VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSV #0065/01 0522147
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 212147Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RUEWMFC/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2910
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1148
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0944
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SUVA 000065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR GENERAL ABIZAID FROM AMBASSADOR DINGER 
CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON PLEASE PASS TO CENTCOM POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2016 
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV FJ US
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S FEBRUARY 25 
VISIT TO FIJI 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Larry Dinger; Sec. 1.5 (D) and (E) 
 
¶1.  (C)  We look forward to your short visit to Fiji.  It 
comes in the run-up to national elections, which could take 
place as early as late April.   It is also a time of very 
difficult civil-military relations.  Tensions between the 
government and military have been at a near-boiling point for 
months with Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) Commander 
(Navy Commodore) Frank Bainimarama (bai ni ma RAH ma) making 
numerous veiled threats to replace the government of Prime 
Minister Laisenia Qarase (ng ah RAH say) over acts and 
policies Bainimarama says are corrupt, racist, or intended to 
forgive past acts of treason.  The government and military 
have also sparred over the military's involvement in the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, with the 
government giving the green light last fall for an additional 
deployment only after protracted internal negotiations and 
additional funding from Australia.  In your meetings (we hope 
with Vice President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi (Man DRY we we), 
Qarase, and Bainimarama), you will have the opportunity to 
explore the possibility of having Fiji join the Coalition of 
the Willing in Iraq.  With Bainimarama you should also 
emphasize the proper role of the military in a democratic 
society. 
 
The Political Background 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  The current tension between the government and 
military is in the context of a "coup culture" in Fiji.  The 
RFMF executed two coups in 1987.  In May 2000, a group of 
nationalist Fijian civilians removed the democratically 
elected government headed by Indo-Fijian Mahendra Chaudhry, 
with help from some dissident elements of the RFMF.  The 
RFMF, under Bainimarama, eventually resolved the situation, 
with Chaudhry still deposed, and installed Qarase as interim 
PM.  In November 2000, dissident RFMF elements made an 
attempt on Bainimarama's life during a failed mutiny.  In 
general elections in 2001, Qarase was elected PM.  He and 
Bainimarama have been at loggerheads much of the time since. 
In late 2003, Qarase attempted to deny Bainimarama a second 
term as Commander RFMF; but President Iloilo declined to 
follow the PM's advice.  According to Fiji's Constitution, 
only the President can remove the military commander. 
 
¶3.  (C)   In 2005, Qarase introduced a controversial 
"Reconciliation, Truth, and Unity Bill" (aka "the Bill") to 
ostensibly heal old wounds and bring the country together. 
The Bill has had just the opposite effect, highlighting the 
schisms that continue to exist between Fiji's indigenous and 
Indo-Fijian communities and bringing civil-military strains 
out into the open.  The USG and many others criticized the 
Bill's amnesty provisions and impositions on judicial roles. 
 Bainimarama is the Bill's biggest critic, arguing that its 
amnesty provisions could lead to the release or exoneration 
of participants in the coup and mutiny, and as such would 
"reward treason."  A  Parliamentary committee suggested 
changes that address some, but not all, of the Bill's faults. 
 Qarase has put the Bill on hold, and it may not arise again 
until after the elections.  Nevertheless, Bainimarama remains 
highly critical of the Bill and openly skeptical of the 
Qarase government's intentions.  In recent weeks, Bainimarama 
has reiterated his oft-stated threat that the military will 
take (unspecified) actions to ensure the Bill is not made 
into law and implemented. 
 
Government and Military at an Impasse 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  In mid-January, then-Land Force Commander 
Baledrokadroka asked Bainimarama to step down, alleging that 
the Commodore had gone beyond the bounds in his threats 
toward the Government.  Bainimarama, in turn, accused 
Baledrokadroka of conspiring with the Government to oust him 
from the military leadership.  The showdown ended with 
Baledrokadroka's resignation.  Soon after, Vice President 
Madraiwiwi mediated a meeting between Bainimarama and the PM 
(the first in many months) in which both sides agreed to tone 
down the rhetoric and hold regular meetings.  Bainimarama 
agreed to share his views with the PM instead of going 
straight to the media, while the PM agreed to include the 
Commander in National Security Council meetings and deal with 
him directly on matters of national security.  Bainimarama's 
titular superior, the Minister of Home Affairs, appears to 
have been cut out of the loop. 
 
¶5.  (C)  This arrangement has not lessened Bainimarama's 
distaste for the current government.  In a February 14 letter 
to Vice President Madraiwiwi (not made public), the Commander 
called for the delay of elections until after a census is 
conducted.  He said that, without a census (now about a year 
overdue), "the upcoming elections will not be contested on a 
fair and democratic basis and it will deprive the people of 
Fiji a truly democratically elected government."  (Note: a 
number of independent observers we have talked to believe 
conducting a census is impractical at this point and are 
satisfied that the coming elections will be reasonably fair. 
End note.)  Perhaps recognizing a census could not be 
completed before the constitutionally-mandated election 
deadline, Bainimarama also reportedly asked the Vice 
President to convince the President to dissolve Parliament 
and put in place an interim government, actions that the 
President reportedly does not believe he has the 
constitutional authority to take.  Additionally, the Embassy 
has a copy of an unsigned, undated think piece, apparently 
drafted by or for the RFMF, on possible extra-constitutional 
options and justifications. The document refers to the 
Pakistan/Musharraf "doctrine of necessity" model as precedent. 
 
