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DE RUEHUL #0498/01 0450502
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O 140502Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5982
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0073
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7104
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0156
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1061
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SEOUL 000498 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL SOCI MNUC PINR EAID ECON KN KS
SUBJECT: FORMER KIM IL SUNG UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR SAYS 
DISCONTENT EXISTS AMONG ALL NORTH KOREANS 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Dr. Cho Myungchul, a think tank researcher who 
defected to South Korea in 1994 after years of living among 
the DPRK elite, told poloff on February 8 that social 
discontent among the DPRK's working class was kept in check 
through propaganda and periodic acts of decency by the state, 
rather than the threat of force as commonly believed by 
outsiders.  Social discontent existed among all North 
Koreans, and the elite was more open to change than was 
commonly believed.  Cho opined that building trust between 
Pyongyang and Washington was crucial for any progress in the 
Six Party Talks, and that the combination of North Korea's 
fear of the United States and the importance it placed in 
having direct contact with the USG was key to understanding 
its negotiating strategy.  He criticized the ROK for 
indulging the DPRK on its demands while receiving little in 
return, stressing the need for North-South engagement to 
focus on reducing tensions rather than on secondary matters. 
He supported former President Kim Dae-jung's proposed visit 
to North Korea, as well as the idea of having a second 
inter-Korean summit, since both events would allow Kim 
Jong-il to hear about the outside world from "equals" who 
could present more accurate information than North Korean 
officials.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On February 8, poloff met with Dr. Cho Myungchul of 
the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIIEP) 
to discuss his perspectives on North Korean society, the Six 
Party Talks, and inter-Korean engagement.  (BIOGRAPHIC NOTE: 
Cho is a former professor of economics at Kim Il Sung 
University in North Korea and the son of former DPRK 
Construction Minister Cho Chul Jun.  He attended the Namsan 
School, a prestigious primary and secondary institution 
attended by all of Kim's offspring including Kim Jong-il, and 
graduated from Kim Il Sung University.  He defected to South 
Korea in 1994 and has since been researching inter-Korean 
economic cooperation at KIIEP.  His entire family, including 
his wife, who also taugtht at KIS University, continues to 
reside in North Korea.  END BIOGRAPHIC NOTE.) 
. 
WORKING CLASS DISCONTENT HELD BACK BY "ONE FAMILY" CONCEPT 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Cho said reports of harsh living conditions in 
North Korea, especially those of more remote provinces, were 
largely accurate.  Social discontent existed at all levels of 
North Korean society, but was controlled through effective 
propaganda among the working class and the threat of loss of 
privileges among the elite.  He disputed some observers' 
assumption that repression or the threat of force by the 
government prevented the public from voicing their 
displeasure over the state's chronic and systemic failure to 
provide necessities like food and fuel.  Rather, Cho argued, 
the government effectively used state propaganda and periodic 
acts of "generosity" to stem people's anger before public 
unruliness could spread.  The state propaganda machine 
emphasized the concept of the state and the people being "one 
family."  At the same time, Pyongyang appealed to the 
public's sympathies by staging events, such as winter quilt 
distributions, while doing little to hide the fact that the 
government had problems with foreign debt.  Such tactics, 
which portrayed the government as undergoing hard times along 
with the people, "pulled at people's heartstrings" enough to 
make it unthinkable for working-class North Koreans to 
complain about their own hardship. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Cho dismissed the idea that increased hardship 
alone could make the DPRK's working class revolt against the 
regime.  The public would continue to sympathize with the 
plight of the government so long as it believed the state was 
making a bona fide effort to provide for the people.  Cho 
recalled from his days living in North Korea that local 
officials would visibly scramble to procure emergency food 
supplies for their districts in times of shortage.  No 
average North Korean would think that the state intentionally 
deprived the population of food under such circumstances. 
Rather, most would have been touched that the government 
worked so hard to provide for the people.  Reports by outside 
 
visitors -- and even North Korean refugees in the ROK -- 
failed to take this factor into account, Cho argued.  The 
poorest members of the working class have learned to cope 
with the government's inability to provide for its people, 
partly through illegal economic activities.  If the people of 
North Korea believed that the state did not care about them, 
as commonly depicted by Western media, there would have been 
a number of violent uprisings in the DPRK, Cho said. 
. 
ELITE'S DESIRE FOR STATUS QUO A MYTH 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Social discontent among members of the upper and 
middle classes was a bigger issue for North Korea's stability 
than among the working class, Cho asserted.  Contrary to most 
outside observers' analysis, the DPRK's privileged class did 
not desire to maintain the status quo.  After years of being 
beaten down by the regime and its system, however, members of 
the DPRK elite had all but given up their dreams of pursuing 
reform and were resigned to pleasing Kim Jong-il and the 
members of his inner circle.  They hesitated to make clear 
recommendations as Kim Jong-il gave less guidance and 
increasingly displayed signs of uncertainty on both economic 
and security policy since the new millennium.  This was 
particularly true of officials involved in economic policy. 
