This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

151557Z Feb 06

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 TEL AVIV 000688 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/IPA (MAHER), NP/RA (ODLUM) 
PENTAGON FOR OSD ISRAEL DESK OFFICER (ANDERSON) 
DOE FOR NNSA DIRECTOR AMB. BROOKS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINR MNUC KNNP IR EU AORC IS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: IRAN-IAEA: ISRAELI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 
REVIEWS ISRAEL'S DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIANS 
 
REF: STATE 19516 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones.  Reasons:  1.4 (b, d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (S) In a February 7 meeting, Israeli Atomic Energy 
Commission (IAEC) Director General Gideon Frank told 
Ambassador Jones the following: 
 
A) On February 16, the EU3 MFA directors general are going to 
meet with an Israeli interagency team in Israel at the MFA to 
discuss Iran and the way ahead. 
 
B) Based on his January 17-18 visit to Moscow, Frank believes 
the Russians are coming to a tougher position on Iran, closer 
to that of the U.S. and the EU3.  Russia's proposal to assist 
Iran with civilian nuclear energy is meant to be an incentive 
to encourage Iran to re-engage the EU3, and is not a 
stand-alone proposal. 
 
C) Russia and Israel believe that it could take Iran as few 
as six months to master the full centrifuge cascade once it 
starts research and development.  Israel believes that Iran 
must not be allowed, under any deal, to conduct such research 
and development. 
 
D) Israel is satisfied with Russia's current position on 
Bushehr and its willingness to resume safeguards discussions 
with the Iranians.  Russian plans to inform Iran by the end 
of the month that, because of "technical problems," it must 
postpone completion of Bushehr until mid-2007, and will not 
send fresh reactor fuel until then.  Russia will lose 
considerable money because of this, and Israel believes 
consideration must be given to economic incentives for Russia 
that will keep it "on board" with respect to Iran. 
 
E) As Israel understands it, Russia's proposal to Iran 
envisions joint ownership, no Iranian access to technology, 
and the construction of an entire enrichment facility. 
Israel believes the Iranians should not be allowed to convert 
past UF-4.  If they must convert to UF-6, it should be done 
in Russia.  The Russians believe that Iran should use its own 
(limited) uranium stocks, an idea which Israel favors. 
However, if Iran balks and Russia withdraws its proposal, 
South Africa may step in. 
 
F) Israel is concerned that Iran may ultimately profit by 
violating its nuclear safety agreements, and that this will 
set a bad precedent internationally.  Israel believes that 
Iran must be forced to suspend enrichment before proceeding 
with the Russian proposal or any other proposal to help Iran 
with civilian nuclear energy. 
 
G) Russia believes Iran should be given some time to consider 
its current situation before it is forced to make a choice. 
Israel believes the international community should continue 
to apply pressure on Iran, and that the current level of 
pressure is insufficient considering Iran's attitudes and 
actions.  Israel believes the Europeans and others need to be 
encouraged to consider "soft" sanctions or "pre-sanctions" 
against Iran that would stand a better chance of being 
accepted in the UNSC than traditional economic sanctions. 
 
H) Israel believes the IAEA is incapable of safeguarding 
facilities that produce the technology used in centrifuge 
production facilities.  The IAEA may also have difficulty 
detecting a clandestine program if Iran declares an overt 
program.  Pressure needs to be stepped up on IAEA DG 
ElBaradei so that his end-of-February report draws all the 
necessary conclusions and is clear and comprehensive.  A 
"layman's guide" to reading the report may be helpful. 
 
I) Israel is concerned that, despite the USG's best efforts, 
Egypt has advanced its position on a Middle East Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone in the IAEA Board's latest resolution on 
Iran.  Israel will look to the U.S. to keep upcoming UN 
discussions on the Iranian nuclear program focused solely on 
Iran. 
 
