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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0098
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RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000394 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL PNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: TRAVELING GNP LAWMAKERS SEEK TO REAFFIRM US TIES 
 
Classified By: Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Rep. Kim Deog-ryong, one of the opposition Grand 
National Party's (GNP) most senior lawmakers, told the 
Ambassador on February 1 that he and five other GNP Assembly 
Members intended to travel to Washington February 7 to 10 to 
emphasize the strength of the bilateral U.S.-ROK 
relationship.  The discussion with the Ambassador covered 
topics that could arise during their trip, including 
strategic flexibility and the transfer of wartime operational 
control, free trade agreement negotiations, and 
counterfeiting.  END SUMMARY. 
 
FRIENDSHIP MISSION TO WASHINGTON 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) During a February 1 breakfast meeting with the 
Ambassador, GNP Assembly Members Kim Deog-ryong, Nam 
Kyung-pil, Chun Yu-ok, Hwang Jin-ha and Park Hyung-joon 
outlined their February 7 to 10 trip to Washington.  The 
purpose of the trip would be to affirm the strength of the 
relationship, "restore trust," and clarify misperceptions 
about Korean sentiment toward the U.S.  According to Kim, the 
group was trying to schedule meetings with Sen. George Allen, 
Sen. Hillary Clinton, Sen. Richard Lugar and Sen. John 
Warner, Rep. Henry Hyde, and Speaker Dennis Hastert.  The 
group also hoped to meet with Deputy White House Chief of 
Staff Karl Rove and Vice President Dick Cheney.  Several 
think tanks would also be on the schedule.  The Ambassador 
offered to convey requests for meetings with State Department 
officials, if the group desired. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) The GNP lawmakers planned to use their meetings to 
convey to USG leaders and opinion-makers that Korea remained 
committed to its friendship and to the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
Rep. Kim expressed concern that statements by President Roh 
had confused both Koreans and Americans about the state and 
importance of the U.S.-ROK relationship.  He and his 
colleagues hoped to help clear the air of confusion.  The 
Ambassador agreed that there were some misunderstandings and 
misperceptions about the relationship in both countries, but 
he noted the reality was better than it seemed.  Despite 
media fretting about the health of the relationship, the 
Ambassador observed that the two countries had achieved much 
recently, including the strategic flexibility agreement and 
other measures designed to modernize the alliance. 
 
 
STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY AND WARTIME OPERATIONAL CONTROL 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Pointing to the recent agreement on strategic 
flexibility, the Ambassador said that the defense and 
security relationship was extremely strong.  This was a 
development from which both countries would benefit. 
Strategic flexibility encompassed the notion that the Korean 
people should have a say in their country's participation in 
a regional crisis.  Also, Korea would benefit from strategic 
flexibility because U.S. Forces stationed elsewhere could 
quickly be mobilized to assist Korea in a time of crisis. 
 
¶5.  (C) However, the Ambassador continued, some sensitive 
issues were still outstanding, such as the transfer of 
operational control and ROK forces during wartime.  When 
Secretary Rumsfeld was in Korea last year, he said that the 
 
SIPDIS 
U.S. was prepared to work on the proposal in the spirit of 
giving responsibility to the ROK commensurate with its 
growing strength.  The Ambassador noted that some false 
expectations about when this transfer would happen might have 
arisen.  The U.S. was ready to develop a roadmap with the 
Korean government, but implementation could take some years. 
This would be a momentous step that should be taken 
carefully, with full consideration of the existing threats on 
the Peninsula and the modernization of Korea's military 
capabilities. 
 
