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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KS
SUBJECT: LEE JONG-SEOK HEARING OCCASIONS REHASH OF 
"STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY" 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  MOU-designate Lee Jong-seok's hearing at 
the National Assembly has served as a stage for renewed 
controversy over the recent U.S.-ROK agreement on strategic 
flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea.  The debate was sparked 
last week when a ruling party lawmaker disclosed classified 
records of internal debates that he claimed showed that the 
ROKG had failed to defend the national interest in its 
negotiations with Washington.  A small minority in the 
Assembly have called for "re-negotiation" on strategic 
flexibility.  Clearly flustered, the Blue House has refuted 
the allegations and has announced an investigation into how 
classified documents found their way into unauthorized hands. 
ROK officials continue to reassure us that the common 
understanding on strategic flexibility remains solid and that 
there is no confusion within the ROKG on the parameters of 
the agreement.  The controversy over strategic flexibility is 
not likely to affect Lee Jong-seok's nomination. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) On February 1, Rep. Choi Jae-cheon of the ruling Uri 
Party revealed the classified minutes of a NSC meeting in 
which principals hashed out their respective positions on 
strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea.  Those minutes 
recorded that FM Ban Ki-moon and other members of the NSC 
expressed support for the USG's position on the necessity of 
strategic flexibility in response to contingencies off the 
Peninsula.  The next day, Choi brandished another classified 
Blue House document that Choi claimed proved that MOFAT had 
exchanged "s-e-c-r-e-t diplomatic notes" with the USG in 
October 2003 without reporting that fact to President Roh. 
(NOTE:  The "s-e-c-r-e-t diplomatic notes" were in fact 
informal working-level documents exchanged during discussions 
between MOFAT and OSD/Embassy. END NOTE.)  Choi went on to 
accuse the MOFAT and the NSC of routinely failing to defend 
the national interest and of deliberately keeping President 
Roh in the dark about how it was conducting U.S.-ROK 
relations. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Blue House appears to have been caught off-guard 
by these accusations, especially as they come from a member 
of the ruling party.  In its initial reaction, the Blue House 
on February 2 expressed deep regret over Rep. Choi's 
disclosure of classified information.  Then, President Roh 
issued an ambiguous statement the following day calling for 
the ROKG to "pay more attention to future negotiations over 
the new U.S. strategy, rather than engage in consumptive 
debate and defeatism."  Roh added that "we can more flexibly 
reflect our positions in U.S. military realignments on the 
basis of mutual confidence and our negotiating power."  On 
February 5, the Blue House issued another statement 
specifically refuting Rep. Choi's charges, asserting that 
President Roh had in fact been fully informed of and engaged 
in the strategic flexibility issue from the beginning, and 
that there were no problems with the NSC's reporting 
procedures.  The Blue House also announced that it had 
launched an internal investigation to identify who had leaked 
the classified documents to Rep. Choi.  MOFAT has also 
protested Rep. Choi's characterization of its management of 
the ROKG response to the U.S. requirement for strategic 
flexibility. 
 
¶4.  (C) Lee Jong-seok, who until his nomination to be MOU was 
Deputy Secretary-General of the NSC (but for all intents and 
purposes controlled the organization), was grilled over this 
issue during his two-day hearings, which ended February 7. 
Lee defended the January 19 joint statement by observing that 
neither Washington nor Seoul had been able to retain its 
original position, i.e., the agreement reflects concessions 
from both sides.  The opposition GNP for its part has 
attacked Lee from a different angle altogether, accusing him 
of favoring North-South engagement at the expense of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance.  These familiar charges from the right, 
however, have largely been overtaken by the unusual and 
ironic accusation emanating from the far left: that Lee 
Jong-seok, and by extension the Roh Administration, places 
too much importance on the U.S.-ROK alliance and has given in 
to Washington too easily. 
 
¶5.  (C) COMMENT:  As Lee Jong-seok's hearing before the 
Assembly's Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee 
winds down February 7, there is no indication that the 
controversy over strategic flexibility will affect his 
ability to assume his new portfolio as Minister of 
Unification.  As for the debate over strategic flexibility, 
the ROKG appears to have been caught flat-footed and fumbled 
its initial response to disclosure of classified materials. 
The ROKG has assured us in the strongest terms that the 
common understanding on strategic flexibility remains solid 
and that there is no confusion within the ROKG on the 
parameters of the agreement.  Although the titillating manner 
in which details of the negotiations have been revealed has 
renewed public interest, analysts predict that, with Lee's 
hearing over, the issue is likely to fade as public attention 
shifts in the next day to what promises to be a contentious 
hearing for Rhyu Si-min, the president's controversial 
nominee for Minister of Health and Welfare. 
 
¶6.  (C) COMMENT CONT'D:  Still, attacks from the left against 
Lee Jong-seok are a significant new development.  We 
understand that these criticisms are being led by young Blue 
House staffers of the so-called "386" generation who believe 
that Lee has failed to uphold the principal of 
"self-determination" and "independence" in ROK foreign 
policy.  These criticisms led directly to Lee's failure to 
place his own people in key NSC positions, including Lee 
Soo-hyuck as NSA and Suh Chu-seok as Deputy NSA, according to 
our Blue House contacts.  END COMMENT. 
VERSHBOW