VZCZCXRO8843
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #1025/01 0321415
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011415Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0151
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016 
TAGS: PREL KUNR PHUM RS
SUBJECT: MFA HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICIAL ON REGULARIZING TIES, UN 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
 
 
Classified By: A/POL Bruce Donahue.  Reasons: 1.4 (B/D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  In a January 18 meeting, A/S Lowenkron and 
Vladimir Parshikov, Director of the MFA Department of 
Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights, agreed to more 
frequent consultations.  Lowenkron laid out the USG position 
on the UN Human Rights Council, and Parshikov responded that 
the GOR favored finding consensus, including by accommodating 
regional groups, before moving forward on the issue.  The GOR 
also favored a Council roughly the size of the current one, 
favored a simple majority vote to elect Council members, and 
was cool to the idea of country-specific resolutions. 
Lowenkron underscored the importance of NGOs, and Parshikov 
argued that Russia was moving in the right direction on 
democratic development.  END SUMMARY. 
. 
¶2. (C) A/S Barry Lowenkron held an introductory meeting 
January 18 with Vladimir Parshikov, Director of the MFA 
Department of Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights, as 
well as with his deputy, Grigoriy Lukyantsev.  Parshikov 
reported that his department has six sections, as follows: 
 
-- universal cooperation on human rights, including the UN's 
Third Committee on Human Rights, the UN's Human Rights 
Committee "and hopefully, the Human Rights Council"; 
-- social development in the UN and European structures; 
-- cooperation on human rights in European institutions, 
including the Council of Europe and OSCE; 
-- migrants and refugees; 
-- human rights in the CIS, notably in the Baltic states; and 
-- international cooperation on culture, sports and leisure. 
 
¶3. (C) Parshikov noted that his department had last held 
regular meetings with its State Department counterparts in 
¶1997.  He and Lowenkron agreed to resume a regularized 
dialogue, with Lowenkron suggesting that Parshikov visit 
Washington next year as part of that effort. 
. 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Lowenkron laid out the U.S. position with regard to 
the Human Rights Council, underscoring the importance of 
having a smaller body than the Commission, meeting more 
frequently than the Commission's once-a-year sessions and 
establishing a higher bar on membership.  The USG was deeply 
committed to the issue, and the U.S. Congress was keen to see 
genuine reform. 
 
¶5. (C) Parshikov agreed that the current arrangement did not 
serve anyone's interests and said the GOR favored reform of 
the UN's human rights structure as soon as possible.  Given 
the range of views in the international community about how 
to proceed, however, the GOR believed it was important to 
accommodate regional groups while still pushing ahead with 
reforms.  The U.S. position did not enjoy the support of even 
the Western group, Parshikov argued.  Noting that General 
Assembly President Eliasson was working hard on the issue and 
had called for resolving it by February, Parshikov doubted 
that that would occur so soon.  That being the case, the 
current Commission would meet again before a consensus could 
be pinned down on the Council. 
 
¶6. (C) Elaborating on Parshikov's points, Lukyantsev 
reiterated that the GOR favored reform but felt that it 
should be done by full or at least partial consensus.  Both 
the GOR and USG based their positions on principles, but both 
might have to make compromises.  Rumors that a vote might 
take place before a consensus could be hammered out worried 
the GOR, Lukyantsev continued. 
 
¶7. (C) From the GOR's perspective, for instance, consensus 
was needed on the Council's composition.  Because the Council 
would deal with "universal questions," it should not be too 
small.  Twenty to thirty members were too few, and the right 
number was closer to the current fifty-one, Lukyantsev 
argued, with the GOR prepared to accept something as low as 
forty-eight.  Geographical balance was also important. 
 
¶8. (C) Consensus was also needed on the process of selecting 
members, Lukyantsev argued.  The GOR believed that in the 
interests of fairness and balance, a simple majority vote was 
appropriate rather than the two-thirds favored by the U.S. 
Lukyantsev added that instituting a two-third vote would 
ensure that countries like Cuba and China would become 
Council members but could keep the U.S. out of the Council. 
Lowenkron responded that the USG recognized that but was 
ready to take its chances regarding membership, since 
establishing a strong Council was more pivotal.  Over the 
long-term, a two-thirds vote coupled with a smaller Council 
(and other selection procedures) would reduce the likelihood 
 
MOSCOW 00001025  002 OF 002 
 
 
of non-democratic countries joining the Council.  Lukyanov 
agreed that that would be the case theoretically but 
expressed doubt about the practicality of such an approach. 
 
¶9. (C) Discussion then turned to the issue of 
country-specific resolutions.  Lowenkron stressed that for 
introducing such resolutions, the USG would not accept 
requiring a two-thirds vote; this was a red line for us. 
Lukyantsev said that the GOR was not even considering a 
two-thirds vote requirement on that issue, but was 
considering the proposal that only regional groupings could 
offer country-specific resolutions regarding countries in 
their regions.  More generally, however, the GOR questioned 
the merit of country-specific resolutions, Parshikov added, 
since these tended only to serve a public relations role. 
For example, rather than criticize the Baltic States 
individually for their treatment of ethnic Russians, the GOR 
preferred to do so in the context of a thematic resolution on 
racism or ethnic discrimination.  Lowenkron responded that 
the Council could allow for both country-specific and 
thematic resolutions.  If the UN created an effective Council 
that would meet often, it could take up country-specific 
resolutions that had teeth and could thus be valuable. 
Parshikov commented that the most recent country-specific 
resolution on Cuba had been extremely mild; if the UN had 
passed a resolution adopting that tone regarding Chechnya, 
even the GOR would have supported it. 
. 
DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA - NGO LAW 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Lowenkron noted that both the U.S. Congress and 
American NGOs were concerned about the new Russian NGO law. 
Parshikov responded that the GOR had its own parliament and 
NGOs to answer to on the issue.  The media also weighed in, 
Parshikov continued.  It was not true that Russia was moving 
away from democracy, he argued, and there were many voices 
heard on all issues. 
 
¶11. (C) Lowenkron said that soon after assuming his current 
position, he had met with a cross section of NGOs.  He had 
promised them that he was always prepared for a dialogue with 
them, even if he would not always agree with their views. 
Throughout the world, NGOs are a reality and are here to 
stay, Lowenkron emphasized. 
 
¶12. (C) Parshikov responded that the GOR also aimed to create 
civil society.  Russia was a young democracy and faced 
challenges in achieving this goal, he continued, although the 
country was on the right track.  Lowenkron replied that the 
Secretary viewed movement on democracy as a trajectory rather 
 
SIPDIS 
than a snap-shot.  In that spirit, we needed to have a 
dialogue on Russia's trajectory.  Parshikov agreed on the 
need for a dialogue, but added that it should be between 
equal partners.  The U.S., being a more mature democracy, had 
the right to share its experiences with Russia but not to 
dictate to it.  Lowenkron stressed that the U.S. was not 
dictating change to Russia, underscoring the Secretary's view 
that democracy by its definition cannot be imposed from the 
outside. 
 
¶13. (U) A/S Lowenkron has cleared this cable. 
BURNS