VZCZCXRO2961
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHSF #0215/01 0411600
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 101600Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1415
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0122
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FBI FOR OIO 
DOD FOR OSD/POLICY (STRAUSS) 
DOJ FOR OIA, OPDAT, AND AG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC KCRM KCOR BU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR BULGARIAN INTERIOR MINISTER 
PETKOV'S MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON 
 
REF: A. 05 SOFIA 2054 
     ¶B. SOFIA 198 
     ¶C. 05 SOFIA 1618 
     ¶D. 05 SOFIA 1685 
 
Classified By: DCM Jeffrey D. Levine, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Interior Minister Rumen Petkov is one of the 
most influential personalities in the current government, and 
is almost certainly the one who evokes the strongest feelings 
among Bulgarians.  Recent public opinion data shows him to be 
among the most popular public officials in the country, a 
first for an Interior Minister in post-Communist Bulgaria. 
On the other hand, many on the right side of the political 
spectrum view Petkov as the poster child for all that is 
wrong with the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP): unreformed, 
unrepentant, and tainted by corruption.  While often 
demonized by his opponents, Petkov is not the one-dimensional 
character he is sometimes made out to be; whether out of 
conviction or convenience, he is clearly on the side of 
reformist Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev.  On the foreign 
policy issues we care most about -- GWOT, Iraq, stationing of 
U.S. forces -- he has used his influence as Deputy Party 
Chairman to move the BSP in our direction.  Not surprisingly, 
since he has only been in office five months, the jury is 
still out on his performance as Interior Minister.  If his 
private comments and public statements are to be believed, he 
is serious about rooting out corruption in his ministry and 
bringing criminals to justice.  The results to date have been 
mixed, however, and Petkov needs to be pushed hard to put 
more of Bulgaria's most notorious organized crime figures 
where they belong: behind bars. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) As head of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) Petkov 
oversees all of Bulgaria's law enforcement agencies, as well 
as the National Security Service (NSS), whose principal 
responsibility is domestic counter-intelligence.  He will be 
accompanied on his visit to the United States by Deputy 
Interior Minister Boiko Kotsev, Interior Ministry General 
Secretary Ilia Iliev, and NSS Director Ivan Chobanov. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶3. (C) Much of the country's success in implementing 
effective rule of law depends on Petkov's personal resolve to 
tackle organized crime.  To date, his tenure at the Interior 
Ministry has not seen significant progress on this front. 
The five largest organized crime groups in Bulgaria (TIM, 
VIS, SIC, Nove Holding, and Multigroup) are household names 
and generally operate with impunity.  Over 30 people have 
been killed in recent years in gangland-style shootings 
linked to organized crime, none of which have been solved. 
During the same time period, only two high-profile OC leaders 
(the Marinov brothers, linked to SIC) have actually been 
detained.  The MOI has made little progress in its 
investigation into the murder of businessman Emil Kyulev, 
which rocked the Bulgarian political establishment in October 
(Ref. A).  Nove Holding, lead by Vasil Bozhkov (aka, "The 
Skull") and TIM, led by Tihomir Mitev and Ivo Georgiev, are 
the two groups that have been largely untouched by recent 
killings and arrests, leading many to believe that they enjoy 
at least tacit support at high levels of the GOB. 
 
------------ 
WHAT WE WANT 
------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Petkov and his deputies have been prepared for a tough 
message on organized crime, and we should press him hard to 
show results.  The imminent appointment of the reform-minded 
Boris Velchev to replace corrupt and ineffective Chief 
Prosecutor Nikola Filchev removes an important obstacle to 
action on this front (Ref. B).  Only if Petkov and Velchev 
succeed in reforming their respective services and tackling 
vested interests will progress be possible in the fight 
against organized crime. 
 
¶5. (S) Cooperation with the U.S. on counter-terrorism and 
counter-proliferation are handled by Petkov through the NSS. 
Agencies at post report that cooperation with the NSS has 
improved under Petkov's leadership and that he has taken 
steps to professionalize the service and insulate it from 
political influence and cronyism.  We should express our 
 
SOFIA 00000215  002 OF 003 
 
 
appreciation and encourage Petkov to continue working closely 
with us on these issues. 
 
-------------------- 
POTENTIAL AGREEMENTS 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Petkov and other MOI officials have repeatedly 
stressed to us their desire to execute a formal bilateral 
agreement on exchange of law enforcement information (Ref. 
B).  We expect them to raise this issue in Washington as 
well.  Under Bulgarian law, legal and investigative records 
are considered classified, and cannot be exchanged with 
another government without a formal agreement.  In practice, 
Bulgarian law enforcement contacts have generally provided 
information anyway, but continually worry that they are in 
technical violation of their own law.  Post generally 
supports the idea of an MOU on this issue to facilitate 
cooperation and allay Bulgarian concerns, but has not been 
able to settle on a text that will be acceptable to both 
Washington counterparts and the GOB. 
 
¶7. (U) Another bilateral legal instrument currently under 
consideration is an update of the extradition treaty between 
the U.S. and Bulgaria, which was last amended in the 1930s. 
This proposal has the strong support of U.S. law enforcement 
agencies as well as the GOB.  C-175 negotiation authority has 
currently passed the inter-agency clearance process, and is 
awaiting final approval from the Department.  If final 
approval is obtained in time for Petkov's visit, a public 
announcement of the initiation of negotiations could be seen 
as a potential deliverable for both sides.  A bilateral 
agreement on WMD-related assistance has also been under 
discussion for several years but significant obstacles remain 
in the negotiation of a mutually acceptable text. 
 
¶8. (U) Less controversial is the INL implementing arrangement 
expected to be signed between Minister Petkov and INL Asst. 
Secretary Patterson during the visit.  This document is an 
 
SIPDIS 
amendment to the LOA between the GOB and INL signed last 
year, and spells out the terms of U.S.-funded law enforcement 
developmental assistance to Bulgaria. 
 
------------------------ 
Politics and Personality 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (S) Petkov is perhaps best described as a political 
operator who has proven his pragmatism and is motivated by 
success rather than ideology.  While strongly supporting the 
policies of moderate BSP leaders such as President Parvanov 
and Prime Minister Stanishev, he also maintains working 
relationships with political forces as diverse as right-wing 
Sofia Mayor Boiko Borissov, leaders of the ethnic-Turkish MRF 
party, and the BSP's "hard left," including representatives 
of communist-era security services.  Petkov's ties to the 
BSP's old guard resulted in political embarrassment in 
September 2005, when he was forced to abandon plans to 
appoint high-ranking former members of the communist-era 
intelligence service and political police to an MOI 
"Citizen's Advisory Council" (Refs. C & D). 
 
10 (S) Petkov's role as campaign manager and "bag man" for 
the BSP's last three national campaigns has inevitably 
resulted in accusations of corruption and links to organized 
crime; however his modest lifestyle suggests these 
associations may have been for party, rather than personal 
gain.  As the mayor of the central Bulgarian city of Pleven 
during the mid-1990s, Petkov was dogged by scandals, some 
serious and some -- like his late night arrest for urinating 
in a public fountain -- simply illustrative of his unpolished 
style.  Like the president and prime minister, Petkov 
understands that Bulgaria must show progress on rule of law 
in order to enter the EU in 2007.  However, past associations 
with controversial figures may make it difficult for him to 
move against certain OC interests.  Petkov has also long been 
publicly associated with Russians who are either directly or 
indirectly affiliated with Russian intelligence. 
 
¶11. (C) In sharp contrast to the statesmanlike style of 
President Parvanov and the reformist enthusiasm of PM 
 
SOFIA 00000215  003 OF 003 
 
 
Stanishev, Petkov is well known for his hard-working, 
hard-drinking approach to politics.  Though this 
controversial image may prevent Petkov from aspiring to 
higher office, it has not hurt his popularity: polls 
consistently show him to be among the popular politicians in 
the country. 
 
------------------ 
Petkov and the MOI 
------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) Despite post's concerns about the MOI's effectiveness 
against OC and corruption, all agencies at post report 
excellent cooperation with Petkov and the MOI on law 
enforcement, intelligence and embassy security.  In recent 
years, U.S.-funded programs have provided significant 
assistance to the MOI, particularly aimed at enhancing the 
technical and investigative capabilities of Bulgarian law 
enforcement.  On February 7, the Ambassador and Petkov held a 
joint press conference to mark the donation of two advanced 
bomb-disposal robots to the MOI.  The Minister is playing a 
key role in Bulgaria's hosting of the 2006 NATO Ministerial 
and the 2006 International Association of Chiefs of Police 
Conference. 
 
¶13. (C) In contrast to previous Interior Ministers, however, 
Petkov has told us privately that the Ministry of Interior's 
main problem is not lack of resources.  He has emphasized his 
concern that many MOI officers at all levels are "working on 
the other side" on behalf of corrupt interests, and has 
argued that the ministry should first clean house before 
turning to foreign donors to solve its problems.  Petkov's 
plan to fire hundreds of corrupt police officers was derailed 
following the Kyulev murder, but he has continued to push for 
major reform of the ministry.  He has thrown his weight 
behind proposals to radically revise the MOI's structure, 
including consolidating the country's numerous police 
services under a single hierarchy and abandoning 
communist-era military titles for MOI officials in favor of a 
civilian ranking system.  The draft MOI Act favored by Petkov 
would also greatly diminish the role of the ministry's 
general secretary, centralizing control of law enforcement 
agencies in the interior minister's hands. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) Petkov is a pragmatist.  He understands that 
Bulgaria's interests, as well as his own, lie in rapid 
integration into Europe and a strong bilateral relationship 
with the U.S.  Despite his checkered past, he is our prime 
contact on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation and law 
enforcement.  He should be praised for his cooperation in the 
first two areas and pushed to show results in the last. END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
Beyrle