¶6.  (C)  In recent days, Bainimarama, via a spokesman, has 
signaled that the RFMF could invoke the "doctrine of 
necessity" to keep Fiji's Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) from 
installing a person implicated in the 2000 coup as Fiji's 
next President in March.  Current President Iloilo has 
indicated he is prepared to stay on for a second term; 
however, Qarase is rumored to want someone different, someone 
who will stand up to Bainimarama and remove him if the PM so 
requests.  One possible candidate is Ratu Jope Seniloli, a 
high chief and former Vice President, who is currently in 
jail on 2000-related charges. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Bainimarama and Qarase may now both be in situations 
of rolling the dice.  For the PM, to continue on the course 
toward an early election carries a risk of rapidly triggering 
a Bainimarama reaction.  To attempt to delay the election in 
order to hold a census and appease Bainimarama, on the other 
hand, may not be legal.  It would also be a sign of glaring 
political weakness.  For the Commander, ordering his troops 
to take illegal action against the government risks their 
refusal to follow.  If he were to succeed, the Commander 
knows such an action would trigger international negative 
reaction detrimental to Fiji's military reputation and its 
tourism economy. 
 
The RFMF in Iraq 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  In the meantime, Fiji troops have acquitted 
themselves very well in Iraq in support of UNAMI.  They have 
a long and laudatory PKO history, most notably in Lebanon and 
the Sinai.   In 2004, 200 Fiji troops were deployed in Iraq, 
a 155-man guard unit and a 45-man personal security 
detachment. In 2005, Fiji renewed its UNAMI commitment and 
authorized adding 110 troops for positions in Erbil and 
Basra.  The additional RFMF troops have trained and are ready 
to deploy.  However, the UN has not yet given the mission a 
green light. 
 
¶9.  (C)  The RFMF is dissatisfied with current UNAMI 
arrangements, which in the RFMF view, do not allow it to use 
the peacekeeping skills it has developed over many years of 
involvement in PKO missions.  After Bainimarama visited Iraq 
in December, he informed us he believes Fiji troops could 
contribute more by participating in the Coalition, in 
addition to meeting current UNAMI commitments.  He has 
proposed sending a platoon (starting small), but the 
Government has not yet responded.  Bainimarama believes 
Coalition participation would provide unique training 
opportunities and enhance the skills of his troops. 
 
Themes For Your Visit 
--------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  From our perspective your visit should have two 
main themes.  First, Iraq: 
 
Commodore Bainimarama has invited you to make the case to the 
Government of Fiji for an RFMF deployment to the Coalition of 
the Willing. 
-- Please express to each interlocutor our deep thanks for 
Fiji's exceptional contributions to peacekeeping operations 
throughout the world, including via UNAMI in Iraq.  Then 
discuss the usefulness of Fiji deploying at least some troops 
in Iraq as a Coalition partner. 
 
-- Fiji's civilian leaders appreciate that RFMF and Fiji 
Police contributions to peacekeeping operations burnish 
Fiji's international reputation and contribute to a more 
peaceful and prosperous world.  This CENTCOM visit, in 
itself, strongly accents the message that the U.S. values 
Fiji's contributions. 
 
-- The RFMF's budget has been a political issue.  It will be 
important to flag to the civilian leadership how the costs of 
an RFMF deployment to the Coalition would be covered. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Second theme: military-civilian relations in a 
democracy: 
 
Given the ongoing tensions in Fiji, we believe it essential 
for senior U.S. military visitors to reiterate to Commodore 
Bainimarama the USG view of civil-military relations. 
Bainimarama is well aware that the U.S. believes the military 
in a democracy must abide by civilian control.  This is 
nowhere more true than in a nation like Fiji with its "coup 
culture" history.  Bainimarama knows that illegally removing 
a lawfully elected civilian government will trigger a cut off 
of USG military-assistance programs, as has happened before 
here.  He knows, as well, that a coup would strongly affect 
Fiji's tourism-based economy.  While the themes have been 
delivered before, we believe the timing of this visit, in the 
context of the RFMF's very recent "doctrine of necessity" 
comments, requires finding an opportunity to raise the 
subject and deliver the clear message: 
 
-- No matter the Commodore's strongly held dissatisfactions 
with the Qarase Government and his deep worries about the 
coming elections, he must work within the civilian-led 
political system.  If the civilians cannot, or are not 
willing to, accommodate military concerns, the civilian view 
still must win. 
 
-- Any RFMF actions to disrupt the constitutional processes 
in Fiji, no matter how sincere the motive, will do great harm 
to Fiji's international relationships, including bilateral 
U.S.- Fiji relations, and, under U.S. law, must result in a 
suspension of military assistance. 
DINGER