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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000792 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA AND NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON FR AR VE BL BR CO CA IR HA
SUBJECT: WHA A/S SHANNON'S 2/2 MEETINGS WITH FRENCH 
OFFICIALS 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS 
ONS 1.4 B/D 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A/S Shannon visited Paris on February 2 to 
discuss the full range of WHA issues with officials from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency.  On Haiti, 
Shannon encouraged France to consider symbolic gestures 
during the election period to demonstrate GOF engagement, an 
action the GOF said it would consider.  He reviewed the 
evolution of U.S relations with Venezuela, and was told that 
in the GOF,s opinion, Venezuela "would not agree" to a 
nuclear Iran.  Shannon praised President Chirac,s message to 
Bolivian President Morales urging cooperation with the U.S. 
French officials said they would use GOF influence to work 
with Morales and encourage him not to be overly influenced by 
Venezuelan President Chavez.  French interlocutors also 
briefed Shannon on FM Douste-Blazy's recent trip to Colombia, 
reviewed the recent elections in Canada, and discussed French 
relations with Brazil and Argentina.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) A/S Shannon met with A/S-equivalent for the Americas 
Daniel Parfait, President Chirac,s advisor on the Americas 
Dominique Boche, PDAS-equivalent for the Americas Jean-Marc 
Laforet and DAS-equivalents Yves Oudin, Pierre-Alain 
Coffinier and Michel Pinard.  He was accompanied by DCM Karl 
Hofmann, POL M/C Josiah Rosenblatt, ECON/C Ken Merten, 
D/POL/C Bruce Turner and Poloff Peter Kujawinski (notetaker). 
 
------- 
GENERAL 
------- 
 
¶3. (C) Shannon explained U.S. attempts to link democratic 
institutions with economic development in Central and South 
America.  Parfait and Boche both agreed that development was 
needed to sustain democracy.  Shannon expressed the hope that 
the U.S. and France would find ways to deepen and broaden 
their cooperation to address the challenges of the region, 
given common purposes in many areas.  His interlocutors 
agreed, noting that French and U.S. efforts were often 
complementary, since each tended to have more influence in 
different countries. 
 
----------------------- 
HAITI AND THE CARIBBEAN 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Shannon explained that, as technical conditions for 
holding elections improved, violence became the only means to 
stop the elections.  It was for this reason that the U.S. 
planned a Coast Guard ship visit as a symbolic gesture to 
boost security.  Furthermore, the U.S. would push MINUSTAH to 
be active in the interim period between the first round and 
likely second round of the elections.  Shannon encouraged 
France to also consider a symbolic gesture.  Parfait said 
that time might be too short for sending gendarmes or 
helicopters, but he was open to considering all 
possibilities, and would pass on this request immediately to 
the Prime Minister,s office. 
 
¶5. (C) Shannon said the U.S. was prepared to live with 
whoever won the elections.  Boche expressed concern, in the 
event of Preval's election, that Aristide might return. 
Shannon said the U.S. would speak to South Africa to try to 
prevent Aristide from leaving there and speculated that 
Preval would see that it was not in his own interest that 
Aristide return.  He argued that Aristide's only claim to 
legitimacy would be in the event of no elections.  Parfait 
said the GOF had already demarched South Africa on this 
subject, and had encouraged them to keep Aristide there. 
Shannon said that in a post-election scenario, MINUSTAH 
should begin to transition from static security to 
peace-building operations such as disarmament.  Parfait 
agreed and said a post-election Core Group meeting would be 
important to discuss steps forward. 
 
¶6. (C) Parfait said that Haiti was at the top of the list of 
discussions France had with all countries in South America, 
but especially in the Caribbean.  In French overseas 
territories there, the presence of illegal Haitian immigrants 
was contributing to a rise in tensions.  He said Spain, the 
 
Netherlands, France and representatives from the European 
Commission had recently met to discuss the Caribbean, in 
particular the rise in violence and drug smuggling.  Parfait 
suggested that the U.S. join the next meeting of these 
interested parties.  Shannon agreed that this would be 
worthwhile. 
 
--------- 
VENEZUELA 
--------- 
 
¶7. (C) During his meeting with Parfait, Shannon reviewed the 
evolutions in the U.S.-Venezuela relationship, and explained 
in particular why the U.S. had decided not to sell lethal 
military equipment to Venezuela.  Shannon added that the U.S. 
was increasingly concerned that Chavez's anti-American 
rhetoric was his core message, and furthermore, Chavez was 
seeking to disrupt good relations between the U.S. and other 
South American countries.  Parfait thanked Shannon for his 
explanation, remarking that it helped him better understand 
U.S. policy.  He added that during a recent conversation with 
President Chirac, Chavez claimed the U.S. was trying to kill 
him.  Boche cautioned against provoking Chavez, given his 
paranoid tendencies; there was a risk of escalation. 
Moreover, Chavez was genuinely popular in the region, he 
noted. 
 
