VZCZCXRO9123
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGP #0554/01 0550351
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZFR
P 240351Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8891
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2077
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1588
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1462
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3810
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5269
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1252
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 6342
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 000554 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PTER SN
SUBJECT: EAP DAS JOHN'S VISIT TO SINGAPORE 
 
REF: SINGAPORE 553 
 
Classified By: EP Counselor Laurent Charbonnet, Reasons 1.4(b)(d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Eric John 
briefed GOS interlocutors on U.S. engagement with Southeast 
Asia and the resumption of military ties with the Indonesian 
Armed Forces (TNI) during his February 8-11 visit.  Ministry 
of Defence Permanent Secretary Chiang Chie Foo said President 
Yudhoyono, his Ministry of Defense, and TNI were slowly 
working to place the TNI under civilian control.  Indonesia 
was the key strategic player in Southeast Asia and Singapore 
could not afford instability there, he argued.  DAS John and 
MFA Second Permanent Secretary Bilahari had a full and frank 
exchange of views on China's and the United States' level and 
quality of involvement with Southeast Asia.  Singapore's 
security agencies told DAS John they believed Indonesia was 
stepping up its counterterrorism efforts, but was still the 
main source of terrorist threat to Singapore.  They argued, 
however, that the Philippines, with its poor governance, 
constituted a more serious terrorist threat for the region at 
large.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Visiting Singapore February 8-11, EAP Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Eric John met with Ministry of Defence Permanent 
 
SIPDIS 
Secretary Chiang Chie Foo, MFA Second Permanent Secretary 
 
SIPDIS 
Bilahari Kausikan, Internal Security Department (ISD) 
Director Pang Kin Keong, Security and Intelligence Division 
(SID) Director BG Chee Wee Kiong, and the American Chamber of 
Commerce.  He also conducted a roundtable discussion with 
researchers at the Institute for Defence and Strategic 
Studies, a government-linked think tank.  DAS John's meeting 
with Foreign Minister George Yeo is reported reftel. 
 
Indonesia and TNI Reform 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) EAP DAS John briefed Ministry of Defence Permanent 
Secretary Chiang on U.S. policy toward Indonesia and the 
 
SIPDIS 
resumption of military ties with the Indonesian Armed Forces 
(TNI).  Chiang said Singapore had considerable interaction 
with the TNI and welcomed the decision by the United States 
to rebuild its links with the Indonesian military.  As an 
institution, the TNI could hold the country together, just as 
former President Suharto used it to keep Indonesia in one 
piece, Chiang argued.  Asked about efforts to place the TNI 
under the civilian control of the Ministry of Defense, Chiang 
said it would not be easy to do.  The TNI had its own clout, 
but President Yudhoyono, the Ministry, and TNI were working 
slowly to resolve this.  Chiang noted that the TNI had played 
a positive role in the Aceh peace process by "restraining the 
actions" of its local units.  Due to strong nationalist 
sentiments, it would be difficult to make progress with the 
TNI if the discussions were public.  The TNI could not afford 
to be seen as pro-West or pro-Singapore.  DAS John commented 
that we wanted to work quietly with the TNI, but members of 
Congress wanted more public statements. 
 
¶4. (C) The GOS viewed Indonesia as the key strategic player 
in Southeast Asia, according to Chiang.  For the region to 
move forward, Indonesia had to be a part of the effort. 
Singapore could not afford instability or anarchy in such an 
important neighbor.  If the provinces broke away from the 
central government, Singapore would have to contend with many 
more power centers.  Chiang cautioned that the United States 
should be patient with its push for Indonesia's 
democratization.  Opening up a political system too quickly 
can lead to unintended consequences, such as Hamas' victory 
in the Palestinian Territories, he asserted. 
 
Amb. Chan's Speech and U.S. Engagement 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) DAS John told MFA Second Permanent Secretary Bilahari 
that Ambassador Chan Heng Chee's February 3 speech in Houston 
on China and ASEAN had stirred a negative reaction in 
Washington.  (Note: Amb. Chan is Singapore's ambassador to 
the United States.  End Note.)  The speech was inaccurate and 
portrayed U.S. involvement with ASEAN in a negative light. 
If Singapore had concerns about our policy toward Southeast 
Asia, the GOS should raise them with us directly, DAS John 
said.  The normally loquacious Bilahari was momentarily 
stunned and finally admitted that he had not read the speech 
 
SINGAPORE 00000554  002 OF 003 
 
 
and couldn't comment on it directly but he took DAS John's 
point.  Neither the Americas Directorate Director nor the 
North American Affairs Deputy Director, who were also in the 
meeting, had apparently read or even seen the speech. 
 
