VZCZCXRO9950
OO RUEHFL RUEHNP
DE RUEHRO #0374/01 0391355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081355Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3471
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0712
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0331
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0262
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0017
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1177
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 1516
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0164
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 0926
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 6404
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 0982
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0418
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4326

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000374 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL XW IT
SUBJECT: ITALY AGREES ON SOMALIA, REQUESTS USG CONTACT ON 
HORN ISSUES 
 
REF: A. STATE 14531 
     ¶B. USEU TODAY 01/05/2006 
     ¶C. ROME 117 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Anna Borg for reasons 1.4 (b) an 
d (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  MFA Director General for Sub-Saharan Africa 
Armando Sanguini February 1 expressed his complete agreement 
with Reftel A points urging support for a meeting of 
Somalia's parliament, and briefed DCM Anna Borg on his recent 
trip to Asmara. Sanguini suggested more regular contact 
between Italy and the United States, perhaps at the A/S or 
DAS level, on Somalia and other Horn issues to exchange views 
and expertise. Noting that Italy was not invited to a 
December Darfur contact group meeting in London, Sanguini 
requested U.S. assistance in obtaining a seat for Italy at 
the March gathering.  End summary. 
 
------- 
Somalia 
------- 
 
¶2. (C) DCM delivered Reftel A points in a February 1 meeting 
with DG Sanguini and encouraged Italy to use its influence 
with Gedi to urge his cooperation in convening a session of 
parliament in Baidoa.  Sanguini expressed his complete 
agreement with our views and commented that the last point 
also could be applied to countries from outside the region, 
which should also refrain from activities that would give the 
perception of external pressures on the process.  With Baidoa 
entering the picture, Sanguini noted that Italy would need to 
take care in determining how to parcel aid out among the 
various regions in Somalia. 
 
¶3. (C) Gedi had been a calming force within Somalia, 
according to Sanguini, but had begun to be a problem 
recently.  Sanguini pointed out Gedi's relative lack of power 
compared to the president and speaker, since the prime 
minister is appointed by the president, and noted that 
President Yusuf seemed very determined to successfully 
convene a session of parliament.  Sanguini said the message 
to Gedi is not to become irresponsible now.  Although Italy 
had believed Gedi would eventually be able convene a session 
of parliament, and he had received the GOI's support, 
Sanguini said it looked like Hassan would be the one to 
finally make that happen.  He noted that Italy would continue 
to try to be supportive of Gedi, especially given the 
impression he left in Rome after a fall visit where he 
delivered what Sanguini termed a message of inclusiveness. 
 
¶4. (C) Touching on the danger of Islamic radicalization in 
Somalia, Sanguini pointed to the fact that most aid in 
Somalia came through Muslim charities.  He noted that this 
was beneficial for Somalis when aid was given out of 
humanitarian consideration, but he expressed concern that 
some of the assistance was a radicalizing influence on Islam 
in Somalia.  Sanguini wondered whether it would be possible 
for Western involvement with the Muslim community to 
counterbalance this influence and noted the need for positive 
engagement.  He noted that the United States seemed to be 
turning its attention to Somalia and put forth the 
possibility of regular contact between U.S. and GOI officials. 
 
-------------------- 
Eritrea and Ethiopia 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) DCM affirmed U.S. commitment to finding a sustainable 
solution to the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute, including 
demarcation of the border in accordance with the Ethiopia 
Eritrea Border Commission decision, and support for a meeting 
of the Witnesses to the Algiers Accord.  Italy is very 
supportive of the U.S. initiative on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
according to Sanguini, and hopes that the effort brings some 
results.  Sanguini noted that he had met with Amb. DeLisi in 
Asmara and had expressed Italy's willingness to collaborate 
with the United States on the Ethiopia-Eritrea demarcation 
issue.  Sanguini noted that the Eritreans conflated the UN 
position on Eritrean independence with the UN role in the 
 
ROME 00000374  002 OF 002 
 
 
border demarcation, and that the international community was 
generally not seen as a friend in Asmara.  He said that the 
Eritrean government considers the international community to 
be "guilty of neutrality". 
 
¶6. (C) Judging President Afwerki's mood as calm and 
confident, but tough, Sanguini suggested that if Afwerki were 
to take a step forward, it could open possibilities as 
President Meles might be able to see a positive result in it 
for himself.  Sanguini also remarked that Eritrea seems to 
prefer bilateral initiatives to multilateralism--big 
organizations tended to put the small country on the 
defensive.  Questioning the utility of an Algiers Witnesses 
meeting, Sanguini said that Ethiopia would have to make a 
step forward, even if it's a small one.  He noted that the 
Eritreans were right about Ethiopia's stance on demarcation. 
 
----- 
Sudan 
----- 
 
¶7. (C) As one of five Western members of the Sudan Evaluation 
and Assessment Commission (EAC), Italy believed it should 
have been invited to the December informal Darfur contact 
group meeting in London.  Sanguini pointed out that Italy had 
many good contacts on Darfur and that the GOI was disturbed 
to have been left out of the group.  When Italy approached 
the UK, they were told that the aim was to keep the group 
small.  Sanguini noted that the UK, United States, France, 
Netherlands, Finland, African Union, and UN were all 
represented and that Italy felt it should be part of the 
group.  Sanguini requested our help in pressing the UK to 
invite the GOI to a follow-up meeting to be held in London in 
March. 
 
¶8. (C) Sanguini also noted that the current AU presence in 
Darfur was a very small force and that it would take enormous 
troop strength to effectively manage an area the size of 
Darfur.  He wondered why SRSG Pronk does not attend EAC 
meetings, given their importance. 
 
------------ 
Consultation 
------------ 
 
¶9. (C) Sanguini strongly emphasized the importance of 
periodic GOI exchanges with the United States on Sub-Saharan 
Africa, especially Horn of Africa issues.  Noting Italy's 
experience and expertise in the Horn, he proposed an A/S or 
DAS-level meeting twice a year in Washington, Rome, or an 
African capital, to maintain a dialogue on Somalia, 
Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sudan, and other topics of mutual interest. 
 Sanguini added that it would also be worthwhile to discuss 
issues in the greater context of the Horn, with all of its 
complex linkages. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Italy sees itself as a major player in Horn of Africa 
issues, actively seeking to influence EU policy (Ref B) and 
regularly sending officials like Sanguini and Undersecretary 
Alfredo Mantica to the region (Reftel C).  The GOI also 
appears to be genuinely interested in engaging regularly with 
us, especially on Somalia.  End Comment. 
SPOGLI