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Viewing cable 06PHNOMPENH327, SAM RAINSY'S POLITICAL STRATEGY: PUSH HUN SEN,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PHNOMPENH327 2006-02-17 09:20 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO0714
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0327/01 0480920
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170920Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6041
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2351
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2196
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0372
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0506
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0524
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3050
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM  PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1318
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000327 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM CB
SUBJECT: SAM RAINSY'S POLITICAL STRATEGY:  PUSH HUN SEN, 
THEN BEAT HIM AT THE POLLS 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Margaret McKean, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 1.  (C)  Summary.  Opposition leader Sam Rainsy says that 
reconciliation with Hun Sen was the only way to improve his 
party's position in upcoming national elections and provide 
hope for the democratic future of Cambodia.  Rainsy hopes 
that his continued ability to move the government towards 
desired reforms within important national institutions will 
solidify democracy in Cambodia -- and his detractors (both 
here and abroad) will recognize the wisdom of his actions. 
Rainsy said that Hun Sen is a fact of life and his only hope 
of helping democracy is to work with the PM to make changes 
that will benefit Cambodians in the long run.  The political 
landscape is shifting, says Rainsy, and it is unclear which 
parties will be standing for election in 2008; FUNCINPEC may 
disappear, CPP could split, and there could be other 
opposition parties that form between now and elections.  The 
Sam Rainsy Party, however, will continue to work on the side 
of democracy and the Cambodian people and seek to eventually 
become the ruling party in the future.  End Summary. 
 
Sam Rainsy Explains Himself 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (C)  On February 17, opposition leader Sam Rainsy, 
accompanied by SRP Standing Committee member Mu Sochua, met 
with the Ambassador, DCM, and Pol/Econ Chief to outline his 
political thinking that led to the rapprochement with Prime 
Minister Hun Sen.  Rainsy said that he has undertaken a 
political reconciliation with Hun Sen, and described the 
process as just beginning and therefore very fragile  -- and 
one that could be reversed.  At the moment, the continuation 
of the process depends on the mood of the PM and not on 
existing democratic institutions.  Hun Sen decides everything 
in Cambodia, and the government institutions, e.g., the 
courts, the parliament, are just a "facade," complained 
Rainsy.  If Cambodia is ruled by one man, then in order to 
get anything done, one must begin by talking to that man, 
said the opposition leader, who added it had been a difficult 
choice.  He noted that he risked the support of many friends 
inside and outside Cambodia to put some trust into a dialogue 
with Hun Sen, but hopes that dialogue will yield positive 
results for Cambodia. 
 
3.  (C)  Rainsy credited the international community's 
interest and support over the past year, as well as the U.S. 
Embassy's work on his behalf, as critical to arriving at the 
situation in Cambodia today.  In public, Rainsy said that he 
uses the Prime Minister's rhetoric of the reconciliation 
being a Khmer-Khmer solution, but in reality he knows that 
Hun Sen never would have reached this stage without outside 
pressure.  He acknowledged that he has been criticized by 
colleagues and friends for having given in, but Rainsy 
insisted that he made the right choice for the right reasons. 
 In order to reach a democratic state in Cambodia, much needs 
to happen but it all comes down to building democratic 
institutions.  That can only happen through a more 
independent and transparent political process and elections 
where average citizens are free to exercise their right to 
vote without intimidation. 
 
4.  (C)  Rainsy explained that Cambodians were afraid to be 
associated with the Sam Rainsy Party because the CPP had told 
them that Sam Rainsy is an enemy who cannot be allowed into 
power without civil war breaking out.  This strategy of 
manipulating poor, uneducated peasants who value stability 
after the 25 years of genocide and civil war hurt the SRP, he 
stated.  If Rainsy is seen to be working with the government 
in a constructive way and the PM no longer characterizes 
Rainsy as an enemy, people will be more willing to vote in 
accordance with their beliefs.  From Hun Sen's perspective, 
if can he can work with the democrats like Rainsy and human 
rights leader Kem Sokha, it will be politically advantageous 
for him as well.  Rainsy said Hun Sen wants better relations 
with the West, particularly the United States, and recognizes 
Rainsy can help him on that front. 
 