¶2. (U) Ambassador Jones provided Frank reftel talking points 
and President Bush's and Secretary Rice's statements 
concerning Iran's referral to the UNSC, noting that they had 
also been delivered to the Israeli MFA and MOD.  END SUMMARY. 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
ISRAELIS SEE RUSSIAN POSITION ON IRAN GETTING TOUGHER 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶3. (S) Frank said the purpose of his January 17-18 visit to 
Moscow was to try to understand Russia's opposition to taking 
a harder stand on Iran, and to influence Russia in the right 
direction.  Frank's interagency delegation met with ROSATOM 
Head Kiriyenko, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov and his staff, 
Foreign Minister Lavrov, and Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak. 
 Frank said the meeting with Lavrov was more formal than the 
other meetings but interesting nonetheless.  Frank said that 
his first meeting with Kiriyenko went well and that he is 
"anxious" to develop a relationship with Kiriyenko: 
Kiriyenko seemed quite open and very alert and not afraid to 
ask questions.  He appeared to be in learning mode but also 
quite knowledgeable, and open to the Israeli position.  He 
said the Russians were very forthcoming and accommodating to 
the Israelis.  They accepted the Israeli delegation on very 
short notice.  Frank said the Russian line is getting 
tougher.  He also said, "The Kremlin is sweating.  There are 
those who fear a confrontation with Iran.  And then there are 
those who fear a nuclear Iran."  He claimed that the Iranians 
have threatened the Russians that they can raise havoc in 
Chechnya.  Frank assessed that Kiriyenko and Ivanov 
(representing the Russian Presidency) seem to be closer to 
the Israeli position than Kislyak (representing the MFA). 
 
¶4. (S) According to Frank, Kiriyenko said, barring 
complications, that it could take the Iranians as few as six 
months from the moment research and development begin to 
master the full cascade.  This surprised the Israelis 
because, according to Frank, it corresponds with the Israeli 
view.  Frank noted that when German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
recently visited Israel, she told the Israelis that Putin 
seems to be more responsive on the Iran nuclear issue.  He 
characterized the Russians as "more transparent" than they 
have been on the Iran issue, and wondered aloud whether such 
an open dialogue could be sustained. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
FRANK SUGGESTS RUSSIANS PUTTING BRAKES ON BUSHEHR 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶5. (S) On Russia's cooperation with Iran on the research 
reactor at Bushehr, Frank said the following: 
 
A) Israel believes Russia will maintain its commitment and is 
ready to resume talks on safeguards at Bushehr.  Kiriyenko 
said that he is willing to have his experts meet with Israeli 
experts to further define additional safeguards that Russia 
could ask the Iranians to apply at Bushehr.  Israel wants to 
discuss with the Russians more about Russia's policy with 
respect to Bushehr, rather than about technical matters. 
 
B) According to Frank, the Russians said they introduced 
changes to the hardware in the contract they have with Iran 
on Bushehr.  (NOTE:  Frank did not supply any details.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
C) Kiriyenko said that Russia will postpone completion of the 
Bushehr reaction until the middle of 2007, and that it will 
not send fresh fuel until then.  Frank said that this is 
extremely important to Israel.  Kiriyenko told the Israeli 
delegation that the Russians will blame the delay on 
"technical problems" when they raise this with the Iranians 
so that the Iranians will not be in a position to complain. 
Frank said that the Iranians have not yet heard about this 
delay, and that they will hear about it from Kiriyenko when 
he travels to Iran at the end of February.  Kiriyenko told 
Frank that Putin himself is ordering this delay.  Frank 
estimates that the Russians are going to lose at least USD 50 
million as a result of the delay.  (He attributed this to 
losses associated with the front load of fuel.) 
 
D) Rumantsyev said Russia has formally committed to not 
assisting Iran on the fuel cycle and will take back spent 
fuel. 
 
------------------------------------ 
FRANK'S VIEW OF THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL 
------------------------------------ 
¶6. (S) Frank, who reports directly to the Israeli Prime 
Minister on the Iran nuclear issue, said the following about 
how Israel views the Russian proposal to assist Iran with 
civilian nuclear energy: 
 
A) The Russians said repeatedly during their January 17-18 
meetings with the Israelis that no details have been worked 
out yet because (at that time) the Iranians had said they 
were not interested in Russia's proposal.  The Israelis 
understand the proposal to include joint ownership, no 
Iranian access to technology, and to comprise a whole 
enrichment facility. 
 