¶6. (C) Rep. Hwang (a retired general and member of the 
Defense Committee) agreed that it would be prudent to be 
cautious regarding transfer of wartime operational control. 
The process of modernizing Korea's military would be 
extremely expensive and take many years.  Hwang stressed that 
the ROK should consider the threat and its capabilities 
before discussing the assumption of wartime control. 
 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The Ambassador noted that the trip to Washington 
would be well-timed to discuss the start of FTA negotiations, 
which would have just been announced.  The Ambassador 
anticipated "lively" public hearings in the ROK on the issue, 
but was pleased that the government was committed to moving 
ahead.  All the studies indicated that the U.S. and ROK would 
be very suitable partners in an FTA.  Issues such as 
agriculture would be sensitive, but any transition periods 
that might be negotiated should be used to help Korean 
farmers adapt to a more open market. In today's world, it was 
very expensive to subsidize sectors that were not competitive 
in world markets.  The U.S. struggled with these issues also, 
and had found that sometimes the least protected products 
ended up being the most competitive in the world market.  The 
Ambassador encouraged the Assembly Members to discuss these 
issues with their counterparts in the Congress. 
 
¶8.  (C) Rep. Nam Kyung-pil said that it would take courage 
for Assembly Members to resist the farmers.  To date, 
lawmakers had been afraid of the farmers, and instead of 
addressing the real issues had just given out subsidies. 
Lawmakers needed to explain why continuing these subsidies 
would be harmful and to prepare the Korean people not just 
for an FTA with the U.S., but also eventually one with China. 
 He believed an FTA with China was inevitable and would spark 
even more resistance than a U.S. FTA.  Rep. Chun Yu-ok said 
that there was a perception among Koreans that any FTA signed 
with a stronger party would serve the interest of the more 
advanced economy. 
 
MISUNDERSTANDING ON COUNTERFEITING 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador said there was a misperception in the 
ROK that U.S efforts to deal with North Korean illicit 
activities were efforts to overthrow the regime.  In fact, 
law enforcement efforts to protect U.S. currency were 
compatible with pursuit of a diplomatic solution to the 
nuclear problem through the Six Party Talks.  Both aimed at 
encouraging a change in North Korean behavior. 
 
¶10.  (C) Rep. Park Hyung-joon said that many Koreans were 
concerned that the U.S. had shifted from a moderate to a 
harsh stance in dealing with the counterfeit issue.  If the 
law enforcement efforts were viewed in conjunction with PSI 
intercepts, they could have a "messy impact" on the Six Party 
Talks.  The Ambassador replied that, in the end, North Korea 
needs to understand that it has more to gain by returning to 
the Six Party Talks than by insisting on a linkage between 
U.S. law enforcement actions and the Six Party process. 
 
¶11.  (C) The Ambassador also pointed out that the law 
enforcement actions were merely the continuation of efforts 
going back many years.  Investigations involving Asian 
criminal groups and an Irish Workers' Party radical activist 
all reached the indictment stage last year, which was the 
time conclusions could be drawn regarding the Banco Delta 
Asia in Macau.  In fact, all these investigations began 
several years ago. 
 
¶12.  (C) In addition, U.S. concerns about proliferation and 
WMD were not limited solely to North Korea, the Ambassador 
noted.  This was a global effort.  PSI intercepts involving 
Libya, for example, were instrumental in persuading Qadhafi 
to give up his nuclear program and make a strategic change in 
policy.  Qadhafi was once demonized in the U.S.  Now 
relations between the countries had normalized and U.S. 
investors were increasingly visiting Libya.  It was thus 
possible for the U.S. to change very quickly if the other 
side changed its behavior.  We hoped that Kim Jong-il would 
follow the same logic, he said, even if the odds were slim. 
 
¶13.  (C) Rep. Chun attributed some of the tension over the 
counterfeiting issue to a "cultural misunderstanding."  She 
advised that if the U.S. had framed the issue in more 
personal terms to Koreans -- "How would you feel if another 
country was printing and distributing your currency?" -- 
Koreans would have better understood the nature of the 
problem and the justification for American actions. 
 
TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS 
------------------- 
¶14. (C)  We understand that, contrary to what Rep. Kim and 
his delegation have told reporters (and the Ambassador), the 
group was not invited by the Korea Caucus or any other 
Congressional person or entity.  The program is being 
arranged by the Asia America Initiative, headed by former 
Rep. Dana Rohrabacher staffer Albert Santoli. 
VERSHBOW