This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2011 
TAGS: PREL KCOR KCRM BU
SUBJECT: NEW CHIEF PROSECUTOR READIES FOR "WAR" 
 
REF: SOFIA 82 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle, for reason 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a February 3 meeting with the Ambassador, 
newly elected Chief Prosecutor Boris Velchev made clear that 
despite pressure to produce immediate results for an EU 
audience, his main focus would be on building solid cases 
against OC figures and asserting control over a deeply 
dysfunctional prosecution service.  Velchev conceded the 
challenge of managing short-term expectations, but displayed 
impressive candor and resolve in outlining his priorities and 
the obstacles he expects to face once in office.  We should 
be prepared to support Velchev's reform of the prosecution 
service with technical assistance, however difficult a time 
he may have meeting the high expectations of Bulgaria's 
political elite and EU observers. END SUMMARY. 
 
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DISARMING A 'TERRORIST' PROSECUTION SERVICE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Velchev spoke frankly about the current state of 
affairs in Bulgaria's prosecution service, stating that from 
what he has learned in recent weeks, the situation is "even 
worse than I had imagined."  In his words, the prosecution 
service under current Chief Prosecutor Nikola Filchev has 
evolved into "some kind of terrorist organization" used to 
settle political and business scores, but totally incapable 
of fighting crime.  So entrenched is the outgoing Chief 
Prosecutor's influence that just three weeks shy of Velchev's 
inauguration, his future deputies refuse to speak with him, 
openly hinting at fears of repercussions from Filchev. 
Citing a lack of access to information, Velchev declined to 
provide a detailed "100-day plan," but outlined three 
potential sources of opposition to change: criminals, 
politicians, and the prosecutors themselves.  Velchev 
declared that he was "not afraid" of criminals, and "could 
find a way to deal with" politicians, but was most surprised 
and discouraged by resistance from within the prosecution 
service.  He indicated that his first moves as Chief 
Prosecutor would be to prepare for "some kind of a war" with 
corrupt incumbent prosecutors. 
 
¶3. (C) Velchev did not expect this struggle to be easy.  Like 
the Chief Prosecutor, Deputy Chief Prosecutors are elected 
rather than appointed, and the current deputies have several 
years remaining in their terms.  In Velchev's evaluation, his 
only near-term chance to build a team he can trust will be to 
approach these deputies individually and convince them to 
resign.  As he attempts to assemble his team of trusted 
deputies, Velchev plans to simultaneously tackle the "easy 
work" of sending signals that political influence in 
prosecutions will no longer be tolerated, as well as the more 
challenging task of beginning to collect hard evidence on 15 
years of unchecked OC activity.  After a house-cleaning 
period of 3-4 months, Velchev hopes to start moving against 
high-profile OC and corruption targets. 
 
¶4. (C) On the issue of Filchev's future, Velchev acknowledged 
the conventional wisdom that he will likely be sent abroad as 
ambassador to Belarus or Kazakhstan.  Filchev, who counts 
Belarussian President Lukashenko as a personal acquaintance 
and has made several official and unofficial trips to Minsk 
in the past year, has lobbied for such a post unabashedly. 
Velchev acknowledged that many aspects of his job would be 
easier if Filchev were physically out of the country and not 
"looking over my shoulder."  However, Velchev also worried 
out loud that as details of Filchev's activities became 
clear, pressure to investigate him might build, causing 
bilateral problems with the country of his posting. 
 
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EU EXPECTATIONS 
--------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Velchev acknowledged the importance of the EU's April 
monitoring report on Bulgaria's readiness for accession, but 
said he could not plan his priorities as Chief Prosecutor 
based on the European Commission's timeline.  The previous 
Chief Prosecutor's lack of progress in fighting corruption 
and solving over 30 high-profile OC-related killings has long 
been a concern of the EU and the U.S. Embassy alike. 
Although many OC figures in Bulgaria continue to operate in 
plain sight, progress toward speedy prosecutions will be 
hampered by years of shoddy evidence collection and a team 
whose previous lack of success indicates they are 
"incompetent, afraid, or corrupt."  In his meetings with EU 
officials, Velchev intends to stress the importance of real, 
rather than cosmetic reform, while holding out hope that a 
reformed, functioning prosecution service will eventually 
"give hope to people" that the war on organized crime and 
corruption can be won.  With regard to domestic public 
opinion, the future Chief Prosecutor mentioned the possible 
need to publicly reveal "the facts" regarding the state of 
the prosecution service in order to manage expectations and 
illustrate the scope of the challenges before him. 
 