B) The problem with UCF conversion is not well defined 
regarding the stage to which the Iranians should be allowed 
to convert.  Israel believes that the Iranians at most should 
be allowed to convert to UF-4, and definitely not UF-6.  In 
Israel's view, if the Iranians are allowed to manufacture 
UF-6, their potential to fuel a clandestine program increases. 
 
C) Israel wants UF-6 conversion itself to take place in 
Russia if the proposal is to be carried out.  If conversion 
must take place in Iran, this is acceptable, but only under 
certain conditions.  Frank explained that a UCF conversion 
plant itself is very hard to safeguard and, in Israel's view, 
the IAEA is not prepared for full safeguards.  It would be 
easy to divert fuel.  It is also the highest visibility part 
of the program.  In the end, for Israel, it is worthwhile to 
insist on UF-4 as the limit for conversion in Iran. 
 
D) Ivanov said that Iran's limited domestic uranium reserves 
should be used.  The Israelis like this because it means Iran 
burns up its uranium supply. 
 
E) Israel still has a problem with the Russian proposal for 
political reasons.  As the Israelis see it, the Iranians end 
up getting something (e.g., operating a conversion plant) by 
violating their agreements.  This, In Israel's view, does not 
set a good precedent. 
 
F) South Africa could help Iran with commercial fuel if 
Russia decided to pull out.  Frank said that South African 
MFA DG Abdul Minty has indicated that South Africa is eager 
to jump in with a commercial deal involving conversion and 
buy-back.  This deal includes South African uranium for 
conversion in Iran.  The South Africans would supply the 
uranium.  The Iranians would fully operate a UCF, and then 
the UCF-6 would go back to South Africa.  Frank said Israel 
is anxious about this prospect because Libya's nuclear 
weapons program reportedly involved South Africans, and 
Israel fears that South Africa would be willing to help Iran 
covertly, just as it reportedly assisted Libya.  Frank 
admitted that Israel is "fuzzy on the details," and added 
that while Minty believes he speaks for South Africa, Frank 
is not sure the South African president would agree with 
Minty's proposal. 
 
G) Asking that we strictly protect this information, Frank 
said that the Iranians have a 70-ton stockpile of Chinese 
UF-6 purchased years ago which is more than Iran needs for 
research and development.  He said that Iran acquired it in 
the early 1990s before China joined the NPT.  Frank claimed 
that Iran has approached China to see if it would fill in for 
Russia if Russia withdrew its proposal.  He claimed that the 
Chinese did NOT/NOT respond enthusiastically. 
 
H) Israel believes Iran does not need much more than it 
already has in terms of centrifuge expertise, and that it 
would not be difficult to get what it needs, should the 
Russians decide to withdraw their proposal.  According to 
Frank, "They have almost all the parts.  If they do not get 
what they need from Russia, they will get it elsewhere." 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
FRANK ON THE WAY AHEAD WITH THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7. (S) Frank said that the biggest problem facing the 
international community is how to prevent Iran from gaining 
as a result of violating its nuclear safety agreements. 
"This," he said, "could cause serious harm to the NPT." 
Frank recounted that he told the Russians in mid-January that 
now is not the time for negotiations with Iran.  Iran must 
fully re-suspend its activities first.  According to Frank, 
Ivanov and Kislyak made it clear that the Russian proposal is 
only an incentive to help the EU negotiate.  It is not a 
stand-alone proposal.  Frank said the Israelis interpret this 
to mean that the Russians are going to require the Iranians 
to suspend enrichment before proceeding on the proposal. 
 
¶8. (S) Frank stressed that Iran must NOT/NOT be allowed to 
conduct research and development on enrichment and warned 
that if this were allowed, it would lead to a series of 
gradual violations and kick off "the beginning of the end." 
He warned that, aside from the political ramifications, 
research and development would help Iran to remove the 
obstacles to mastering the conversion technology.  Frank 
suggested that the Iranians are not far away from this anyway. 
 