Cho, who said he had personal knowledge of officials who had 
"disappeared" after making novel policy recommendations to 
Kim Jong-il, believed DPRK officials would welcome change in 
the regime and liberalization of North Korean society if Kim 
Jong-il allowed it.  He dismissed the notion that the North 
Korean military would object to large-scale economic reforms 
and social liberalization, asserting that Kim Jong-il alone 
made economic decisions. 
. 
MIDDLE CLASS SMALL, BUT ALSO THE MOST ANTI-REGIME 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) According to Cho, no group in North Korea had 
greater levels of social discontent than the tiny middle 
class.  This group, while subject to far less government 
scrutiny and monitoring than either the lower or the upper 
class, had aspirations for improving on the status quo 
commensurate with their education and mental capacity.  They 
tended to be jealous of others' accomplishments and rewards 
and, as such, resented the DPRK's system, which made upward 
mobility impossible. 
. 
FOR DPRK, SIX PARTY TALKS A CONDUIT FOR CONTACT WITH U.S. 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) On the DPRK nuclear issue, Cho lamented that the 
United States and North Korea had wholly different objectives 
for the Six Party Talks.  Whereas Washington sought 
denuclearization as the ultimate goal of the talks, the DPRK 
used the forum solely as an avenue for direct contact with 
the USG.  With Pyongyang playing the nuclear card to persuade 
Washington to ease economic sanctions and improve bilateral 
relations -- a risky gamble from Cho's calculus -- and the 
United States continuing to assert that denuclearization 
could not be a side issue to the talks, it was uncertain what 
could break the deadlock in negotiations. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Cho added, however, that improving ties with the 
United States was unquestionably the number one priority for 
North Korea.  The fact that the DPRK was willing to endure 
the awkward dialogue structure of the Six Party Talks 
indicated just how important contact with the United States 
was to North Korea.  The greatest difficulty to overcome, 
however, was the fundamental lack of trust between Washington 
and Pyongyang.  Cho noted that the DPRK's fear of the 
relative size and firepower of the United States alone made 
it difficult for Pyongyang to trust Washington, even without 
statements from U.S. officials hinting at regime change.  It 
was easier to understand North Korea's cautious approach in 
negotiations by remembering that whereas one mistake in the 
nuclear issue could be costly for the United States, the DPRK 
believed that one slip-up would bring catastrophic results. 
. 
INTER-KOREAN TALKS NOT FOCUSED ON REDUCING TENSIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) On inter-Korean talks, Cho sharply criticized the 
ROKG for missing the central point of North-South engagement 
-- reducing tension on both sides to lay the foundation for 
eventual reunification.  With little to no progress on 
holding regular military talks, while emphasizing 
"accomplishments" on economic projects of questionable 
immediate utility, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, 
the ROKG undermined the long-term viability of its own 
engagement policy by exacerbating political division in South 
Korea between those who supported vigorous engagement versus 
those who preferred a more cautious approach.  For a more 
successful approach, the ROK had to ensure there was 
measurable progress on military dialogue and cooperation, 
real improvements in living conditions for average North 
Koreans, and improved cross-border access.  Everything else 
was secondary.  Noting that he had just left a late-evening 
strategy session on the next round of inter-Korean talks at 
the Ministry of Unification, Cho told poloff that he had 
strongly urged that at the March round of inter-Korean 
ministerial talks, the ROKG should raise human rights, demand 
the resumption of general officer-level military talks, and 
generally insist on greater reciprocity in North-South 
relations.  (NOTE: Cho regularly consults for the ROKG on 
North-South dialogue.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Cho, stressing that he agreed with the fundamental 
strategy of engaging North Korea, complained that the ROKG 
indulged the DPRK's demands excessively and failed to 
negotiate more reciprocal treatment in cabinet-level talks. 
He acknowledged that the level of N-S engagement could be 
viewed as in its infancy and that Seoul could see some 
advantages to compromising with the DPRK in order to gain 
long-term cooperation and trust.  This ought not continue too 
long, however, as the DPRK would be spoiled by ROK 
indulgence.  Having visible, measurable markers on 
reciprocity was crucial, if only for the sake of having broad 
support for the engagement policy. 
. 
KJI NEEDS MORE CONTACT WITH OUTSIDE LEADERS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Cho was positive about plans for former ROK 
President Kim Dae-jung to visit the DPRK and seek a second 
inter-Korean summit.  Producing a breakthrough or having a 
set of deliverables from a second summit was less important 
than for President Roh Moo-hyun to have a chance to engage 
Kim Jong-il, Cho noted.  Both KDJ's visit and a second summit 
were important ways for Kim Jong-il to discuss the world at 
large with outside leaders who could explain regional issues 
to him more candidly than would his lieutenants.  The DPRK's 
culture of "hyper-allegiance" to KJI prevented senior North 
Korean officials from presenting accurate reports.  This 
phenomenon, coupled with the fact that Chinese and Russian 
leaders were the only foreigners with genuine access to KJI, 
exacerbated the North Korean leader's already distorted 
worldview, Cho said. 
VERSHBOW