This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000347 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE/NEA FOR A/S WELCH; U/S BURNS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SALEH SHARES INFORMATION AND INVITES 
EMBASSY TO JOIN IN THE SEARCH FOR ESCAPEES AND VISIT PSO 
PRISON 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR KRAJESKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
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 Summary: 
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¶1. (S) Ambassador, DCM and SIMO met with President Saleh, 
Wednesday, 2/8, to ask for an update on the status of the 
al-Qa'ida escapees and to stress the need for absolute 
transparency on ROYG findings and steps being taken. Saleh, 
the Director of the National Security Bureau (NSB) and the 
Attorney General jointly briefed Ambassador and Emboffs on 
details of the escape, shared photos and reports and invited 
Emboffs to visit the PSO prison to see the tunnel for 
themselves. Saleh indicated that the PSO was in a state of 
dissolution and showed Emboffs letters of resignation from 
the three top leaders of the PSO. Saleh revealed that the NSB 
had warned the PSO of a possible escape being planned and 
complained that the PSO had taken no special steps to 
investigate. Upon Emboffs' request to see the tunnel, Saleh 
arranged for DCM and SIMO to visit the PSO prison to see 
evidence of the escape which had been left intact to 
facilitate in the investigation. End summary. 
 
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I'm shocked! 
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¶2. (S) President Saleh responded very quickly to Embassy's 
request for a meeting on the issue of escaped al-Qa'ida 
prisoners. Saleh opened the meeting with an expression of 
profound shock and dismay over the escape and said that he 
fully realized the damage this does to Yemen's image abroad, 
to the image of his security forces inside the country and to 
his own trust in the PSO, an institution he has relied on 
heavily for the entire period of his rule. Saleh added that 
preliminary investigation suggests that gross mismanagement 
and corruption made the escape possible but that other 
motives were still under investigation. Saleh seemed 
confident that the escapees would be rounded up but that his 
shattered confidence in his top security advisors poses some 
difficult questions. Saleh assured us that he would be 
cooperating with the USG closely on recapturing the fugitives 
and that he had already been in touch with the Saudis to 
share information and coordinate next steps. Typical of all 
such meetings with Saleh, there was a request for assistance 
but not of the monetary kind. Saleh repeated a request he had 
made during a previous crisis (the capture of al-Qa'ida 
operative Kanaan) for geolocation equipment. "You have the 
most sophisticated equipment in this area," said Saleh, "it 
would make a difference in tracking these criminals if we 
could make use of it." 
 
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PSO or NSB? 
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¶2. (S) Saleh said that he had received letters of resignation 
from his three top PSO leaders. "The PSO should be considered 
in a state of dissolution," declared Saleh; "If these guys 
had not submitted their resignation, I would have fired 
them." Informed of Embassy concerns over a security gap, 
should the entire PSO become paralyzed, Saleh stepped back 
from his earlier assertion and turned to NSB Director, Ali 
al-Anesi, and directed him to tell the PSO leadership that 
their resignations would remain on hold while they continue 
to discharge their duties and assist in the capture of the 
escapees. Told of Embassy's lack of confidence in NSB's 
ability to fill any security void (and, in particular, lack 
of confidence in his nephew's leadership), Saleh called in 
his nephew and Deputy Director of NSB and instructed him to 
be fully cooperative and work hand-in-hand with Emboffs in 
the days and weeks to come. (Comment: DCM had met separately 
with Ammar Saleh the day before to warn him that any lack of 
transparency on the prison escape and how it is handled would 
be taken very seriously by the USG and would have 
repercussions on future dealings with the ROYG). 
 
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Dead or Alive: 
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¶3. (S) Both Ammar Saleh and his uncle, the President, said 
separately that Director of the PSO, Ghalib Gamesh, was not 
under suspicion for collusion in the escape but that he had 
failed miserably by trusting the wrong people and not heeding 
warnings about a possible escape plan being hatched. 
(Comment: Indications are that Gamesh would be allowed to 
continue in his job for the time being, though with 
circumscribed movements and under scrutiny by NSB Director 
al-Anesi. End comment). NSB Director al-Anesi and Attorney 
General al-Ulfi, then described the ongoing investigation as 
taking place inside NSB headquarters and involving 17 prison 
officials, including the deputy director of the prison, floor 
wardens and several guards. So far, according to al-Anesi, 
material incentives seem to have swayed the deputy director 
who took advantage of the incompetence of other responsible 
officials. Saleh announced that different rewards were under 
consideration to help bring in citizen participation in the 
hunt and that it would be different amounts for information 
leading to an arrest, the arrest itself or the killing of any 
of the escapees. Told by his nephew that six escapees (but 
not the most important ones) were under surveillance at 
fifteen possible locations, Saleh instructed his nephew to go 
after them once it was clear that no one else could be 
tricked into joining them and ordered, "If they offer any 
resistance, kill them." 
 