¶9. (S) Frank said that Iran's current constraint is mastery 
of the technology for operating a centrifuge cascade.  Once 
the Iranians master the technology of a full cascade, it 
means they can start industrial-sized operations.  Frank 
suggested that the Iranians would run into problems, but 
observed that even the loss of 10-20 percent of their 
centrifuges would be acceptable to them.  He noted that 
commercially, such a loss would be considered a disaster, but 
stressed that the Iranians do not care about this.  "They 
are," he said, "running a crash program to acquire a 
capability."  Frank said that within one year, Iran's rate of 
production will depend on its decision:  If Iran wants more, 
it will get it.  After a year, Iran could have its first 25 
kilos of U-235. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
FRANK COMPARING THE RUSSIAN AND ISRAELI POSITIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶10. (S) Frank said that in the current situation, and 
considering the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) 
"weaknesses," Israel believes it would be better NOT to have 
a conversion facility in Iran at all, and that Russia agrees. 
 He added that there appears to be no difference between the 
Israeli and Russian positions on: 
 
A) recognizing the risks of allowing the Iranians some sort 
of nuclear program; 
 
B) the objective of what that nuclear program would be; and 
 
C) the need, now, to do something concrete to address the 
current threat. 
 
¶11. (S) Frank said that the big difference between the 
Israeli and Russian positions is on "what to do."  According 
to Frank, the Russians pointed out that all the people 
dealing with the nuclear issue in Iran are now new.  They are 
feeding the supreme leader all his information, including on 
options.  According to Frank, the Russians believe it is best 
to allow these new people some time to "digest" the current 
situation and consider the possible consequences.  This will 
give them time to provide sound options to the supreme 
leader.  Frank said that the Russians feel that if the West 
pushes these new people too hard and fast now, they will 
react negatively and advise the Supreme Leader poorly, 
resulting in the Iranians making decisions that are 
disadvantageous to the West.  Frank made it clear that Israel 
disagrees with this view, and believes that Iran is 
susceptible to pressure.  He said that the current reaction 
by the West is "too small and too slow."  He added, "We know 
Iran is moving elements of its program right now.  It has 
gone beyond the breaking of the seals.  Yet, there is no 
reaction." 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
DISCUSSION ON INCENTIVES TO KEEP THE RUSSIANS ON BOARD 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶12. (S) Frank and the Ambassador exchanged views on whether 
the international community could compensate Russia for its 
losses associated with keeping Bushehr at its current state. 
Frank promised to give the USG more information on what kind 
of economic incentives might be considered to keep Russia on 
board with respect to Bushehr. 
 
¶13. (S) IAEC Deputy DG Ariel Levite suggested that the 
southern supergovernors in Russia influence considerably the 
Russian position on the Iran nuclear threat.  He suggested 
that there is one in particular that has direct access to 
Putin, and said that this supergovernor "cries foul" and 
urges Putin to "go slow" in confronting Iran.  (NOTE:  Levite 
did not identify the supergovernor or which region he comes 
from.  END NOTE.) 
¶14. (S) Frank said that the key question is whether the 
Russians will agree to applying stronger measures against 
Iran.  He wondered aloud what would trigger Russia to react, 
and observed that if the Russians begin to negotiate with the 
Iranians.  It will be necessary to ensure that the Russians 
do not "give up the store." 
 
------------------------------ 
FRANK ON THE IAEA'S WEAKNESSES 
------------------------------ 
 
¶15. (S) On the IAEA, Frank made the following comments: 
 
A) The IAEA is not effectively safeguarding the technology 
that can be used in centrifuge production facilities. 
Factories producing the kind of parts that can be used in 
centrifuge production facilities are "all over the place" in 
Iran.  Most of these factories are in defense facilities 
where the IAEA is denied access.  Furthermore, the IAEA does 
not have the resources to monitor the suspension of the 
production of centrifuges. 
 
