah figures 
were holding the line.  Gilad said "this is the most 
sensitive time," and said the U.S. needs to clarify to Abu 
Mazen that his message needs to be strong and consistent.  He 
said PIJ and others were strengthening their capabilities. 
Speaking personally, he added, "we could find ourselves back 
in Gaza."  In response to a question from Dibble, Gilad said 
the Hamas electoral victory would change the leadership 
dynamic between those in Damascus and those in the 
Palestinian territories.  At the same time, the military wing 
would be "impatient for blood."  Dibble stressed the 
importance of the period up to formation of a new government 
in the PA, saying it was important to squeeze Hamas and keep 
on the pressure, but also to avoid strengthening Hamas 
inadvertently.  It was important to find and encourage the 
moderate center.  Noting that ordinary Palestinians would 
feel the squeeze on Hamas, Gilad said that whoever got the 
combination of pressure on Hamas and support for moderates 
right "will get the Nobel prize."  Dibble stressed the 
importance of supporting Abu Mazen, while recognizing his 
weaknesses.  She raised the GOI decision to suspend transfer 
of customs receipts to the PA in advance of any change of 
government.  Gilad said he was not involved in that 
"political decision," but then suggested that the way the 
U.S. took back the USD 50 million it had committed to the PA 
earlier "may have inspired" the GOI decision. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
STABILITY OF JORDAN AND EGYPT CRITICAL TO ISRAEL 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5. (C) Gilad commented on the Jordanian reaction to remarks 
by an Israeli general that King Abdullah might be the last 
Hashemite monarch to rule Jordan.  The Jordanian Charge' had 
angrily demanded an apology from Minister of Defense Mofaz, 
but was later somewhat mollified by an MOD clarification that 
the general's remarks did not represent GOI views or policy. 
Gilad called Jordan "our only barrier with Zarqawi."  Noting 
that Israel was in a bad neighborhood, he referred to Jordan 
and Egypt as the "good coalition."  Jordan was being tougher 
than Gilad had expected, by not welcoming the Hamas 
leadership.  For Jordan, the Hamas victory was an internal 
problem, Gilad said. 
 
¶6. (C) Gilad said he sensed ambivalence from the Egyptian 
leadership.  Mubarak's intentions were not clear.  He was 
facing an earthquake in the Middle East.  Gilad thought the 
parliamentary opposition would have been several times larger 
if the government had not influenced the recent election 
process.  He was concerned about the succession in Egypt. 
Mubarak had not designated a deputy, his son had not 
performed well, and Soliman will turn 71 in July.  The 
Egyptian wing of Al Qaeda was influencing Al Qaeda's overall 
direction, producing ideas that would make it stronger, 
including an emphasis on the Middle East, return to Moslem 
empire, differences with Zarqawi, and a direction towards 
becoming a political movement and not just carrying out 
violence.  Gilad asked rhetorically, "Can you imagine Jordan 
as Hamastan?  Egypt as the Moslem Brotherhood?"  Commenting 
on recent events in the region, Gilad said, "We have to be 
careful of this 'democracy on the way to dictatorships.'" 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
IRAN FUNDS WILL FOCUS ON TERROR, NOT BUDGET SUPPORT 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶7. (C) Dibble asked whether Iran would be able to pass 
significant funds to Hamas.  Gilad replied that "one dollar 
for terror goes a long way" (from Iran's standpoint); "five 
dollars to a corrupt PA does not go so far."  The difference 
was between suitcases of cash for terror and significant 
funds for payrolls and hospitals.  Iran would not give one 
billion dollars to the PA, Gilad said.  Iran would want to 
"accelerate the terror," but at the same time an elected 
Islamist government "in the middle of the peace camp" was 
very good for Iran, Gilad said.  Hamas would take economic 
moves to reduce its dependence on assistance.  Dibble noted 
an estimate of 79,000 persons on security payrolls.  Gilad 
said Hamas would gradually take over other people's guns 
after taking over the government and reducing the number of 
security personnel.  On a separate point, Gilad said the 
Russian minister of defense had told the GOI he had "no 
doubt" that Iran had a plan to develop nuclear weapons. 
 
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AL QAEDA DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (S) Gilad claimed that he had received some sensitive 
information from a senior Egyptian general following his 
February 21 meeting with the Ambassador (Ref).  The Egyptian, 
he said, agreed with Gilad's estimation that, even though the 
Rafah crossing "looked nice," even "Zarkawi or Bin Laden" 
could get through into Gaza.  The Egyptian "let it slip" that 
a suspected member of Al Qaeda had entered Gaza and been 
arrested there.  The general said the suspect was looking for 
American targets.  The Egyptian claimed not to know the name 
of the individual, but promised to get Gilad more specific 
information.  The Egyptian was also dubious that Egypt would 
be willing and able to put as many as 5,000 soldiers at the 
Gaza border to provide security and prevent terrorist 
intrusions, a proposal Gilad had discussed with other 
Egyptian officials during a recent visit to Egypt (Ref). 
 
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