5.  (C)  Rainsy allowed that his year in exile showed that he 
cannot reform Cambodia's political institutions from the 
outside as his party would only become more marginalized. 
The PM has agreed to SRP representation in the Constitutional 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000327  002 OF 002 
 
 
Council and the National Election Commission; two crucial 
institutions for delivering free and fair elections in 2008, 
he noted.  By being part of those institutions, the SRP will 
be in a stronger position to stand for upcoming elections, 
claimed Rainsy.  Rainsy said that it has been helpful to his 
political future for the Prime Minister to suggest that the 
CPP would invite the SRP to join a coalition government with 
them in 2008.  Rainsy said he would also invite the CPP to 
join him if the SRP wins.  In either event, it shows the 
populace that the parties are not enemies but constructive 
partners for the betterment of Cambodia's future.  If the SRP 
can also show results to the population, that will also help 
their chances, he said.  Hun Sen has complained to Rainsy 
about the poor governors, ministers and other public 
officials within the system and asked that Rainsy help him 
with necessary reforms.  Already, the PM is taking my advice, 
said Rainsy, referring to the PM's instructions to one of his 
advisors to resolve a dispute between businessmen in Kampong 
Thom and provincial authorities.  Rainsy appealed to the PM 
to assist in this matter as an advocate for the businessmen, 
and the PM agreed.  These results help the PM take credit but 
Rainsy said that people will also see him as the catalyst for 
change and credit him as well. 
 
Future of the Political Parties 
------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  Rainsy described the political landscape in Cambodia 
as shifting and one that could change dramatically before 
2008.  FUNCINPEC has been a poor partner to the CPP in 
government, and Rainsy said that his political reconciliation 
with Hun Sen has given the PM the opportunity to get rid of 
FUNCINPEC.  Rainsy noted that the Prime Minister is unhappy 
with members of his own party -- the old guard whose 
interests lean towards Vietnam and others whom Rainsy 
characterized as the "mafia" types within the party.  Rainsy 
would not be surprised if Hun Sen split the CPP and created 
his own party to rid himself of those people.  Another factor 
is the political future of Hun Sen's son, Hun Manet.  Rainsy 
noted that Hun Sen has political ambitions for his son, but 
it remains to be seen if those are shared by others in the 
CPP.  Rainsy also does not believe FUNCINPEC will survive; he 
speculated that FUNCINPEC supporters will move either towards 
the CPP or the SRP.  Any party that depends on handouts from 
the CPP but has no interest in governing cannot survive, 
summed up Rainsy; the SRP envisions itself as the governing 
party someday -- if not 2008 then in the future. 
 
7.  (C)  As far as the creation of other opposition parties, 
Rainsy acknowledged that human rights leader and director of 
the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), Kem Sokha, was 
a factor and potential party leader in his own right.  If the 
Sam Rainsy Party falters, suggested Rainsy, Kem Sokha would 
see an opportunity and likely form a party to assume the 
mantle of the political opposition.  However, if the SRP is 
strong, Kem Sokha will not come forward, predicted Rainsy. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (C)  Rainsy has a clear strategy for his party's 
political future and hopes to capitalize on his credibility 
as a democrat to move the Prime Minister along the path of 
democratic reform to the SRP's electoral advantage in 2008. 
He also appears to have been influenced by the yawning 
leadership void in the life of the political opposition in 
Cambodia during his year in exile, and Kem Sokha's 
aspirations to fill that void if Rainsy did not return.  It 
is still too soon to know if Kem Sokha (or others in the 
political opposition) will remain on the political sidelines 
or decide to start a new party.  While it is possible that 
FUNCINPEC will wither and splinter as a political party, not 
so for the CPP, whose members recognize that one of the CPP's 
biggest advantages is holding together as a unified party. 
If the SRP does begin to gain more strength in the 
countryside, the CPP will likely remain more unified, not 
less so.   But Rainsy is correct that the political landscape 
in Cambodia has shifted dramatically in a short period of 
time -- and may continue to do so between now and 2008. 
Mussomeli