This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000246 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BM NLD
SUBJECT: NLD'S FLEXIBLE OFFER TO THE BURMESE REGIME 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 207 
     ¶B. RANGOON 110 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: NLD leaders have low expectations that the 
Burmese regime will respond favorably to their February 12 
proposal to convene the Parliament elected in 1990 in return 
for the opposition's recognition of the ruling regime as a 
transitional government.  The NLD is nonetheless encouraged 
by the positive reaction to their proposal among diverse 
opposition groups--and they say that they have informed Aung 
San Suu Kyi and she supports their effort.  The NLD leaders 
view their new initiative as a "give and take" offer and are 
willing to negotiate further with the SPDC.  Some ethnic 
leaders have grumbled that the NLD did not consult with them 
in advance, but NLD leaders insist that all democratic 
opposition parties support the overall reconciliation effort. 
 We recommend that Washington officials cite the NLD proposal 
at appropriate opportunities as a positive gesture and 
possible mechanism to begin national reconciliation.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) National League for Democracy (NLD) Chairman U Aung 
Shwe and party spokesman U Lwin told us on February 21 that 
the ruling military regime has not yet reacted to the party's 
recent proposal to convene the Parliament elected in 1990 in 
return for the NLD's recognition of the SPDC as a de jure 
transitional government (ref A).  The party leaders have low 
expectations that the SPDC will respond favorably, if at all, 
but they are nonetheless encouraged by the positive reaction 
to their proposal by leaders of domestic opposition and exile 
groups. 
 
EVER-FRAGILE UNITY 
 
¶3. (C) The NLD unveiled their new proposal for reconciliation 
at the democratic opposition's February 12 commemoration of 
Union Day (ref A).  Despite the outward appearance of close 
unity among the NLD and other political parties there, 
several ethnic pro-democracy leaders have quietly criticized 
the NLD effort.  A spokesperson for the United Nationalities 
Alliance (UNA), for example, complained to us that the NLD 
had not consulted in advance with ethnic politicians, 
including the democratic opposition's multi-ethnic Committee 
to Represent the People's Parliament (CRPP). 
 
¶4. (C) The top two NLD leaders acknowledged to us that "a 
few" ethnic leaders were displeased that the NLD had not 
consulted with them in advance of the announcement.  They 
stressed, however, that while the ethnics had issues with the 
process, they stood united on the proposal itself as a means 
to initiate a dialogue with the regime.  The NLD leaders 
convoked a meeting of the CRPP on February 22 in order to 
discuss the proposal more fully with ethnic leaders. 
 
¶5. (C) U Aung Shwe said that NLD leaders kept a very close 
hold on the proposal prior to February 12 to avert an advance 
crackdown by the SPDC.  The regime generals, he said, do not 
recognize the legitimacy of the multi-party CRPP and would 
"most certainly have taken action if they perceived an 
attempt to build a stronger coalition with the ethnics."  The 
two NLD leaders said they had not even informed the rest of 
their own party's executive committee until one week prior to 
the announcement. 
 
A VIEW FROM THE NORTH 
 
¶6. (C) Kachin ethnic leader, and peace negotiator, Rev. Saboi 
Jum told the Charge on February 16 that he would like to 
follow up on the NLD's proposal by suggesting he could 
promote dialogue between regime leaders and the democratic 
opposition using the National Convention process.  He 
welcomed ongoing international pressure on the regime and 
agreed with the NLD that ASEAN should play a mediation role. 
¶7. (C) The Charge called the National Convention a sham that 
had no credibility.  She asked Saboi Jum what problems he had 
with the NLD proposal of everyone discussing the way forward. 
 Saboi Jum described the NLD proposal as "confused," but 
offered no specifics.  He stressed, however, the importance 
of a role for local groups and organizations to bring the NLD 
and the military closer together.  Comment: Although Saboi 
Jum has played a prominent role in previous SPDC negotiations 
with ethnic insurgents, the democratic opposition views him 
as close to the regime and would not likely seek his 
involvement in their initiative.  End Comment. 
 
¶8. (C) Ethnic sources told poloff that the NLD proposal 
resembles a similar effort undertaken after the 1990 
legislative election.  The then-leader of the military regime 
(SLORC), General Saw Maung, dismissed the proposal at the 
time as "useless" and jailed the MPs-elect who had drafted 
it.  The SPDC carried out another massive round up of 
MPs-elect after the NLD floated a similar proposal in 1998. 
 
A "GIVE AND TAKE" APPROACH 
 
¶9. (S) The two NLD leaders confided that they had informed 
the party's General Secretary, Aung San Suu Kyi, prior to 
announcing the proposal, via her personal physician during 
his most recent medical visit to her Rangoon compound 
(STRICTLY PROTECT; ref B).  The two leaders said that they 
had not received a direct return message from her, but 
intimated that ASSK had endorsed the proposal.  They added 
that ASSK "is supportive of all NLD efforts to achieve a 
peaceful dialogue."  U Aung Shwe also affirmed that ASSK 
remains under house arrest at her compound, where the NLD 
continues to deliver food on a daily basis. 
 
¶10. (C) U Aung Shwe described the NLD proposal as a "give and 
take" effort.  "We are not making any demands of the regime," 
he said, "we are simply undertaking every effort to indicate 
that we are prepared to have an open dialogue."  He noted 
that in unveiling the proposal the NLD had cited April 17 as 
a date by which the party hoped to hear from the regime. 
"This is not a deadline," added U Aung Shwe, "but rather a 
polite suggestion that the regime use the Burmese New Year to 
accept our offer to negotiate." 
 
U TIN OO REMAINS UNDER HOUSE ARREST 
 
¶11. (C) U Aung Shwe confirmed international media reports 
that the GOB had recently extended NLD Vice Chairman U Tin 
Oo's house detention for another twelve months.  According to 
U Tin Oo's wife, who frequently visits NLD headquarters, 
police officials arrived at his home last week with an order 
signed by the Minister of Home Affairs.  The order cited 
provisions of Burmese security law as justification for his 
continued house arrest. 
 
COMMENT:  AREAS OF COMMON AGREEMENT UNITING THE OPPOSITION? 
 
¶12. (C) The challenge of forging unity among the democratic 
opposition remains a serious pitfall.  The democratic 
opposition must contend with a regime intent on thwarting 
coalition building among political and ethnic groups.  The 
NLD and ethnic opposition parties share a common enemy, the 
military regime, but little else unifies them.  Historic 
grievances among them have resulted in constant bickering 
over process and details. 
 
¶13. (C) Nonetheless, the vast majority of the democratic 
opposition supports the substance of the new NLD initiative 
to preserve the integrity of the 1990 election and to use the 
election results as means to effect a transition.  Any 
agreement among all the opposition forces represents progress 
which we will encourage.  U Aung Shwe and U Lwin told us that 
they would welcome U.S. support for their effort.  We 
recommend citing the NLD proposal at appropriate 
opportunities as a useful gesture and possible mechanism to 
advance Burma's national reconciliation process.  It 
demonstrates NLD's flexibility in the face of regime 
stonewalling.  Now, if only the democratic opposition could 
present a united face to that stone wall.  END COMMENT. 
VILLAROSA