VZCZCXRO5167
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0203/01 0441532
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131532Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5539
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0957
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0457

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000203 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT OPPOSITION ELECTS NEW LEADER 
 
REF: A. 05 NICOSIA 1869 
 
     ¶B. 05 NICOSIA 1465 
     ¶C. LIBBY-INGMANSON EMAIL (12/09/2005) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador R. Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  The National Unity Party (UBP) has elected 
Nicosia "MP" Huseyin Ozgurgun (see bio below) to lead the 
party, which is the second largest Turkish Cypriot political 
party and the north's main opposition formation.  Ozgurgun 
represents a new, young face for his party -- which was 
thrown out of office in 2003 after over two decades in power, 
and has since been unable to shake the image of a reactionary 
clique of corrupt old men.  Ozgurgun must now focus on the 
daunting task of reversing his party's fortunes by June, when 
Turkish Cypriots go to the polls to fill two empty 
"parliamentary" seats and vote on all of the "TRNC's" mayors 
and city councils.  The UBP's success or failure in these 
elections will reflect on more than just Ozgurgun's 
leadership; a resurgent nationalist opposition could spell 
trouble for pro-settlement "President" Talat and his CTP. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
ADRIFT, THE UBP GETS A NEW RUDDER 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) The north's main opposition grouping, the nationalist 
UBP, has elected Nicosia "MP" Huseyin Ozgurgun as party 
president.  The 40-year-old Ozgurgun emerged from a crowded 
pack of dark-horse candidates after Dervis Eroglu's heir 
apparent, Salih Miroglu, died unexpectedly a few weeks before 
he was to have taken over the top job (ref a).  Ozgurgun 
defeated former "FM" and fellow Nicosia "MP" Tahsin 
Ertugruloglu by 540 votes to 410 at the UBP's February 11 
Party Congress, putting to an end several months of 
uncertainty that began with the resignation of party leader 
and former "PM" Dervis Eroglu in September 2005 (ref b). 
 
¶3. (SBU) The party's leadership crisis dates back to December 
2003, however, when the pro-settlement CTP upset the 
long-ruling UBP in legislative elections that brought Mehmet 
Ali Talat to power as "PM."  Subsequent Turkish Cypriot polls 
-- including the April 2004 Annan referendum and Talat's 
April 2005 knock-out defeat of Eroglu for the "TRNC 
presidency" -- have been unmitigated disasters for the UBP. 
The party, which opposed the Annan Plan and campaigned in 
favor of a harder line vis-a-vis the Greek Cypriots, has 
appeared increasingly out of step with Turkish Cypriot public 
opinion, and no longer benefits from the political and 
material support it enjoyed from Ankara prior to the AKP 
government.  With the directionless party foundering in the 
polls, the graying Eroglu's decision to step down and make 
way for a "new generation" was universally welcomed inside 
the UBP as the only way to start winning elections again. 
 
OUT WITH THE OLD, IN WITH THE LESS OLD 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Ozgurgun's election has exposed serious divisions 
within the party over the way ahead, however.  Ertugruloglu 
(as well as other candidates like Irsen Kucuk, the "Tahsin 
Lite" figure who eventually supported him) unapologetically 
advocated a hard right turn.  Stressing that Turkish Cypriot 
support for the Annan Plan had failed to deliver an end to 
the north's "isolation," Ertugruloglu advocated a more 
vigorous defense of "TRNC" sovereignty as a response to the 
failed "promises" and unmet obligations of the international 
community toward the Turkish Cypriots.  Ozgurgun, however, 
took a more nuanced line, insisting that the UBP needs to 
"respect the will" of the 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots who 
voted "yes" to Annan, and suggesting that the UBP must also 
shake off the image of corrupt cronyism it earned over 
decades in power by developing a more business-friendly, 
"center-right" message.  At the same time, Ozgurgun sought to 
burnish his own nationalist credentials by actively 
challenging the controversial property restitution law 
recently passed by the CTP "government" (ref c). 
 
¶5. (C) Ozgurgun's victory, however, seems less due to 
ideology than to personality and electoral calculus.  Many 
UBP supporters recognized that the fire-brand Ertugruloglu 
was "too radical" to appeal to most mainstream voters -- and 
might leave the party even worse off than it had been under 
the uninspiring Eroglu.  At the same time, the young, 
athletic Ozgurgun seemed to present at once a more appealing 
face to local voters (scoring higher than Tahsin in 2005 
legislative elections) and to the outside world (he is one of 
two Turkish Cypriot representatives at the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, where he is by all 
accounts well respected).  While many UBPers may sympathize 
with Tahsin's angry rhetoric, they appeared to feel that 
 
NICOSIA 00000203  002 OF 003 
 
 
Ozgurgun stood a better chance of helping their party at the 
ballot box. 
 
¶6. (C) The most important factor in Ozgurgun's victory, 
however, was probably the support of Eroglu.  Although no 
longer a credible candidate for "national" office, Eroglu 
still maintains significant influence over the party's 
grass-roots members, many of whom owe their positions as 
Party Congress delegate, "MP," or city councilman to Eroglu. 
UBP insiders say Eroglu urged his allies to vote for 
Ozgurgun, and that they were happy to oblige -- partly as a 
way to soothe their guilt over pressing Eroglu to step aside 
in the first place.  This has led to speculation that 
wet-behind-the-ears Ozgurgun may end up being a puppet of 
Eroglu, who remains in "parliament" and could continue to run 
the party, Lee Kwan Yew-style, from behind the scenes. 
 