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BENDING THE RULES? 
------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Despite his respect for the rule of law, Velchev 
argued that bending rules of evidence and procedure was 
justified in the case of certain organized crime leaders. 
Referring again to the failure of Bulgarian prosecutors and 
law enforcement officials to collect more than "feeble 
evidence" against OC figures, Velchev announced his intention 
to pursue a "contract with the courts" - i.e., to appeal to 
judges to convict OC leaders based on evidence that otherwise 
might not pass muster.  He estimated that such an arrangement 
would be justified against the country's 20-30 
highest-ranking criminals, in whose cases adherence to 
"strict legal principles will be counterproductive." 
According to Velchev, Interior Minister Petkov had already 
enlisted his support in deploying this strategy in the 
high-profile prosecution of the Marinov brothers for 
attempted murders linked to organized crime. 
 
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THE U.S. ANGLE 
-------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Velchev said he appreciated the Ambassador's offer of 
USG support, and agreed with the Ambassador's statement that 
while the U.S. could help build the technical competency of 
prosecutors, the moral and ethical foundation for an 
effective prosecution service would have to come from the 
Bulgarian side.  Velchev stressed that while technical 
assistance would be necessary in time, the need to 
consolidate control of the prosecution service and initiate 
successful cases made USG cooperation in gathering and 
sharing information a more pressing priority.  Velchev cited 
Bulgarian law enforcement's lack of previous success against 
OC as justification for a lack of confidence in 
"professional" officials of the Ministry of Interior, raising 
the possibility that even USG information previously shared 
with GoB law enforcement counterparts might be "filtered" 
before making it to his desk.  In a request that highlighted 
his lack of support among the corps of prosecutors, Velchev 
asked Post's Resident Legal Advisor to suggest a shortlist of 
effective regional prosecutors we have worked with in other 
cities who could serve as potential allies in his reform 
efforts. 
 
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LIBYA 
----- 
 
¶8. (C) Despite working extensively on the issue of the 
Bulgarian medics in Libya in his role as the President's 
Legal Advisor, Velchev was not aware of the outcome of recent 
meetings in London.  He expressed guarded optimism about the 
prospects for an eventual favorable resolution of the case. 
Specifically, he predicted that the Libyan side would push 
for a solution "in the hardest possible way for us" - by 
re-convicting the nurses, sentencing them to death again, and 
finally pardoning them, perhaps by late summer.  He thanked 
the Ambassador for the USG's efforts on behalf of the nurses, 
and noted that the last six months had seen a notable 
increase in Libya's willingness to find a quick resolution to 
the crisis. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9. (C) Velchev is clearly open to cooperation with the U.S.: 
he specifically mentioned that some public expression of U.S. 
support for his efforts once in office would send a strong 
and positive message to the Bulgarian people and strengthen 
his position.  Velchev's outline of his concerns and 
priorities struck us as right on target: only a short-term 
focus on internal house-cleaning will make the longer-term 
war against organized criminals effective.  However, even if 
his attempts at meaningful reform are fully successful, 
results are likely to materialize in months, not days.  The 
high expectations of many observers for short-term results 
are unrealistic given the extent to which the "old way of 
doing business" is entrenched in the prosecution service. 
Nonetheless, after seven years of pervasive, systemic 
corruption under the outgoing prosecutor, Velchev offers the 
best chance for change Bulgaria could have hoped for, and we 
should be ready to offer all the support he can use.  END 
COMMENT. 
Beyrle