VZCZCXYZ0021
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0609/01 0550629
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240629Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6157
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0147
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7133
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0226
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1090
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SEOUL 000609 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL SOCI EAID KN KS
SUBJECT: NGO PROJECT TARGETS FAMILY REUNION FOR 
KOREAN-AMERICANS WITH FAMILY TIES TO DPRK 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) On February 22, Stephen W. Linton, Chair of the 
Eugene Bell Foundation (EBF), an NGO with a long history of 
providing humanitarian assistance to DPRK medical 
institutions, told the Ambassador about his organization's 
new project to help Korean-Americans locate relatives in the 
DPRK.  Linton and project leader Alice Suh said the project 
had received initially positive responses from contacts in 
both the ROKG and the DPRK.  Linton urged USG endorsement of 
the project, as it could help improve Washington's image in 
South Korea and curb Pyongyang's practice of charging 
exorbitant fees to Korean-Americans desiring reunion with 
their North Korean family members.  Linton expressed 
frustration at the DPRK's gradual restriction of site visits 
for EBF's tuberculosis assistance programs, adding that 
without site visits, the programs would collapse in less than 
four years.  He did not believe that even large-scale health 
crises could force the DPRK to allow better access for 
foreign aid workers.  Linton asserted that the DPRK was as 
shocked by the shift in U.S. policy toward North Korea with 
the election of the Bush Administration in 2000 as the United 
States was by the events of 9/11, and that the resultant fear 
of Washington prevented it from accepting any security 
assurances from the USG absent high-level contact.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) In a February 22 office call, Stephen W. Linton, 
Chair of the Eugene Bell Foundation (EBF), briefed the 
Ambassador on "Saemsori" -- his organization's new project 
for assisting Korean-Americans locate relatives in the DPRK 
-- and shared his thoughts on working with DPRK officials on 
humanitarian projects in general.  EBF Korea Representative 
James Lim and Washington Office Director Alice Jean Suh 
accompanied Dr. Linton.  DCM and emboffs also attended. 
(NOTE: EBF is an NGO that has been serving since 1995 as 
liaison between North Korean medical facilities and 
international donors.  The organization helps facilitate the 
delivery of medicine, equipment and supplies to tuberculosis 
centers in North Korea.  END NOTE.) 
. 
FAMILY REUNION FOR AMCITS WITH DPRK FAMILY TIES 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) According to Linton and Suh, EBF launched Saemsori 
to address the concerns of Amcits with close family ties to 
the DPRK.  Korean-Americans could not participate in either 
the inter-Korean family reunion events at Mt. Geumgang or the 
digital video reunions launched by the ROK's Ministry of 
Unification (MOU) due to their U.S. citizenship.  As a 
result, these individuals had to go through private channels 
and pay exorbitant fees to DPRK officials in order to arrange 
individual family reunions.  Suh estimated that ten percent 
of the two million people of Korean descent in the United 
States either traced their roots to North Korea or had family 
members who had relocated to the DPRK and could not return 
after the Korean War. 
. 
NO OFFICIAL RESPONSE FROM DPRK YET 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Saemsori project would conduct a nationwide 
survey in the United States for an accurate estimate of the 
number of Amcits with family ties to North Korea; create a 
central database of specific cases of divided Korean-American 
families; maintain an archive of letters, photographs and 
oral histories of first-generation Korean-Americans to share 
with surviving generations and families in North Korea; and 
engage DPRK officials to negotiate agreement on actual 
reunions and hometown visits.  Linton said EBF's contacts in 
both Koreas responded positively to the Saemsori initiative, 
although to date the DPRK had not delivered an official 
response to the proposal. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) MOU, in particular, showed interest in Saemsori 
because additional arrangements for family reunions could 
potentially bring the cost down for the ROK and relieve some 
of its own burdens in arranging family reunions.  Linton 
added, however, that even if the DPRK rejected EBF's 
 
proposal, the project would at least allow aging 
first-generation Korean-Americans to be registered in a 
database that could be used at some point in the future, 
after North Korea became more open. 
. 
USG INTEREST: IMPROVED IMAGE IN ROK, CURB CASH FLOW TO DPRK 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Linton underscored that the project also had 
implications for the USG and urged Washington's endorsement. 
First, a proactive role by the USG in arranging reunions by 
separated Korean families, regardless of their nationality, 
could have a positive effect on both U.S.-ROK relations as 
well as the South Korean public's opinion of the United 
States.  Considering that no other country with Korean 
immigrants had a program like Saemsori, the image of 
Washington taking the initiative before others could counter 
anti-American sentiments among some South Koreans. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Second, USG endorsement for the project could 
potentially reduce the enormous price tag (up to USD 90,000 
in some instances, according to Linton) for individual family 
visits by Korean-Americans, which was also a potential a 
source of questionable funds for the DPRK.  If the DPRK 
viewed the project as an avenue of dialogue with the United 
States, it could also make it easier for Korean-American 
staff to participate in EBF visits to project sites, 
currently forbidden by North Korea. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Moreover, potential donors could support EBF's 
projects with less concern about tensions between the USG and 
the DPRK.  This was particularly true with the 
Korean-American community, which tended to work quietly for 
fear of rousing suspicions in the United States for showing 
interest in North Korea, even though this group was one of 
the biggest and most steadfast donors of humanitarian aid to 
North Korea, Linton said. 
. 
GRADUAL DECREASE IN SITE VISITS FOR TB PROGRAMS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶9.  (BU) Linton noted that EBF took a big risk in 
undertaking Saemsori, as DPRK officials could impose 
roadblocks on EBF's existing tuberculosis assistance programs 
out of suspicion.  Linton and his delegation could only visit 
15 out of 19 sites during the fall site visits, which 
reflected a gradual decrease in the number of site visits 
permitted.  The problem, Linton asserted, was that DPRK 
authorities looked upon EBF's site visits as monitoring 
activities even though they involved merely routine 
maintenance of medical equipment. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) This, said Linton, was likely part of the overall 
trend of the DPRK reducing the number of foreign aid 
organizations operating in the country.  If the trend 
continued, EBF would not be able to sustain its tuberculosis 
programs.  Donors mandated site visits, without which they 
would not provide funding.  Linton predicted that, without 
site visits and equipment maintenance, existing programs 
would fail in increments of 30 percent per year due to 
equipment failure.  Unfortunately, the DPRK Ministry of 
Public Health did not wield sufficient influence to counter 
the competing interests of the State Security Department and 
other government agencies that sought to minimize foreign 
monitoring, particularly in rural sites. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Linton opined that little could be done to address 
the difficulty in getting access to the DPRK, especially 
since Pyongyang was in the business of selling access to 
foreigners.  The ROK, in particular, continued to pay 
generously for access.  Until that market dried up, the DPRK 
would have no motivation to conduct business differently. 
Linton noted, however, that his ROKG interlocutors were 
increasingly frustrated with the DPRK and predicted that 
Seoul, at some point, would drive a harder bargain in its 
dealings with Pyongyang.  He believed that Seoul was, for the 
time being, willing to tolerate the DPRK's rigid, old-school 
officials until they made way for younger leaders who had no 
memory of the Kim Il Sung era, and might be flexible on 
liberalizing North Korea's society and economy.  Allowing 
 
changes gradually with a generational shift was more 
characteristic of Korean culture than a large-scale 
revolution, Linton added. 
. 
HEALTH CRISES WOULD NOT INCREASE ACCESS TO DPRK 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) In response to the DCM's question about how the 
DPRK would act in the event of a large-scale health crisis, 
such as an avian flu pandemic, Linton responded that 
Pyongyang would fear a large influx of outsiders more than 
the outbreak.  The DPRK would likely contact UN agencies, 
pretend to allow increased access for international aid 
workers, but pre-select them from those who spoke no Korean, 
as it did in 1995, when it reached out for emergency food 
assistance.  Linton did not believe the DPRK elite would have 
any problems getting access to medicine or treatment, unlike 
ordinary citizens.  He also noted that Pyongyang had learned 
from its experience in 1995 when international donors took 
more than two months to respond to its call for emergency 
food assistance.  DPRK authorities would instead reach out to 
China and the ROK. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Econoff asked whether ordinary citizens would 
accept vaccinations or other assistance from foreign 
organizations.  Linton responded that ordinary citizens would 
not resist, but local authorities and elites could be 
obstructionist if outsiders did not fully consider existing 
practices or protocol.  He cited the contrast between the 
DPRK's receptivity to EBF's programs and its rejection of 
Doctors Without Borders (MSF), stressing that MSF was forced 
to leave because it criticized medical practices by North 
Korean doctors and staff, and existing facilities, thus 
causing many local elites to lose face and many health 
authorities to lose their jobs. 
. 
LACK OF ACCESS TO RURAL DPRK PARTLY DUE TO EMBARRASSMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Linton stressed that the DPRK was as paranoid 
about what foreigners saw in North Korea as it was about 
their activities.  It restricted outsiders from most rural 
areas out of concern that they would see just how miserably 
it has failed to provide basic necessities to its citizens, 
which was a source of great embarrassment for the regime.  In 
contrast, access to the relatively more prosperous Pyongyang 
was now relatively easy, especially during the annual Arirang 
Festival, during which the regime sought to have as many 
foreigners as possible see the reenactment of its national 
myth. 
. 
PYONGYANG WON'T ACCEPT ASSURANCES ABSENT HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) On U.S.-DPRK relations, Linton asserted that North 
Korea awaited direct contact with the USG at the highest 
level, adding that the DPRK had been "waiting for Kissinger 
for years."  After years of believing that the U.S. electoral 
process was just an act, Pyongyang found to its surprise in 
2000 that the USG could indeed pursue radically different 
policies toward it with the election of a new administration 
every four or eight years.  The DPRK was, Linton opined, as 
shocked by the 2000 elections as the United States was by the 
events of 9/11.  Given the level of fear in Pyongyang, no 
amount of security guarantees or assurances would suffice 
until Pyongyang felt that its "Kissinger" had arrived. 
VERSHBOW