JUNE ELECTIONS: OZGURGUN'S LITMUS TEST 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) With municipal elections -- as well as by-elections 
to fill two empty "parliamentary" seats -- due in June, 
Ozgurgun must immediately take to the hustings for his party. 
 The UBP's impressive grass-roots organization is planning to 
mount a municipal campaign in every district, and with two 
open seats in "parliament," the party could theoretically 
emerge in a position to oust the current CTP-led coalition of 
"PM" Ferdi Soyer.  But the chances of such a sweep appear 
slim. 
 
¶8. (C) For one thing, the UBP does not have its hands on the 
levers of power and cannot dole out pre-election goodies to 
win support as it did in the past.  Pragmatic Turkish Cypriot 
voters are less inclined to support a party they perceive to 
be corrupt if they are not getting a piece of the action 
themselves.  Fresh blood at the top may help counter this 
image, but the party continues to poll very poorly among 
young swing voters despite its handsome new leaders. 
 
¶9. (C) Furthermore, divisions between the UBP's radical and 
pragmatic wings have not healed and will continue to hamper 
efforts to articulate a coherent alternative to the CTP's 
pro-solution platform.  Disappointment over Talat's failure 
to deliver an end to Turkish Cypriot "isolation" -- as well 
as frustration over domestic issues like public sector pay 
raises -- "will only get us so far," Ozgurgun confided to us. 
 He also noted that the party is having trouble finding 
candidates to run in June.  UBP needs volunteers who are at 
once personally electable, willing to toe a vaguely 
nationalist line, and not already in office or with some 
other party.  Such people are as rare as hen's teeth in the 
limited north Cyprus talent pool. 
 
¶10. (C) With so little time to overcome these problems, few 
observers expect the UBP under Ozgurgun to do more than tread 
water in June's elections.  If the party can keep most of the 
municipalities it already controls -- or even pick up a few 
-- the election will be a success and help cement Ozgurgun's 
position as leader.  Wresting one of the "big three" cities 
(Nicosia, Famagusta, or Kyrenia) from CTP control or winning 
one of the "parliamentary" seats would be much more 
difficult.  But if Ozgurgun can manage either feat, his 
fortunes as leader would be boosted further. 
 
¶11. (C) If UBP suffers further reverses, however, Ozgurgun 
could well be replaced.  Another party congress is due in 
December (this weekend's gathering was an interim meeting to 
elect a replacement to serve out the remainder of Eroglu's 
term as party president), and members may want to eject their 
new leadership if there is no electoral good news.  In this 
case, another radical-vs.-pragmatic showdown would be 
unavoidable and could lead to an open schism. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) The UBP leadership contest is more than just a 
side-show soap opera.  The lack of an effective opposition 
has meant that the CTP "government" has enjoyed an 
unnaturally long honeymoon -- despite growing public 
frustration with "PM" Soyer's domestic performance and 
"President" Talat's failure to deliver the goods on 
"isolation" and the Cyprus problem.  If Ozgurgun can whip the 
UBP into shape and do well at the ballot box, the 
pro-solution CTP would face serious difficulty.  A 
reinvigorated nationalist opposition could prompt Talat and 
Soyer to cover their right flank by staking out a harder line 
on the Cyprus problem and/or driving a tougher bargain on 
confidence-building measures like Ledra Street or the 
Committee on Missing Persons.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
NICOSIA 00000203  003 OF 003 
 
 
BIOGRAPHY OF HUSEYIN OZGURGUN 
----------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Huseyin Ozgurgun was born in Nicosia in 1965.  He 
graduated from Ankara University's Faculty of Political 
Science in 1988 and later did course work in English and 
management at Cambridge.  He is an avid athlete who has 
competed in amateur track-and-field events abroad, and plays 
basketball, volley ball, tennis, and soccer on the "TRNC 
national" teams.  Ozgurgun began his political career in the 
center-right DP of Serdar Denktash -- but quit the party 
after separating from his wife, Serdar's sister-in-law, and 
joined the UBP.  Now divorced, Ozgurgun has been conducting a 
quiet romance with a parliamentarian from Andorra whom he met 
at the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly -- where he 
has served as one of two Turkish Cypriot party 
representatives since 2004.  He reportedly has good contact 
with his two children from his marriage.  Ozgurgun was 
elected to "parliament" three times on the UBP ticket (1998, 
2003, 2005), becoming party SYG and Dervis Eroglu's heir 
apparent as party leader after the death of Salih Miroglu in 
November 2005.  Ozgurgun is a close Embassy contact, and was 
selected as an IV program participant in 2005 (although his 
new duties as party leader may make it difficult for him to 
schedule his participation). 
 
¶14. (C) Ozgurgun is a gregarious fellow, whose athletic good 
looks add to his charisma.  At 40, however, he is much 
younger than most other leading Turkish Cypriot politicians 
and can seem like a callow, johnny-come-lately compared to 
many of them.  While clearly no fool, Ozgurgun does not 
project the same image of intellectual sophistication as some 
of his rivals.  Nonetheless, he is an effective politician 
who can quickly read his audience and calibrate his message 
to a variety of situations -- he is as at ease hobnobbing 
with European parliamentarians in Strasbourg as he is 
campaigning in peasant villages in the Karpass.  It is too 
early to tell which of these instincts will prove stronger, 
and whether as leader he will take the UBP down a 
center-right reformist path or stick close to its reactionary 
nationalist roots.  He speaks passable English. 
SCHLICHER