This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000314 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: ROYG'S PUBLIC RESPONSE TO AL-QA'IDA JAILBREAK: 
WHERE IS IT? 
 
REF: A. SANAA 272 
     ¶B. SANAA 286 
     ¶C. SANAA 296 
     ¶D. SANNA 50 
 
Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (S/NF)  Summary.  Yemeni security services continue to 
search for the 23 al-Qa'ida prisoners who escaped from a 
high-security prison in Sanaa on February 3 (ref A).  Per 
Saleh's orders (ref B), the National Security Board is 
leading the nation-wide manhunt, while the Political Security 
Organization (PSO), from whose prison the al-Qa'ida 
operatives escaped, remains under investigation to ferret out 
those responsible for incompetence and/or aiding and abetting 
the jailbreak.  Family members of the escapees are being held 
for questioning, but all 23 prisoners remain at-large. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  While the manhunt continues, there has been no 
visible increase in security measures on the streets of 
Sanaa, a tactic the ROYG typically employs during such a 
threat to assert government control and allay public concern. 
 Government media outlets have largely remained quiet on the 
escape since the armed forces website "26 September" first 
broke the story, even refraining from any attempt to deflect 
criticism away from the government.  Saleh told Ambassador 
and DCM that he did not want to alarm the public with too 
much publicity but that a reward system would be put in place 
if the escapees are not found soon (Comment:  DCM will report 
septel on details of the conversation with Saleh.   End 
Comment).  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Where's the Security? 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Despite a slightly increased security posture 
immediately following the February 3 break-out, neither 
civilian nor military security forces have been deployed en 
masse in Sanaa, although security at checkpoints leading out 
of the city has been increased.  While the ROYG may believe 
the individuals have already fled to rural areas outside 
direct government control, increased security on the streets 
is normally used during high-profile security situations to 
give the appearance that the government is taking every step 
necessary to counter the threat.  Contacts at the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI) have provided no information to post on any 
increased security posture or the possible deployment of the 
country's elite CT force, the Central Security Force - 
Counter Terrorism Unit (CSF-CTU). In January, the CSF-CTU 
played a crucial role in securing the release of five 
kidnapped Italians by successfully tracking and apprehending 
the kidnappers (ref D). 
 
----------------- 
Where's the Spin? 
----------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) After being the first to report on the break-out, 
government media sources have remained relatively quiet (ref 
C).  Most noticeably is the absence of any public relations 
campaign to deflect criticism away from the government. 
After the Italian kidnapping in January, official media 
launched an aggressive campaign, daily lauding the 
government's tough stance against kidnapping (promising the 
death penalty for those involved) and its efforts to 
apprehend the kidnappers.  So far there has been only one 
article in the "26 September" weekly paper, correcting some 
media reports that said the jailbreak occurred at a military 
facility. 
 
¶5.  (C) Many contacts continued to view the lack of obvious 
security measures and official media reaction as an 
indication that the escape somehow involved high-level 
government support.  Conspiracy theories abound, including 
that Saleh himself authorized the "transfer" of the 
prisoners, and plans on extorting the USG for money in 
exchange for their return.  While conspiracy theories range 
from the ridiculous (that American forces kidnapped the 
al-Qa'ida prisoners because Yemen outlaws extradition) to the 
plausible (complicity of security officials at some level), 
its clear that many Yemenis are questioning both the 
government's ability to provide security and its role as a 
partner in the GWOT. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
6  (S/NF)  The official media's reluctance to assign blame 
for the al-Qa'ida break-out or quickly offer up a sacrificial 
lamb reflects the sensitivity of the ongoing investigation. 
Saleh is still grappling with his loss of confidence in PSO 
Director Qamish, one of the President's most trusted 
confidants.  While the break-out presents an opportunity for 
the upstart National Security Bureau (NSB) to assume the 
long-coveted role of Yemen's most powerful security agency, 
the downfall of the PSO and Qamish would be a blow to Saleh 
and CT efforts.  It also exposes a weakness in Saleh's ruling 
style, which has served him relatively well during the last 
27 years.  Saleh has been very effective at neutralizing 
potential opposition through an opaque system of financial 
patronage and fostering competition between government 
agencies.  His success at preventing the rise of strong 
leaders throughout the government, combined with the ROYG's 
centralized decision making process and lack of institutional 
capacity, however, mean that Saleh cannot easily replace 
someone like Qamish or permit the PSO to continue its CT 
efforts without a trusted leader. 
Krajeski