B) It might be harder for the IAEA to detect a clandestine 
enrichment or conversion project, if the Iranians declare an 
overt project because legitimate enriched uranium traces 
would mask over the traces that would be left by a 
clandestine project.  A clandestine project would also not 
have to be housed in a single, large facility.  It could be 
broken down into smaller facilities and spread out, per what 
he termed the Libyan model. 
 
C) Israel sees IAEA DG ElBaradei as a negative figure who 
keeps trying to circumvent the problem Iran poses, instead of 
taking it head on.  The IAEA's next report on Iran is due at 
the end of February.  If done properly, this report could 
help to mobilize more members to act more resolutely on Iran. 
 The materials and information that the IAEA has are 
incriminating.  The question, for Israel, is whether 
ElBaradei will act correctly.  Israel believes that Israel, 
the U.S. and like-minded countries need to increase the 
pressure on DG ElBaradei to make his report as clear and 
comprehensive as possible. 
 
D) Israel wonders whether the IAEA's in-house clearance 
process will "affect" the outcome of the February report. 
Will the connection with the military program be blurred?  In 
Israel's view, it is all there, but it needs to be made 
explicit.  What may be needed is a "layman's guide" on how to 
read the report, so that the right connections are made.  In 
a general sense, Frank agreed that the report was more 
important for "what it did not say."  Frank explained that, 
in the past, reports have included all the information that 
needed to be included, but that there was no executive 
summary to draw the connections between the information.  In 
these cases, most of the diplomats in Vienna were not able to 
correctly process the information and come to the right 
conclusions. 
 
E) Israel believes that the U.S. could help other diplomats 
understand the IAEA's reports correctly.  The Indians told 
IAEC staff member Merav Zafary recently that they do not have 
the information they need to justify a stronger position on 
Iran to the Indian public and their own political left. 
Frank and Levite complained that Norway is not being helpful 
at the IAEA, but they did not elaborate. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
FRANK ON EUROPEAN ATTITUDES RE: THE UNSC, SANCTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶16. (S) Frank said that it is clear to Israel that it will 
take a long time before sanctions can be discussed in the 
UNSC.  He urged the U.S. to try to get other countries to 
consider "pre-sanctions" or "soft" sanctions that will 
probably have more of an impact on Iran that traditional 
sanctions.  Israel has in mind preventing the Iranian 
national soccer team from attending certain international 
events, or having European capitals deny landing to Iran's 
national airlines.  Another idea would be to warn investors 
of the risks of doing business in Iran.  Israel has already 
discussed these ideas with some Europeans.  According to 
Frank, the French have said that they see merit behind these 
ideas, and have agreed to warn investors.  Frank said that 
Germany has been more of a "stumbling block," but claimed 
that Chancellor Merkel had promised the GOI that she would 
"have her people work on it."  Frank warned that the Italians 
feel insulted for not being consulted on these matters to 
date and will require some real work to get them to come 
around. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
FRANK ON EGYPT'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE PUSH IN THE UN 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶17. (S) Frank said that Israel is truly grateful for the U.S. 
effort on the language in the IAEA's latest resolution 
reporting Iran to the UNSC, but "Despite America's best 
efforts, the Egyptians have obviously scored with the 
reference in the Board of Governors' resolution to 'a Middle 
East free of WMD.'"  He said that the Egyptians have a game 
plan for taking the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) forward, 
and that there is "no way" that the UNSC can address Iran 
without touching on this issue.  Frank said that the U.S. and 
Israel will have to watch this and work together closely, as 
any such linkage could block any positive move on Iran.  He 
urged the U.S. to help Israel by keeping the UN's discussion 
of Iran's nuclear program focused on Iran. 
 
¶18. (C) Apart from IAEC DG Gideon Frank and Ambassador Jones, 
the meeting was also attended on the U.S. side by the DCM and 
the embassy's POL-MIL officer; and on the IAEC side by Deputy 
DG Ariel Levite and staff members Merav Zafary and Gil Reich. 
 
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JONES