This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000839 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PRETORIA FOR DEA/WAGNER 
THE HAGUE FOR DEA 
BOGOTA FOR DEA 
LONDON FOR DEA 
JUSTICE FOR OPDAT, ICITAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2026 
TAGS: SNAR PREL PINR KCRM PGOV KE
SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL WAKO UNCONVINCING ON SEIZED 
COCAINE 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 158, B. NAIROBI 511 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMB. WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, REASONS 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Attorney General Wako offers inconsistent, 
unconvincing explanations of why more than one ton of 
cocaine held by the Government of Kenya (GOK) for over a 
year cannot yet be destroyed. We agree with the U.K. to 
give the GOK another 3 weeks to develop a credible plan 
before going public with our dissatisfaction. Although many 
have called for Wako's resignation in recent months, 
President Kibaki does not have the constitutional authority 
to remove the Attorney General from office. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) U.K. High Commissioner Adam Wood, a UNODC official, 
and I met for over an hour February 15 with Attorney 
General Amos Wako and Director of Public Prosecutions 
Keriako Tobiko. The meeting was at Wako's request. He said 
he was aware of international concerns about Kenya's 
handling of the 2004 cocaine haul and wanted to put our 
minds at ease. He was also aware of our previous complaints 
to the Foreign Ministry on this subject, and of the Foreign 
Ministry's diplomatic note requesting UN and USG assistance 
in disposing of the drug stockpile (ref B). 
 
¶3. (C) Wako explained that due to a "bad law" 
(specifically, section 74(a) of the Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Control Act), the GOK could not 
destroy the drug stockpile until it had been exhibited to, 
and sampled in the presence of, all of the defendants in 
the case. This has already occurred for six defendants 
currently standing trial in Nairobi. Another key defendant, 
however, has just been convicted on drug charges in the 
Netherlands. While the Netherlands has agreed to Kenya's 
request for extradition, the defendant had appealed to the 
Netherlands high court. The High Court is expected to 
decide within the next two or three weeks whether the 
defendant can be extradited. 
 
¶4. (C) Wako said once the defendant is extradited, he will 
confront the evidence (the stockpile) and, after that, the 
stockpile can be disposed of. Wako was vague on how long 
this process might take. If, on the other hand, the Dutch 
High Court ruled against extradition, there would be no 
need to retain the stockpile. 
 
¶5. (C) Wood and I both pressed for the GOK to at least 
invite in outside experts to test, measure and seal the 
stockpile. This could be done immediately, and without 
prejudice as to how and when the stockpile was eventually 
disposed of. Such verification was needed, we argued, to 
put to rest worries that the stockpile had been tampered 
with and possibly trafficked. Wood explained how, with 
shipments of cocaine showing up in London on incoming Kenya 
Airways flights, HMG's patience was growing thin. I added 
that the GOK would soon have a serious credibility problem 
if it could not show that the stockpile was intact and 
being handled in accordance with best international 
practices. 
 
¶6. (C) Unfortunately, Wako explained, it would not be a 
good idea to test, measure or seal the stockpile. It would 
undermine the prosecution's case since it would allow the 
defense to argue that the State did not have confidence in 
its own evidence. Wood and I dismissed this argument as 
lacking any credibility. When pressed about whether 
retention of the entire stockpile was necessary throughout 
the trial, Wako and Tobiko were evasive. Eventually, they 
admitted that the stockpile could be disposed of once the 
prosecution rested its case. 
 
¶7. (C) Wood and I concluded the conversation by advising 
Wako that we were not satisfied and would soon be in touch 
with the GOK again. Wood and I later agreed to await the 
outcome of the Dutch court case. If the GOK still had no 
credible plan at that time, we would consider options for 
going public with our concerns. 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT.  Wako obfuscated throughout a long and 
somewhat confusing legal conversation. Tobiko appeared 
uncomfortable and intervened only to clarify points of law, 
although he also seemed uncertain of what he was saying at 
times. The bottom line is that the Kenyan authorities have 
been sitting on more than a ton of cocaine for more than a 
year, at least four consignments of cocaine have reached 
the U.K. from Kenya in that period, and no one in the GOK 
is able or willing to assert that the stockpile is intact 
and that a credible plan exists for measuring and disposing 
of it. It is significant that Police Commissioner Ali, 
under whose authority the cocaine is supposedly 
safeguarded, urged us prior to the Wako meeting to press 
the Attorney General hard for verification as soon as 
possible. Ali wants to wash his hands of the mess; for some 
reason, Wako does not. 
 
¶9. (C) We have heard repeated complaints from respected 
figures in and out of the GOK (including Anti-Corruption 
Chief Justice Ringera and World Bank Director Colin Bruce) 
that Wako is the main obstacle to successful prosecutions 
of any kind in Kenya. Whether he is profiting in some way 
from the drug trade, protecting others who are involved in 
it, or is working from some other motive, we cannot tell. 
He may feel a degree of immunity since the constitution 
does not allow the President or any other authority to 
remove him from office.  END COMMENT. 
 
BELLAMY