¶4. (S) The plan, so far according to the Attorney General, 
was to disseminate information on the escapees as widely as 
possible throughout the country and the region, to offer 
rewards and to watch and/or arrest relatives and friends of 
the escapees in the hope of catching them trying to get in 
touch with family or contacts. Al-Ulfi offered to share with 
us the names of those currently under investigation and to 
share any leads that result from interrogations. 
 
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Tunnel Vision? 
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¶5. (S) DCM and COS responded to Saleh's invitation to view 
the escape tunnel and ascertain for themselves evidence of 
the escape. The visit was well worth it and yielded the 
following observations: 
 
- The PSO prison, nominally a maximum security prison, was 
anything but. 
- The cell where the 23 plotted their escape held only three 
of them originally, their requests for their friends-in-crime 
to visit them were all granted. 
- The cell was actually part of a suite that included two 
cells and a large bathroom. The outside door was used as the 
controlled entrance while the inside doors were left open so 
the prisoners could wander freely within the suite. 
- The prisoners reportedly asked not to be disturbed and 
waived their right to fresh air and exercise for two weeks 
prior to the escape. 
- The smaller of the two cells, used for digging the tunnel, 
was almost totally filled to the ceiling with compacted dirt 
that came out of the tunnel. The larger room, where the 23 
lived, was one third filled with the same compacted dirt. 
Water from the bathroom was used to press it down. 
- Graffiti on the walls was limited to some of the prisoners 
names and the names of some of the operations they had 
undertaken. There was one reference to the British Embassy, 
with three names listed above it. (SIMO is tracking and 
analyzing this reference). 
- The tunnel itself (44 meters long) was videotaped by a PSO 
technician after the escape and the tape showed only a couple 
of wrong turns taken and then corrected by the diggers. Other 
than the points of entry and exit, which were larger and 
deeper, the rest of the tunnel provided only crawling space 
for one escapee at a time. 
 
¶6. (S) General Ghalib Gamesh, the now discredited Chairman of 
the PSO, was in his office when emboffs called and he 
accompanied the group to the prison, in a bloc just adjacent 
to the PSO headquarters. Gamesh was visibly drawn and 
depressed and did not display the usual spark and arrogance 
with which he greeted visitors in the past. PSO guards still 
clicked their heels and saluted him as he passed by but NSB 
Director al-Anesi seemed to be calling the shots and acting 
as tour guide of the prison. DCM asked Gamesh how he felt and 
if he was up to the task of catching the bad guys and Gamesh, 
practically in tears, said that it was a very difficult thing 
to function under the circumstances. "It's a big blow to me. 
My life's work has been destroyed in one day by some stupid 
mistakes. I don't know if I can take it." Details of the 
tunnel, the escape and tools used by the escapees were 
detailed to us as we walked by al-Anesi and by a PSO 
technical expert. Gamesh stayed in the background and did not 
say much. 
 
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Comment: 
 
¶8. (S) We were struck by the seriousness and professionalism 
of NSB Director al-Anesi. His relationship with President 
Saleh seemed comfortable and professional, in contrast to the 
demeanor of the President's nephew and NSB Deputy Director, 
Ammar Saleh, who was visibly nervous in his uncle's presence 
and barely able to deliver his report on the status of 
recapture efforts. Attorney General Ulfi was already well 
known to post for his professionalism and cooperation and 
also behaved like a person who has his president's trust and 
confidence. General Gamesh, probably saved from immediate 
dismissal by our questioning how Saleh planned to fill the 
gap at the PSO, looks like he might hang in for only a few 
more months while the investigation and the recapture efforts 
unfold. The future of the PSO and the NSB remain to be 
determined. The NSB's mission, never clearly defined from the 
outset, may have taken on a new shine under the 
circumstances, but Saleh did not come across as a man with a 
vision as to where his security and intelligence 
establishments were headed in the near term. Separately, the 
retaining of MOI Allimi and his promotion to Deputy Prime 
Minister in the recent cabinet shuffle may indicate a more 
prominent role for law enforcement in the months ahead. End 
comment. 
Krajeski