This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000738 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2015 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL UNGA CT FR
SUBJECT: S/CRS DELEGATION FINDS FRENCH IN LISTENING MODE 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt.  Reas 
ons 1.4b,d 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary and Comment:  French interlocutors were in 
active listening mode during 24-25 January briefings by 
Acting Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 
(S/CRS) Marcia Wong and NSC Director for Stabilization Clint 
Williamson.  Wong and Williamson invited feedback on the 
non-paper "Creating a Global Response Network for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction" which was distributed in 
meetings at the MFA with S/P A/S-Equivalent Philippe Carre, 
Acting AF A/S-Equivalent Elisabeth Barbier, and IO 
A/S-Equivalent Sylvie Bermann, and also to Secretariat 
General for National Defense (SGDN) Director Eric Lebedel and 
to High Representative for Security and Conflict Prevention 
Pierre-Andre Wiltzer.  The proposal calls for closer 
international coordination on crisis prevention and response. 
 The French lack of an S/CRS equivalent showed in 
discussions, with each interlocutor reacting according to his 
or her individual equities.  Bermann sought a tie-in to the 
UN Peacebuilding Commission.  Barbier lobbied for a 
Francophone test-case, such as the Central African Republic. 
Wiltzer sought affirmation for the efforts of his own small 
shop at interministerial coordination.  Lebedel thought in 
terms of conflict prevention.  And Carre and his PDAS focused 
on French efforts at delimitation of NATO doctrine.  End 
Summary and Comment. 
 
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Building around the PBC? 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Sylvie Bermann, IO A/S-Equivalent, lauded the S/CRS 
initiative, observing that crisis response required more than 
military resources and governments should reorganize to apply 
appropriate civilian resources toward crisis prevention and 
response.  Bermann noted her previous experience at the EU 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) where the EU was 
tackling similar challenges to S/CRS.  Perhaps, she mused, it 
would be easier for a young institution like the EU to stand 
up its effort than for larger and more deep-rooted government 
bureaucracies. 
 
¶3.  (C) Bermann asked how S/CRS would interact with the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).  For example, would S/CRS 
participate directly in PBC deliberations in New York? 
Bermann saw establishment of the PBC as a crucial 
breakthrough in UN reform.  There was a need to learn lessons 
from misfired stabilization efforts like in Haiti, she said. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Burundi represented an 
early success, however the international community should 
take care not to prematurely reduce its engagements.  Some 
were advancing DRC as a possible test case for the PBC, 
however Bermann agreed with the view of French Permrep de La 
Sabliere that the DRC was too vast and complex a challenge 
for a first attempt. 
 
¶4.  (C) Bermann stated the French MFA was considering forming 
a kind of "Crisis Cell," loosely similar to S/CRS, which 
could include military and other agency detailees, to assist 
MFA regional offices in organizing their response.  The MFA 
was also considering how better to coordinate support for the 
African Union, bolstering AU crisis management capacity and 
looking at other areas for assistance, such as the judiciary. 
 Bermann remarked there was a lively internal debate on how 
best to disburse aid or channel assistance for crisis 
response, whether through multilateral organizations or 
bilaterally.  She judged the latter approach less efficient, 
yet offering other unstated advantages.  Decisions would be 
taken ad hoc, she suspected. 
 
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Central African Republic:  A Lab in Waiting? 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Acting A/S-Equivalent for African Affairs Elisabeth 
Barbier acknowledged French MFA interest in developing 
capacities similar to the S/CRS initiative, yet she said the 
exigencies of day-to-day crisis management made it hard for 
policy-makers to step back and take a strategic overview. 
She saw the Central African Republic (CAR) as an example of a 
situation that would derive immediate benefit from 
internationally coordinated stabilization efforts in order to 
sustain its fragile emergence from prolonged crisis and its 
transition to democratic rule.  The CAR was in a "grey zone," 
unable to attract donor support because it had not yet worked 
out agreements with Bretton Woods institutions.  With peace 
dividends delayed, the pressures of near-term challenges, 
like payment of civil servant salaries, were accumulating. 
Barbier asked how the S/CRS initiative, and the goal of 
internationalizing a cooperative network, would complement 
the UN Peacebuilding Commission. 
 
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Aiming to mimic S/CRS (on a small scale) 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) High Representative for Security and Conflict 
Prevention Pierre-Andre Wiltzer, who was Junior Minister for 
Cooperation and Development from 2002-2004, a position in 
which he was often the official French face to Africa, said 
his current duties entailed developing a recommendation for 
the establishment of a French-style S/CRS-type 
interministerial organism.  Wiltzer said he currently oversaw 
a 5-person team, including two MFA detailees and 2 military 
officers.  He described the RECAMP initiative (Reinforcement 
of African Peacekeeping Capabilities) as a signature French 
contribution to our common stabilization efforts, akin to 
GPOI.  France now sought to further energize RECAMP by giving 
it an increasingly international cast, notably through EU 
participation, in support of the African Union Standby Force 
and regional African organizations. 
 
¶7.  (C) Wiltzer underscored the risk of relapse into violence 
for states emerging from conflict;  Haiti and Liberia in the 
1990s were egregious examples.  He suggested the 
international community and international financial 
institutions (IFI) in particular, should revisit their 
approach to such states.  A key mistake was to require full 
ownership of the post-conflict process on the part of such 
fragile states before the release of funding.  All too often, 
the World Bank made available large credit lines that went 
untapped, however, for want of local projects to meet proper 
financing criteria.  He suggested precedence should be given 
to security sector reform in future. 
 
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SGDN Focused on Prevention 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Eric Lebedel, Director of international and strategic 
affairs at the Secretariat General for National Defense 
(SGDN), observed that French thinking on stabilization, 
reconstruction and conflict prevention was still in its early 
stages.  (Note: the SGDN is a small coordinating body under 
the Prime Minister's office tasked with covering sensitive 
security issues.)  No specific French government body has 
been tasked along the lines of S/CRS, he noted, but the 
French approach will be based on pragmatism.  Additionally, 
he stated that French thinking is much less ambitious than 
the U.S. approach, in part, due to limited French resources. 
 
¶9.  (C) Lebedel stated that the SGDN is studying how best to 
deal with conflict prevention, with the expectation that the 
MFA and MOD are working on the other aspects of 
reconstruction and stabilization.  He said France is taking a 
coordinated approach by working with academia and the 
European Union.  Wong described the U.S. framework for early 
warning and detection, including the National Intelligence 
Council's watch list of countries at risk of instability, and 
hopes for better interaction with the EU on early warning and 
crisis response.  SGDN goals are modest, according to 
Lebedel.  Building on lessons learned in handling the Balkans 
crisis of the 1990's, the SGDN aims to ensure that once a 
warning of a country in crisis is made, that all relevant 
French political actors are fully informed.  Lebedel 
concluded with the observation that the question remains as 
to what the SGDN should seek to accomplish beyond providing 
an early warning service.  In the meantime, as part of the 
SGDN's research into the issue, but without providing any 
details, Lebedel informed the U.S. delegation that France was 
looking to host a conference in May to share views on 
conflict prevention 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Is Harsh Reality in Afghanistan Driving New Doctrine? 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶10.  (C) MFA Director of Strategic Affairs, Philippe Carre, 
who was flanked by desk officers Alexis Morel and Xavier 
Chatel, commented that he was glad to hear about Department 
of Defense Directive 3000, and to hear that the USG viewed 
combat and stability operations as complementary, not 
contradictory, in nature.  He said that the French recognized 
that the U.S. was trying to develop a comprehensive approach, 
elaborating that the French felt that the thrust of this 
approach was evident in how the U.S. envisioned NATO 
operations in Afghanistan after the failure of the 
lead-nation model.  When representatives from S/CRS pointed 
out that S/CRS did not have primary responsibility for Iraq 
or Afghanistan Carre warned, "reality creates doctrine also." 
 Carre asked that S/CRS pay attention to how the Pentagon 
presents issues of reconstruction and stabilization in the 
context of NATO in Afghanistan, saying that U.S. actions on 
the ground are not necessarily "in synch" with what S/CRS 
presented.  He conceded, however, that perhaps the French 
were only seeing "part of the picture." 
 
¶11.  (C) Carre said that the GoF had interpreted the U.S. 
perspective as an expansion from traditional military roles 
for the military; while there were "traces of intellectual 
debate about doctrine, U.S. ideas were still essentially 
being hatched in a military context."  In contrast, Carre 
said the French were well aware of the limitations of their 
more financially constrained military and were therefore 
reluctant to create new functional demands for them.  He 
lamented that the French military was overstretched overseas 
and that, while new missions always come up, "the old ones 
never seem to go away."  Given these constraints, he said, 
coupled with political and public aversion to involving the 
military in conflict situations, the GoF would prefer to 
develop the capabilities of other actors, or "relays," such 
as the AU for conflict related activities.  For natural 
disaster humanitarian action, however, he said there has been 
an increased counterpush to increase the military's 
capabilities to respond quickly. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Carre added that he will be in Washington on 
February 7 to have meetings with EUR A/S Dan Fried and A/S 
for Defense for International Security Policy Peter Flory. 
He said that he would be happy to meet again with 
representatives from S/CRS while he is there. 
 
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MFA Sensitivities re Civilian/Military Relationship 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶13.  (C) On January 25, Clint Williamson from the NSC called 
on Nicolas Niemtchinow, MFA DAS-equivalent director for 
NATO/ESDP issues, to follow up on the earlier discussions 
with Strategic Director Philippe Carre.  Niemtchinow and NATO 
desk officer Xavier Chatel emphasized that France is keen to 
delineate military intervention from civilian reconstruction 
tasks.  Additionally, France does not want to see 
civilian/humanitarian efforts under military leadership. 
These French redlines are driven, in part, by the French 
military's reluctance to get involved directly in civilian 
reconstruction, given existing resource demands on the 
military.  That said, the French military would be interested 
in joint planning to ensure that civilians take over this 
function as quickly as possible following a conflict scenario. 
 
¶14.  (C) In terms of coordination of civilian/military relief 
efforts, the French would like to see the UN and relevant 
local authorities in the field take the lead.  The French 
also noted that with respect to such planning at NATO, 
Pentagon thinking emphasizes the integration of civilians 
under a military chain of command.  Williamson observed while 
much of this has fallen to the military by default for lack 
of civilian capability, the U.S. is committed to enhancing 
civilian planning and response capabilities.  S/CRS is 
looking at many operational models to work hand in hand with 
the military and with international and multilateral 
partners.  Niemtchinow agreed, but stated that given the 
financial constraints of European governments, they are not 
keen to spend military resources on civilian tasks.  To 
illustrate further French concerns, Chatel pointed to NATO 
operations in Afghanistan.  NATO has a legitimate 
responsibility to protect civilian workers, he stated, but it 
remains unclear whether NATO should have a role in generating 
police force contributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton