VZCZCXRO6731
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0792/01 0451434
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141434Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8913
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000792 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: LEADING POLLSTER ANALYZES PRESIDENTIAL RACE 
 
REF: MEXICO 618 
 
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR WILLIAM H. DUNCAN, R 
EASONS: 1.4(B/D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  One of Mexico's most respected pollsters, 
Maria de las Heras, told us that according to her own data, 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), presidential candidate of 
the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), remained the 
candidate to beat in Mexico's July 2 presidential election, 
although for the moment, all three candidates remain 
competitive.  She believes that with polls showing him in the 
high 30s, AMLO is at the ceiling of his possible support. 
She believes that Felipe Calderon of the National Action 
Party (PAN) has lost his momentum and will have trouble 
breaking out of the low 30s unless he is able to redefine 
himself to appeal to voters other than PAN loyalists. 
Although Roberto Madrazo of the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) is running a close third to Calderon, and while 
the PRI enjoys a potential base much larger than that of the 
PRD or PAN, de las Heras asserts that Madrazo has run an 
error-prone campaign that has repelled more voters than it 
has attracted.  She believes that unless Madrazo is able to 
use the party's forthcoming legislative lists to consolidate 
the party's base -- an uncertain prospect at best -- she 
believes he may miss his last chance to pull even.  While we 
largely agree with de las Heras's analysis, we would add the 
caveat that with nearly five months to go, there remains 
plenty of time for scandals or dirty tricks that could 
quickly change the dynamic of the race.  End summary. 
 
Race Remains AMLO's to Lose 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) On February 8, poloff met with Maria de las Heras, 
one of Mexico,s most respected pollsters and an advisor to 
the Madrazo campaign.  According to de las Heras, her polling 
continues to show that this tight, three-way race remained 
AMLO's to lose.  At the moment, AMLO continues to poll in the 
high 30s, with Felipe Calderon polling in the low 30s and 
Roberto Madrazo polling 1-2 percentage points behind 
Calderon.  She said that most polls were fairly consistent 
with her own data, with any differences falling within the 
margin of error.  She explained that the small number of 
outlying polls did not seek to predict the vote of undecided 
voters, and therefore did not add up to 100 percent, which 
might account for their disparity with mainstream polls.  She 
noted that current trends suggest the 2006 election would see 
significantly lower voter participation than in recent 
presidential elections; such a dynamic could favor the party 
with the strongest "get out the vote" operation, the PRI. 
 
AMLO's Challenge: Hold On To Uncommitted Voters 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3.  (C) De las Heras told poloff that while at the moment, 
AMLO was the clear leader, he was near his "ceiling" of 
possible support, with little possibility for further growth. 
 According to her polling, AMLO,s loyal base of support was 
approximately 30 percent and his 7 percent of additional 
support reflects swing voters leaning towards him.  AMLO,s 
challenge in the campaign was to hold on to those swing 
voters. 
 
Calderon Needs Distance from the PAN 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Although Felipe Calderon's enjoyed early gains in the 
polls after he won his party's nomination, de las Heras 
believes he will have trouble surpassing his current level of 
support unless he redefines himself.  Unlike President Fox, 
who during his 2000 campaign was perceived as an agent of 
change and unbeholden to the PAN, Calderon has neither 
advantage in his favor.  He is widely viewed as representing 
the PAN's traditional, conservative ideology, which alienates 
many Mexicans.  She predicts that unless Calderon succeeds in 
redefining himself to appeal to a broader swath of the 
electorate, his poll ratings will see little additional 
upward movement. 
 
Madrazo Struggling to Win Back Former PRI Voters... 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Although a loyal PRIista and Madrazo advisor, de las 
Heras was less than optimistic about Madrazo's chances, 
seeing no sign that he had turned the corner in what she 
characterized as a blundering campaign.  She argued that 
while Madrazo potentially enjoyed the largest base of 
reliable voters, he had squandered a considerable portion of 
this potential support through poor strategic moves.  She 
noted the PRI had won 14 million votes in the 2003 midterm 
elections and that if Madrazo were able simply to hold on to 
 
MEXICO 00000792  002 OF 003 
 
 
those voters, he would be assured of victory.  She observed, 
however, that Madrazo was considerably less popular than the 
PRI itself.  She said that many who had voted for the PRI in 
the past did so out of the conviction that the PRI knew how 
to maintain stability and get things done.  She opined that 
Madrazo's ham-handed handling of his conflicts with teachers' 
union leader Elba Esther Gordillo and  PRI rival and former 
Mexico State Governor Arturo Montiel cost him one million 
loyal PRI voters, for whom these disputes raised questions 
about his basic competence. 
 
...While His "Last Chance" Approaches 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) De las Heras was particularly critical of Madrazo's 
strategy of seeking to win over non-PRIistas before he had 
consolidated his support among the party's base.  For 
example, she noted that Madrazo had promised a 
disproportionate number of spaces on the party legislative 
lists to the PRI's alliance partner, the Green Party, largely 
in the hope of winning the youth vote.  Yet as far as she 
could discern, the Greens had contributed virtually nothing 
to Madrazo's support.  De las Heras opined that the 
elaboration of the PRI's legislative lists represented 
Madrazo's "last chance" to jump-start his campaign, as it 
provided the last opportunity for him to consolidate the 
PRI's base, by ensuring that the party's regional and local 
bosses had a stake in the campaign. 
 
¶7.  (C) Yet de las Heras remained unconvinced that the 
candidate would succeed in using this opportunity to his 
advantage.  She noted that breaking with PRI tradition, 
Madrazo had decided to allocate spots on the party's 
district-by-district lists by polling, according the 
nomination to the candidate who polled highest in the state 
or district.  (Note: Some congressional seats are filled 
through head-to-head races in each district or state; others 
are filled on a proportional basis from each party's national 
list.  Candidates prefer a place on the national list, 
because a high place on the national list virtually 
guarantees their election, without having to campaign.  End 
note.)  She noted that those candidates who polled highest 
months before the election were not always those who were 
most able to unify the party at the local level, and that 
this tactic would leave a number of regional party bosses out 
in the cold. 
 
¶8.  (C) Note:  Other contacts have also criticized this 
element of Madrazo's strategy.  Recent PRI defector Deputy 
Laura Reyes-Retana complained to poloff that in preparing the 
PRI's electoral lists, the Madrazo camp appeared to be 
ignoring numerous local party leaders (like herself) who, 
while not national figures, commanded considerable loyalty in 
their home districts, and had played an important role in the 
PRI's past electoral successes.  She said the PRI planned to 
delay release of its legislative lists until after the PAN 
and PRD had finalized theirs, to prevent defections by those 
PRIistas who were not offered a place on the party's lists. 
Not surprisingly, Federico Madrazo, son of the candidate and 
a member of the Chamber of Deputies, had a different take on 
his father's strategy.  He told poloff that his father was 
asking well-known party members to take advantage of their 
popularity and run for competitive seats in their districts, 
rather than seeking a secure place on the national list; he 
believed this would increase Madrazo's vote totals in those 
districts.  He said his father planned to reserve spots on 
the national list for little-known technocrats who could not 
win a competitive seat, but whose expertise was needed in 
Congress.  End note. 
 
Winning May Be Easier than Governing 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) De las Heras confessed to being less concerned about 
who would win the presidency and more concerned about how the 
eventual winner would be able to govern.  She noted that 
while PAN candidate Felipe Calderon had pledged to form a 
coalition if his party did not win a majority in Congress, 
she suspected he would have as little success in governing by 
coalition as President Fox has had.  She noted that unlike 
Fox, who was something of a pragmatist with few fixed policy 
principles, Calderon was far more committed to the party's 
conservative principles, which would likely lead to conflict 
with the other congressional factions.  She added that AMLO 
was considerably more popular than his party, and that she 
saw no chance that the PRD would win a majority in Congress, 
complicating his ability to govern.  Finally, she intimated 
that Madrazo could face problems governing because the PRI 
had lost much of its party discipline.  Referring to the 
candidate as a "failed Machiavelli," she said that Madrazo's 
tendency to manage disputes in a heavy-handed and 
self-interested manner continued to contribute to the party's 
 
MEXICO 00000792  003 OF 003 
 
 
factionalization. 
 
Comment: Battling for the Swing Vote 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) Given that de las Heras is a close advisor to 
Madrazo, we were surprised at how critical she was of his 
campaign.  On the other hand, she emphasized that Madrazo had 
failed to heed much of her advice, and it may be that she 
wants to distance herself from what may well be a losing 
enterprise.  If de las Heras's analysis of the race is 
largely accurate -- and we suspect it is -- then ultimately 
the election will turn on which of the candidates is most 
successful in winning (or holding on to) the 15-20 percent of 
the electorate that is not yet firmly behind one of the 
candidates.  Such a battle over the swing vote may well 
produce a race to the political center by the three 
candidates.  While for the moment AMLO seems to have 
consolidated his lead, the elections remain nearly five long 
months away.  This provides plenty of opportunity for 
scandals, dirty tricks and other unforeseeable events that 
could quickly change the dynamic in this race. 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity 
 
KELLY