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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000154 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR EAID MR
SUBJECT: THE HIGH-LEVEL US DELEGATION'S VISIT TO MAURITANIA 
-- THEMES AND OBSERVATIONS 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) 
 
-------------- 
(C) Key Points 
-------------- 
 
-- The Mauritanians, whether in government, civil society, or 
politics, made a convincing case that they are committed to a 
national transition to democracy.  But their timeline is 
extremely ambitious.  They will need technical and financial 
assistance, from us and from others, in order to succeed. 
 
-- The most immediate danger to the election process is the 
impending census and the associated national voter list will 
be done poorly.  That could throw off the timetable.  It 
would certainly make election results less credible.  It 
could even cause civil strife. 
 
-- As many as 200,000 Mauritanian citizens of voting age do 
not have the national identity cards needed to register to 
vote.  Many, maybe even most, are Afro-Mauritanians.  The 
danger remains that Afro-Mauritanians will be disenfranchised 
at a much higher rate than other racial groups in the census 
and voter registration process.  The Embassy is raising this 
issue frequently, including with Colonel Fal during the 
delegation's visit. 
 
-- Miscommunication and suspicion continue to hinder 
cooperation between political parties and civil society. 
 
-- Mauritanian government officials continued to express 
their unwavering commitment to counterterrorism. 
 
End Key Points. 
 
¶1. (C) The high level mission to Nouakchott headed by AF PDAS 
Bobby Pittman contributed significantly to the advancement of 
our policy in Mauritania.  The delegation met with government 
officials (septel) and members of political parties and civil 
society (septel). 
 
¶2. (C) The Embassy's assessment is that, in every meeting, 
the delegation succeeded in impressing upon the Mauritanians 
the need to adhere strictly to the established election 
timetable.  The delegation also succeeded in communicating 
the USG's interest in engaging with the Mauritanians on 
issues of vital interest, such as democracy and 
counter-terrorism.  The delegation also promised a return to 
full relations following free and fair elections.  That came 
under attack by some of the "independent" press, but it was 
certainly the right thing to say. 
 
¶3. (C) The delegation was led by AF PDAS Bobby Pittman, and 
included S/CT Virginia Palmer, DRL DAS Jeff Krilla, AF/W 
Director Phil Carter, OSD Principal Director Office of 
African Affairs Chuck Kosak, NSC Director of African Affairs 
Mark Swayne, and Democracy Officers Ryan McCannell and Dana 
Beegun from USAID. 
 
------------------ 
ELECTION TIMETABLE 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) The transitional government has committed to hold a 
series of elections culminating in the turnover of power to a 
constitutional government, which PDAS Pittman correctly 
described in his press statement as "ambitious."  While 
realizing the obstacles facing them, virtually all the 
Mauritanians with whom the delegation met were optimistic 
that the goal could be met.  International observers, 
including the local head of the UN mission, strongly agreed 
with the PDAS's assessment.  Several are quite concerned 
about the Mauritanians' ability to hold to the timetable, 
even with significant technical and financial assistance. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
POLITICAL PARTY-CIVIL SOCIETY: COMPETITORS FOR AID 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In several meetings, the delegation witnessed 
first-hand the miscommunication and suspicion between 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000154  002 OF 002 
 
 
political parties and civil society.  For their part, 
political parties were largely unable to work effectively 
together, and refused to consider that civil society had a 
role in the political process.  While government officials 
stressed their open and collaborative approach, some 
political parties expressed frustration at not having been 
consulted enough during the election planning process. 
 
¶6. (C) The delegation has a useful meeting with all 16 
members of the National Independent Electoral Commission. 
From their words and demeanor, the commission members clearly 
took seriously their role as overseers of a historic process. 
 They appeared to guard jealously their independence. 
However, they were quick to admit that they were not 
elections experts.  From the discussion it was clear that the 
members understood the daunting task ahead. 
 
¶7. (C) Signficantly, despite some criticism about the 
commission's ability to fulfill its mission, the delegation 
did not hear any complaints about the integrity of commission 
members. 
 
-------------------------- 
THE AFRO-MAURITANIAN ISSUE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The delegation heard several comments about the extent 
to which Afro-Mauritanians, both inside and outside 
Mauritania, can participate in the electoral process.  Col. 
Fal was adamant in his meeting with the delegation that 
Mauritania was not in the position to conduct any type of 
out-of-country voting given the short timetable.  He refused 
to provide any views on establishing procedures to allow 
Mauritanians residing outside to return to vote. 
 
¶9. (C) At the same time, quite a few Mauritanians appear to 
view full participation of Afro-Mauritanians in the process 
as a critical element for credible elections.  While an 
estimated 150,000 to 200,000 eligible Mauritanian voters do 
not currently have national identity cards -- which are 
required to register to vote -- the vast majority of these 
are Afro-Mauritanians.  The government has taken efforts to 
accelerate the ID issuance process, but the Embassy continues 
to assess that Afro-Mauritanians are likely to be 
disenfranchised at a much higher rate than other racial 
groups.  Embassy officers continue to raise these concerns 
whenever and wherever appropriate. 
 
---------------- 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
---------------- 
 
¶10. (C) On all occasions Mauritanian government officials 
expressed their unwavering commitment to counterterrorism. 
Most telling, however, was the delegation's meeting with the 
five heads of intelligence services. The discussions clearly 
demonstrated that the services do not routinely interact 
(please see septels for additional information and comment, 
including IIRs). 
 
---------- 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
¶11. (C) At all levels, the Mauritanians welcomed and 
encouraged U.S. participation in the transition process.  The 
visit also raised expectations for increased U.S. involvement 
in the future. 
 
¶12. (C) Embassy encourages the Department to fund electoral 
assistance to the greatest extent possible.  It strongly 
recommends that the UN basket fund be funded as much as 
possible.  NDI is also doing critically important work with 
the political parties and should be funded, too. 
 
¶13. (U) This cable was prepared after the departure of the 
delegation.  The delegation has not cleared the text. 
LeBaron