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FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2016 
TAGS: ENRG ECON ETRD TRGY EINV EPET PREL SENV
SUBJECT: UNDER THE YOKE: BULGARIA'S DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS 
 
REF: A) SOFIA 190 B) 05 SOFIA 2063 
 
Classified By: Amb. John Beyrle for reason 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Sixteen years after the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria still finds itself under the Russian 
energy yoke.  Bulgaria receives 88 percent of its natural gas 
from Gazprom or one of its sister companies, and 73 percent 
of its oil from Russia.  As it awaits entry into the EU, 
Bulgaria still faces the fact that one country-supplier can 
control whether the lights stay on.  Minister of Economy and 
Energy Rumen Ovcharov went to Moscow January 31 - February 1 
to discuss the Belene Nuclear Plant, Burgas-Alexandropolous 
(B-A) oil pipeline, and gas prices with Russian Energy 
Minister Khristyenko.  Upon return, he has publicly spoken 
about the prospect of an even larger Russian energy presence 
in Bulgaria if Russian firms are selected to build the 
proposed Belene Nuclear Power Plant.  In a possible quid pro 
quo, he has also said Russia and Bulgaria have agreed that 
the current subsidized gas delivery contract with Gazprom -- 
which the Russian side had insisted on revising -- will 
continue unchanged for the time being.  In addition, Ovcharov 
announced that Russia, Bulgaria and Greece will meet in 
Athens in March to discuss final details for the 
Burgas-Alexandropolous pipeline.  The GOB, with its neighbors 
and soon-to-be EU partners, must come up with an energy 
policy that diversifies its supply of primary fuels, without 
burning any bridges to Russia, on which it will be dependent 
for years to come.  END SUMMARY 
 
GAS: GAZPROM CALLING THE SHOTS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  Gazprom's recent attempt to reopen the contract it 
negotiated in 1998 with Bulgaria has again highlighted 
Bulgaria's need for strategic energy planning (Ref B). 
Although Bulgaria drafted an energy policy in 2004 with the 
aim of diversifying its sources, scant attention had been 
paid to the issue until Gazprom's, New Years "surprises" here 
and in Ukraine. 
 
¶3.  (C)  In 2005, Bulgaria consumed 3.47 billion cubic 
meters, of which 3 billion was imported from Russia.  The 
remaining amount was produced domestically, from dwindling 
reserves.  Bulgaria currently pays less than market prices 
for the portion -- 40-50 percent -- of the gas it receives 
from Gazprom in the form of transit fees for gas flowing to 
Turkey, Greece and Macedonia.  The transit price was fixed in 
1998 at USD 83/1000 cubic meter.  Bulgaria claims that for 
the first few years of the contract, they lost USD 30 Million 
at that price.  Once energy prices began to rise, though, 
Bulgaria began to enjoy the fruits of a contract that now 
seems very shrewd.  The agreement is complex; but the current 
average price for all gas delivered to Bulgaria is approx. 
USD 160-170 vs. a market price of USD 258.  In December, 
Gazprom began calling for renegotiation of the contract due 
to the escalation in natural gas prices.  Gazprom said it 
would pay the transit fees in cash, and charge Bulgaria 
market rates for all gas deliveries. 
 
¶4.  (C) GOB officials and private analysts told us the 
sanctity of the 1998 contract could and should be respected. 
If the EU backed up Bulgaria, it would send a strong message 
to Russia not to meddle with previously agreed contracts. 
Nevertheless, Bulgarian leaders privately worry that they 
could "win the battle, but lose the war," as former Economy 
and Energy Minister Milko Kovachev told us.  When the current 
contract runs out in 2010, Bulgaria will not only have to 
contend with a potentially stronger Gazprom, but could be 
faced with loss of revenue from its pipeline if Russia makes 
good on its threat to build an additional Blue Stream route 
in Turkey.  GOB officials, including current Minister of 
Economy and Energy Rumen Ovcharov, have told us they take 
seriously the threat that Russia will go ahead with another 
Blue Stream route, which could leave Bulgaria holding an 
empty pipeline come 2010.  This, more than any other piece of 
Russian gas leverage, has forced the GOB to assess its 
long-term strategic goals, rather than just seek short-term 
pricing advantages. 
 
¶5.  (U) Upon his return from the Moscow meetings, Ovcharov 
said Gazprom was pleased with Bulgaria for not slowing the 
supply of natural gas to neighboring countries, and that the 
current gas contracts will stay in place for the time being 
) a victory of sorts for Bulgaria.  But he also said that 
the two sides discussed increasing the transit of natural 
gas, as well as the involvement of Gazprom and other Russian 
companies in various energy projects in Bulgaria.  In a clear 
 
SOFIA 00000202  002 OF 003 
 
 
recognition of the unbalanced nature of the Bulgarian-Russian 
energy relationship, Ovcharov said that Bulgaria, as a small 
country, "cannot stand up to a giant like Gazprom" and 
discuss natural gas in isolation from other energy projects. 
 
¶6.  (C) Ovcharov told the press that in Russia the two sides 
discussed the option of jointly constructing an extension of 
the current gas pipeline grid and possible Gazprom 
participation in a future privatization of Bulgargaz, but 
this would not happen until after EU-mandated changes in the 
structure of Bulgargaz in 2007.  These changes might help 
Bulgaria resolve its current gas and transit fee dilemma, but 
would lead to a much deeper reliance on Gazprom. 
 
NABUCCO: BACK ON THE RADAR SCREEN 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The prospect of continued dependence on Gazprom has 
renewed Bulgaria's focus on a long-delayed alternative, the 
Nabucco pipeline.  In 2005 Austria's OMV, Hungary's MOL, 
Romania's Transgas, Turkey's Botas, and Bulgaria's Bulgargaz 
signed a joint-venture agreement to establish Nabucco.  Each 
of the partners would own a 20 percent stake.  This pipeline 
would bring jobs, transit fees and, most importantly to 
Bulgaria, a non-Russian source of gas.  However, it is still 
in the discussion stage.  There are outstanding questions 
about where the gas would come from -- Iran, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, or other Caspian sources -- and whether Turkey 
would first purchase the gas and re-sell it to the pipeline, 
or allow it to transit through and just collect their own 
fees.  The Bulgarians complain that Turkey wants to play a 
controlling role in both gas and oil supply, rather than 
remaining "just" a transit country.  In fact, Turkey and 
Bulgaria can be seen as competitors in the gas/oil hub arena, 
although Turkey, closer to the sources and much larger, has 
an obvious advantage over Bulgaria. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Ovcharov told us the earliest Nabucco will be 
on-line is 2011-12, and even then the most likely potential 
supplier ) Iran ) is not necessarily a more preferable 
partner than Russia.  Ovcharov said this in the context of 
explaining why Bulgaria will need to improve its overall 
relationship with Gazprom for both current contracts and for 
other energy-sector projects.  Nabucco, particularly with EU 
support, could help Bulgaria diversify away from Russian 
sources -- unless, of course, Gazprom purchases Bulgargaz. 
 
OIL PIPELINES: B-A BACK IN PLAY 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U)  There are currently two oil pipelines under 
consideration to run through Bulgaria: AMBO ) an 
American-led consortium to carry oil of unspecified origin 
from Burgas, Bulgaria, through Macedonia and on to Vlore, 
Albania; and B-A, taking Russian oil from Burgas to 
Alexandropolous, Greece.  The current Bulgarian government 
has not clearly indicated whether it will support one route 
over another, or allow the market to take over the process. 
Ovcharov, in remarks to Parliament on January 27, stated that 
B-A is at a more advanced stage of development than AMBO. 
Ovcharov said Russia and Bulgaria agree now is the time to 
move B-A into the implementation stage.  Specifics will be 
discussed in a trilateral meeting in Athens in March. 
Interestingly, Gazprom will also take part in the 
construction of B-A, Ovcharov reported after his trip to 
Moscow. 
 
¶10.  (C)  However, we learned from Bulgaria's Minister of 
Regional Development, Asen Gagauzov, that Russia recently 
reneged on last year's three-nation agreement on equal 
ownership in a consortium to build B-A, and is now pushing 
for a 90 percent share, leaving Bulgaria and Greece with only 
5 percent each.  Gagauzov claimed Greece has already accepted 
the deal, and the GOB is ready to concede as long as it can 
be guaranteed ownership and control of the Universal Terminal 
Burgas (UTB) ) the entry point for the oil.  The GOB says it 
does not want to build two terminals, in case both AMBO and 
B-A are eventually built. 
 
¶11.  (C)  American companies involved in B-A have told us 
privately that they are strongly opposed to the current 
structure of the UTB (the companies want the terminal to be 
part of the pipeline, not separate) and route, and would not 
participate under the current plan.  However, if the GOB 
brought in an international investor, that could change the 
equation, XXXXXXXXXXXX told us.  There are 
also questions about the players involved in UTB and their 
links to current and former high-ranking government 
 
SOFIA 00000202  003 OF 003 
 
 
officials.  In the end, Amb. Beyrle has told Gagauzov and PM 
Stanishev that the GOB needed to work with the private sector 
regarding plans for UTB in order to get their buy-in.  One 
risk here for Bulgaria is that if the government puts too 
many conditions on the structure of the project, it could 
chase investors to other routes through Romania or Turkey. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Successful completion of B-A would give Bulgaria a 
more reliable supply of oil, and increase the government's 
revenues from transit fees.  However, with such a large 
presence of Russian financing, construction and supply 
interests, it would not help Bulgaria diversify its energy 
sources. 
 
AMBO MOVING SLOWLY 
------------------ 
 
¶13.  (C)  There are conflicting views of whether AMBO is a 
viable project.  Ovcharov told Parliament that it is possible 
if AMBO receives backing from a major power (i.e., the U.S.), 
along the lines of Baku-Ceyan.  Others feel the length and 
cost of the project, not to mention the potential instability 
of Macedonia and Albania, make AMBO less attractive as a true 
Bosphorous bypass. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Private sources have told us AMBO has not yet 
signed up the international suppliers necessary to finalize 
the project's financing.  GOB energy officials told us AMBO 
has not been active for months ) perhaps waiting to see how 
B-A gets moving.  Curiously, this is an area where the EU 
might be more interested, former Energy Minister Kovachev 
told us, due to the potential to bring oil right to Italy's 
shores.  AMBO, with US and/or EU participation, could 
diversify Bulgaria's energy supplies -) particularly if the 
oil comes from non-Russian (Kazahk) sources -- but there 
needs to be some external interest from the oil suppliers as 
well as a major governmental player for this to happen 
anytime soon. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶15.  (C)  Bulgaria's leadership recognizes that their 
dependence on one energy supplier ) even a historical friend 
like Russia ) threatens its independence and prosperity.  It 
is likely Gazprom's threat to cut off supplies was a ploy to 
get favorable concessions on other projects.  Any move by the 
GOB to allow Gazprom to reach further into Bulgaria's energy 
market could ensure Bulgaria's gas supplies in the short 
term, but weaken the country's ability to resist further 
pressures from Gazprom and/or Russia.  Bulgaria's 
geographical position makes it a natural energy hub for 
Southeastern Europe, bringing oil and gas from the East to 
Europe and beyond, while continuing to export electricity to 
the immediate region.  The strategic challenge for the 
Bulgarians is securing their hub position without mortgaging 
too much of their future to Gazprom and Russia. 
Beyrle