This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000286 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE/NEA FOR A/S WELCH AND ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2013 
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SALEH SIGNALS SHAKE UP IN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 
AFTER JAIL BREAKOUT 
 
REF: A. A) SANAA 235 (EXDIS) 
     ¶B. SANAA 266 
     ¶C. B) SANAA 272 
     ¶D. TD-314/08298-06 
 
Classified By: DCM NABEEL A.KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 B & D 
 
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 Summary: 
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¶1. (S) CDA Requested and received a phone call from President 
Saleh, 2/5, on the heels of the jail break-out that yielded 
23 al-Qa'ida operatives to the streets of Sanaa, and perhaps 
beyond. CDA stressed to Saleh the importance of working in 
close tandem with the USG on this critical issue and not 
allowing any misunderstanding to develop because of delays or 
reluctance anywhere in his services to share information and 
coordinate efforts. Saleh assured CDA that the issue is being 
accorded the highest priority and that coordination with the 
U.S. would be very thorough. He requested assistance in 
trying to locate and apprehend the escapees but suggested 
that our cooperation would have to be with the relatively new 
National Security Bureau (NSB) as opposed to the Political 
Security Organization (PSO) which is undergoing a thorough 
investigation "from top to bottom" because of their failure 
to prevent the escape. The good news here is the seriousness 
with which the matter is being treated; the bad news is that 
the NSB lacks the experience and the staffing of the PSO and 
has had a less than stellar record in its dealings with the 
U.S. Embassy.  End Summary. 
 
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The Need to Know: 
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¶2. (S) The Embassy's Emergency Action Committee met, 2/5, to 
discuss the escape of 23 al-Qa'ida operatives from a high 
security PSO jail in Sanaa on 2/3. Other than considering 
immediate security implications for the Mission, members 
looked at the long-term implications for the U.S. and the 
region and agreed that the longer these individuals stayed at 
large, the more dangerous they would become - with time on 
their hands to reconnect with their old contacts and to plot 
new operations in Yemen and the region. In that context, EAC 
members worried about the level of cooperation the relevant 
agencies at the Mission are likely to see from the Yemenis, 
at a time when the temptation to cover up mistakes might be 
strongest. The request to speak to President Saleh was made 
with this anxiety in mind. 
 
¶3. (S) During his subsequent conversation with the President, 
CDA did not have a chance to finish expressing concern over 
the escape when Saleh cut in,"If you are concerned, imagine 
how I feel. I'm furious that my services have shown such 
weakness and I'm concerned about our reputation and about 
others taking advantage of this weakness. Please let 
Washington know that we have no higher priority right now 
than to find out what went wrong and to fix it." Saleh said 
he was confident that the escapees would be rounded up in 
short order but that discovering the vulnerabilities in his 
"services" was the more serious challenge. 
 
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Internecine Rivalry: 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) CDA urged Saleh to instruct his services to work 
closely with the U.S. Embassy and 
to leave no doubt in anyone's mind that this is a joint fight 
in which all information is to be shared completely and in 
real-time. Saleh responded by inviting the USG to join in the 
investigation and the hunt but added, "you will be working 
with the NSB because the entire PSO is under investigation, 
from top to bottom." Knowing that Saleh's nephew, Ammar 
Saleh, NSB's number two, was in charge and has been known to 
horde information, CDA asked Saleh to please give clear 
instructions to his nephew on working closely with the 
Embassy. Saleh said that he had not yet spoken to his nephew 
but had given instructions to NSB Director, Ali al-Anesi, to 
do exactly that. (Comment: Ammar Saleh's competitiveness with 
the PSO has not been such a well kept secret and the young 
man is probably literally biting his fingernails in 
anticipation of replacing the older, and still head of the 
PSO, General Gamesh as his uncle's trusted advisor on 
security and intelligence matters. End comment.) 
 
¶5. (S) Saleh added a plea for assistance: "We will work 
closely with you but you have to be more forthcoming in your 
assistance. I need the right equipment to track these people 
and you are the only ones who have the most sophisticated 
machinery for this job. I also need you to hurry up with 
military assistance we need to end the rebellion in the north 
which is tying up our security forces. Please tell Washington 
these are not normal times and we need your help fast." 
Comment: 
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¶6. (S) Saleh's anxiety seemed genuine. He was clearly shaken 
and agitated by the event and realized what an escape of this 
magnitude does to his reputation as a reliable ally in the 
GWOT. The good news is that this is a good time to exercise 
leverage over Saleh's decisions with timely, yet discrete, 
assistance. The bad news is that the shake-up, already 
underway in PSO ranks, might leave Yemen even more vulnerable 
to security threats and ultimately place all terrorism 
related matters under the control of Ammar Saleh, a corrupt 
and immature young man with demonstrated suspicion of and 
reluctance to work with the USG. We intend to speak very 
bluntly to the younger Saleh about our lack of tolerance of 
any delays or gaps in his coordination with us in the 
challenges that lie ahead. End comment. 
Krajeski