¶8. (C) Shannon enumerated Chavez's attempts to destroy the 
historically good relationship between the U.S. and 
Venezuelan armed forces and posit the U.S. as the theoretical 
invading force during Venezuelan exercises.  Asked about 
Venezuelan interest in purchasing submarines from France, 
Boche insisted that discussions were at a preliminary stage 
and that no decisions had been taken, a statement echoed by 
Parfait.  Boche acknowledged that there were currently some 
bilateral tensions between France and Venezuela and that U.S. 
concerns were also a factor to be taken into consideration. 
But he challenged the U.S. to explain why such sales would 
constitute a threat to U.S. interests.  (Comment: Boche's 
insistence that no decision had been made on selling 
submarines to Venezuela contrasted with recent statements 
made by Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Maurice 
Gordault-Montagne (Boche's superior) to the Ambassador 
suggesting that France ultimately would not agree to sell the 
submarines.  End comment.)  Parfait promised transparency 
with the U.S. on the matter. 
 
¶9. (C) Parfait briefed Shannon on his recent trip to 
Venezuela, in which he and MFA Secretary General Stanislas de 
Laboulaye discussed Iran with Venezuelan officials.  The 
GOF,s conclusion, said Parfait, was that Venezuela would not 
agree to a nuclear Iran, although it needed to be convinced 
that Iran had crossed the line in attempting to gain a 
nuclear weapon capacity.  A key to convincing Venezuela would 
be a strong statement from IAEA Director General el-Baradei, 
said Parfait.  Although the GOF understands it would be hard 
for Chavez to vote against Iran, it believes he will do so if 
the IAEA statements are strong enough, said Parfait. (Note: 
Venezuela was one of three countries that voted against 
referring Iran to the UNSC.  End comment) 
 
------- 
BOLIVIA 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Shannon expressed appreciation for the messages on 
the importance of governing responsibly that President Chirac 
passed to President Morales during the latter's visit to 
Paris.  Boche responded that Morales was aware that he lacked 
international experience and needed international support and 
good relations with Europe and the U.S.  Morales was also 
willing to listen to advice, he added, and recently had 
called Chirac to thank him for receiving him in Paris and 
solicit his advice on traveling to an unnamed country. 
(Comment: Iran. End comment.)  Boche said Chirac had argued 
against such a visit, leading to Morales' agreement to 
postpone the trip.  Boche said France wanted to help Morales, 
which explained Cooperation Minister Girardin's attendance at 
his inauguration.  Parfait said the relationship between 
Presidents Chirac and Morales seemed to be very good, due in 
part to Morales, "admiration" for Chirac,s long-standing 
 
interest in indigenous peoples. 
 
¶11. (C) Shannon confirmed, based on his own meeting with 
Morales in La Paz, that Morales appeared to have understood 
the French message on governance, noting that he had 
discerned a new openness to relations with the U.S.  Boche 
said Morales' only complaint about the U.S. had been that 
U.S. assistance was conditional; otherwise he had assured 
France that any rules affecting foreign companies would be 
transparent and designed to last.  Shannon cautioned that 
Morales would come under pressure from his own constituency's 
expectations for more radical change, adding that the U.S. 
and others could use this to their advantage.  He said 
President Bush had called Morales on February 1 to 
congratulate him on his election.  The U.S., said Shannon, 
was not looking for a fight; it was looking for a 
relationship.  Parfait welcomed this, and said France (and 
the EU) was prepared "to do a lot" in Bolivia. 
 
-------- 
COLOMBIA 
-------- 
 
¶12. (C) A/S Shannon asked Parfait for a read-out on French FM 
Douste-Blazy,s January trip to Colombia.  Parfait said that 
it was a good trip even though there has heretofore been no 
movement on release of FARC-held hostages, especially Ingrid 
Betancourt.  Before continuing, Parfait said he felt obliged 
to note that French relations with Colombia are "excellent," 
that there is between $300 and $400 million of French 
investment in Colombia, and that Colombia vies with Brazil as 
one of the largest sources of Latin American students in 
France. 
 
