VZCZCXRO0586
PP RUEHVK
DE RUEHUL #0551/01 0480703
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 170703Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6062
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0780
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0183
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0103
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 2711
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK PRIORITY 0781

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 000551 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS USAID FOR AA/DCHA/MHESS AND DCHA/FFP 
STATE FOR EAP/K AND IO 
ROME FOR FODAG 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: USAID OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DPRK FOOD SITUATION WITH 
ROK GOVERNMENT AND NGO'S 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Visiting USAID official Jon Brause met with a range 
of ROKG officials and NGO and other agency leaders involved 
in assistance to the DPRK, February 12-16.  Brause 
articulated the USG position on the upcoming WFP proposal 
for Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) in the 
DPRK, and sought information on the current humanitarian 
situation in North Korea.  ROKG officials understood our 
concerns about the WFP proposal and agreed that a 
cooperative effort during next week's Executive Board 
meeting would be best.  The consensus among those consulted 
is that the worst of the food crisis is indeed over, but 
there are still areas of food insecurity that would benefit 
from a well targeted WFP activity.  End Summary. 
 
ROKG: DONOR COORDINATION WELCOME, BUT NOT BINDING 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (SBU) USAID DCHA/PPM Office Director Jon Brause met with 
South Korean officials at the director general level from 
the Ministry of Unification (MOU) and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (MOFAT).  While it is MOFAT who represents 
the ROK government on issues dealing with WFP, South Korea's 
delivery of food to the North is controlled by the MOU. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Brause explained to each of his interlocutors that 
while the USG supported the presence of international 
organizations in North Korea, the proposed WFP Protracted 
Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) plan for the DPRK 
lacked critical operational details related to access and 
monitoring, which will prevent the USG from supporting the 
activity at the Executive Board meeting next week.  Brause 
stressed, however, that we were not rejecting the proposal, 
and that we hoped to coordinate a response for the Executive 
Board meeting that would encourage WFP to work with the DPRK 
to add detail to the proposal, strengthen it and ultimately 
resubmit it to the Board.  The ROKG officials took this on 
board, but said that the South Korean government had not yet 
formally decided what stance to take at the Executive Board 
meeting.  They expected, however, that the ROK would take a 
very low profile in interventions, so as not to anger the 
DPRK. 
 
¶4. (SBU) More generally, Brause also discussed with ministry 
officials the detrimental impact ROK bilateral assistance 
could have on the humanitarian efforts of other donors and 
international organizations, if it is perceived by the North 
as obviating any role for other donor organizations.  While 
recognizing the South Korean government's significant 
ability to provide large-scale economic assistance to the 
DPRK, Brause stressed that the ROKG must make a greater 
effort to ensure that this bilateral assistance does not 
impede the ability of the donor community to support 
activities with a strong humanitarian focus. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In response, the ROKG officials made no specific 
commitments, but assured Brause that they wanted to work 
with the United States to develop a common humanitarian 
approach.  They added that the South Korean government also 
valued the continued presence of international organizations 
in the DPRK.  In the final analysis, the ministry officials 
did not seem prepared to consider any significant 
modifications to their bilateral assistance to the DPRK. 
They did, however, concede that a broader humanitarian 
presence in the DPRK was to South Korea's advantage, and 
that more visible support to multilateral humanitarian 
activities was necessary. 
 
NGO's: MOVING TO "DEVELOP" ASSISTANCE, STUCK NEAR PYONGYANG 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Brause also met with several NGO's that currently 
have projects in North Korea.  Among that sample, the 
consensus seemed to be that a large majority of the North 
Korean populace is no longer experiencing a food crisis 
situation.  At the same time, areas further away from 
Pyongyang -- in particular mountainous areas and the 
Northeast -- probably receive significantly less food, 
 
SEOUL 00000551  002 OF 002 
 
 
resulting in continued pockets of food insecurity in these 
regions.  Most NGO's agreed that even if WFP were to begin a 
new program, access to the vulnerable areas could not be 
expected. 
 
¶7. (U) While some NGO's continue to operate some variant of 
a feeding program, it is clear that most are moving to a 
model that could be more accurately described as 
"development-oriented."  For instance, one South Korean NGO 
working in the North is providing raw materials for the 
manufacture of tillers and automated rice-planting machines, 
which are then distributed to farming cooperatives.  Another 
NGO that has identified basic childhood diseases as a 
critical problem is refurbishing the Pyongyang Children's 
Hospital and building a manufacturing plant for intravenous 
solutions. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Most of the NGO activities are grass-root 
interventions that are too small to have a systemic impact. 
It is also clear that most of the NGO activities described 
are carried out in and around Pyongyang.  Little if any NGO 
work seems to be allowed in the central and northeastern 
sections of the country, which are universally recognized as 
the most in need of assistance. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Brause's consultations with the ROKG on the 
humanitarian situation in the DPRK highlighted the need to 
develop a shared approach to assistance in the DPRK.  The 
willingness of the USG to discuss our planned position on 
the new WFP PRRO for the DPRK in advance of the Executive 
Board meeting helped ensure that the ROKG understood that 
our actions were an effort to strengthen humanitarian 
response in the DPRK, rather than end it.  Additional, 
regular consultations with the ROKG on humanitarian and 
developmental activities in the DPRK could further our 
mutual goals in that area. 
 
¶10. (U) USAID Brause cleared this message. 
 
VERSHBOW