¶6. (C) Bilahari went on to argue that the United States was 
falling behind China's multilateral diplomacy with ASEAN.  He 
acknowledged the intrinsic structural restraints limiting the 
United States' ability to engage multilaterally -- the United 
States was "always ambivalent" about regional diplomacy and, 
as a global power, had limited time to devote to each region. 
 China had been engaged in a concerted effort over the last 
decade to improve its ties with Southeast Asia.  China had 
been "spinning a web" with various meetings, forums, and 
agreements.  While many of these were "meaningless" in and of 
themselves, they took on a different meaning in their 
totality.  China's goal was not to displace the United States 
from Southeast Asia -- which it couldn't do -- but to shift 
it aside.  A number of countries in Southeast Asia, in 
addition to Burma and Laos, were calculating their national 
interests with China in mind, asserted Bilahari. 
 
¶7. (C) DAS John stated that the United States was interested 
in quality agreements with ASEAN that had substance.  The 
ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership would enable us to expand our 
economic and political engagement.  He added that there would 
also be significant "visit diplomacy" this year, with the 
President's trip to Hanoi in November for APEC and several 
trips to the region by the Secretary.  Our goal was not to 
compete with China for influence, but to maintain a high 
quality of involvement.  Bilahari responded that Singapore 
welcomed a positive competition for influence in the region. 
An "imbalance of influence would cramp our style." 
 
Regional Terrorism Threats 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Indonesian security forces had become more serious 
about the terrorist threat, due to pressure from President 
Yudhoyono and other countries as well as inter-service 
rivalry, observed SID Director BG Chee.  Inter-agency 
coordination, however, remained a weak link in Indonesia's 
counterterrorism (CT) efforts.  Indonesia's legal framework 
was also poor.  Given President Yudhoyono's concerns about 
maintaining his popular support, some Muslim groups had been 
able to slow down attempts to strengthen Indonesia's CT laws. 
 BG Chee commented favorably on Vice President Kalla's 
efforts to encourage moderate Muslim clerics in Indonesia to 
get together and speak out against extremists and terrorism. 
This was a more sophisticated strategy by the GOI to isolate 
religious extremists and it seemed to enjoy high public 
support. 
 
¶9. (C) The terrorist threat remained very real in Indonesia, 
cautioned BG Chee.  The Jemaah Islamiya (JI) network in 
Indonesia had "morphed" and had changed its operational 
style.  Instead of mass attacks that killed too many Muslims, 
JI had turned to more targeted suicide bombings.  ISD 
Director Pang Kin Keong said the GOS was watching the 
development of other militant groups in Indonesia, some of 
which shared a similar ideology with JI but hadn't attacked 
any international targets yet.  Some of these groups had 
provided assistance to JI, he claimed.  Terrorists continued 
to use the Sulawesi Sea area to move people and goods between 
southern Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, BG Chee said. 
The GOS hoped to get a better understanding on what was 
happening in this area.  Stemming the terrorist traffic would 
be difficult due to official corruption, the ease of evading 
immigration controls, and geography. 
 
¶10. (C) In the Philippines, the main obstacle to CT efforts 
was poor governance, commented BG Chee.  The GOS had found 
people it could work with in the Philippine military and 
security agencies, but the political situation in the country 
didn't allow more systematic progress.  Given its size and 
proximity, Indonesia was Singapore's primary concern for 
terrorism.  For Southeast Asia in general, however, the 
Philippines was a bigger problem, concluded BG Chee.  The 
government there was not pursuing terrorist groups as 
aggressively as it should. 
 
¶11. (C) The violence in southern Thailand was due to 
historical separatist grievances, argued BG Chee.  While 
 
SINGAPORE 00000554  003 OF 003 
 
 
there were no signs of foreign involvement or religious 
ideology behind the violence, that could change, he warned. 
Foreigners could join the fight with their own ideology; many 
of the separatist leaders had religious backgrounds and could 
become more sympathetic to the global jihadist movement. 
Separatists hadn't shifted their attacks to foreign targets, 
attacked outside the south, or used suicide bombers -- all 
key indicators that hadn't been "breached" yet, noted BG 
Chee. 
 
¶12. (C) The Malaysian security agencies had a good grasp on 
the terrorist threat, commented BG Chee.  He cautioned, 
however, that Islamic issues were more sensitive and 
politicized in Malaysia than Indonesia.  Both the ruling UMNO 
and opposition PAS parties had put religious issues "front 
and center." 
 
CT in Singapore 
--------------- 
 
¶13. (C) ISD Director Pang told DAS John that he didn't deny 
that some of "our own Muslims" in Singapore might be 
"sympathetic" and "susceptible to terrorist ideology."  The 
GOS was confronting the terrorist threat on two fronts. 
First, the GOS used a "low threshold" to take action.  If an 
individual embraced an extremist ideology, Pang said, "I will 
bring him in and evaluate him."  Instead of focusing on just 
terrorist group members, the GOS would "go upstream" to 
identify potential terrorist recruits and take action. 
Second, the GOS had an active community education program to 
encourage Muslim religious leaders to preach a moderate 
ideology and say why the extremists were wrong.  In the end, 
to succeed, it would be necessary to "make the ideology die." 
 
¶14. (U) DAS John has cleared this message. 
HERBOLD