¶13. (C) In explaining the recent Douste-Blazy hostage release 
initiative, Parfait said that President Uribe had surprised 
the GOF by almost immediately announcing "contrary to the 
agreed plan" the French initiative publicly.  "Does the FARC 
agree with our proposal?" Parfait asked; "unfortunately we 
still don,t know; we don,t have an answer from them." 
Parfait said the GOF realized that it was very likely being 
manipulated by the FARC.  He said the GOF had been talking 
with Spain and Switzerland about obtaining a stronger 
communique.  Parfait added that the GOF was still talking 
with FM Barco about the initiative and that those discussions 
had been "very good."  The GOF has also been in touch with 
the Catholic Church as well as a representative of the 
communist party to seek their input.  Parfait noted that this 
hostage return proposal is the "most serious proposal on the 
table" and that it seems like "a good moment to get 
something."  A/S Shannon replied that the U.S. sees the 
hostage issue as a Colombian issue and one that the GOC needs 
to determine how to resolve.  He opined that the FARC would 
use any hostage release to try and create a problem for 
President Uribe. 
 
¶14. (C) Parfait said he wanted to reassure A/S Shannon that 
the GOF and "the Europeans" harbor no "romantic" illusions 
about the FARC.  He said that France supports the fight 
against the FARC, has "nothing against" President Uribe, and 
has "nothing against your aggressive policy" in Colombia. 
Boche added that the Betancourt case was a delicate issue for 
France and assured Shannon that France would act in a 
transparent manner and that it had no interest in weakening 
Colombian president Aribe. 
 
------ 
CANADA 
------ 
 
¶15. (C) Boche expressed concern that new Canadian PM Harper 
had no connection to France.  He said GOF leaders were 
interested in developing a personal relationship with him as 
soon as possible, in order to reestablish the close ties of 
the past.  Boche said Canada was an important country for 
France, given the convergence of French and Canadian 
approaches to such issues as peacekeeping, assistance and 
development, and multilateralism.  Shannon responded that 
good French-Canadian relations were good for Canada and the 
Western Hemisphere, noting that the conservative party had 
performed surprisingly well in traditional liberal bastions 
 
in Quebec.  He praised the political symbolism of an 
Anglophone from western Canada who spoke French during the 
election campaign.  Boche responded that Harper's apparent 
receptivity to Quebec's specific situation and a favorable 
economic situation bode well for keeping separatist 
tendencies under control. 
 
------ 
BRAZIL 
------ 
 
¶16. (C) Parfait said Brazil is France,s "main partner" in 
Latin America and the GOF believes Brazil plays an important 
stabilizing role in the region.  He noted that French 
companies consider a presence in Brazil to be an essential 
component to any global strategy.  Shannon agreed and said 
that Brazil was an emerging democratic power.  Parfait 
mentioned a February 28 conference on the financing of 
development, which would include consideration of President 
Chirac,s pet project: an international tax on airline 
tickets.  Brazil would be making a decision, said Parfait, on 
whether it would support Chirac,s project.  Parfait added 
that France had asked Brazilian President Lula da Silva to 
exercise a "moderating influence" on Venezuelan President 
Chavez. 
 
--------- 
ARGENTINA 
--------- 
 
17.(C) Parfait said France is worried that Argentina remains 
confronted with "lots of problems," particularly economic 
ones.  He noted that French firms in Argentina had lost 
considerable amounts of money in 2001-2002 and that French 
economic interests in the country remain significant. 
Parfait said that France was concerned about the lack of 
fiscal reforms and the quick resurgence of inflation.  Given 
President Kirchner,s weak and unpredictable economic policy, 
there was little incentive for foreigners to invest in 
Argentina.  More broadly, Parfait reported, the GOF was 
"unsure" of Kirchner,s long-term political and economic 
intentions.  Parfait explained that in his most recent trip 
to Buenos Aires his primary goal was to "maintain the 
relationship" and to "express disappointment about their 
economic policies."  He noted that, for their part, the 
Argentines were very interested in a visit from President 
Chirac and strongly encouraged Parfait to press for one after 
returning to Paris.  Parfait explained that no such trip is 
planned for President Chirac at this time and that "to go 
that far, you have to be going to other places in the region 
too."  Despite the economic and political worries, French 
interests there are significant. 
 
¶19. (C) Parfait asked whether the USG still had special 
concerns about the Tri-Border Region between Argentina, 
Brazil and Paraguay.  A/S Shannon said that the USG has good 
cooperation with all three governments and that those 
governments were also concerned about the money laundering 
and other international criminal activity in the region.  He 
reported that Argentina, as the only country in the region to 
have experienced international terrorism on its soil, worked 
closely with relevant USG agencies in monitoring activities 
in the region.  A/S Shannon noted that Brazil in particular 
had a problem in that it hosts a large ethnic Syrian 
population which has some small radicalized Islamic elements 
in its midst. 
 
¶20. (U) A/S Shannon cleared this cable. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton