VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0304/01 0400013
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 090013Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5167
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000304 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL KCOR
SUBJECT: LIBERAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION MAGISTRATE: WE ARE 
NOT BUMS; PLC BOYCOTT IS LEGITIMATE 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 0281 
     ¶B. 2005 MANAGUA 3061 
 
Classified By: DCM Peter M. Brennan. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) magistrate 
Rene Herrera of the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) 
asserts that the PLC has boycotted CSE sessions to prevent 
the Sandinista (FSLN) majority from passing regulations that 
will enable the Sandinistas to steal the Atlantic Coast 
elections and would set a similar precedent for the November 
national elections.  An adamant Herrera warned us February 6 
that the Sandinistas, who now control the CSE, will resort to 
whatever tricks it takes to win the March and November 
elections.  He believes that only the direct participation of 
the international community, including the OAS and IFES, can 
stem FSLN fraud.  End Summary. 
 
The Sandinistas' Bag of Dirty Tricks 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU) CSE magistrate Rene Herrera (PLC) alleged to DCM and 
polcouns February 6 that PLC has boycotted CSE sessions to 
prevent the Sandinista (FSLN) majority from passing 
regulations that will permit the Sandinistas to steal the 
Atlantic Coast elections and would set a similar precedent 
for the November national elections.  "We are not bums; our 
boycott of the CSE sessions is justified," argued Herrera. 
With a quorum, the Sandinistas can vote in any regulatory 
changes they desire, he explained.  Herrera, who recently 
returned from Mexico where he underwent open heart surgery, 
was understandably subdued, but nonetheless insistent that 
the Sandinistas, who with CSE President Roberto Rivas now 
control the CSE (4 FSLN votes to 3 PLC votes) will do 
whatever it takes to win the March and November elections. 
(Rivas was affiliated with the PLC but currently supports the 
FSLN's positions on the CSE, reportedly in exchange for not 
being charged with corruption by Nicaragua's 
Sandinista-dominated legal system).  According to Herrera, 
the Sandinistas' bag of dirty tricks includes the following 
tactics: 
 
--Issuance of backdated birth certificates:  The Sandinistas 
have set up shops in people's residences (Herrera knows of 
one women who has 25 computers in her home) to issue birth 
certificates that backdate the DOB so 14 and 15-year-olds 
appear to be 16 and eligible to vote.  These birth 
certificates together with cedula applications are forwarded 
to the CSE where their respective cedulas are expedited. 
 
--Cedulation: Fast Track for Sandinistas; Slow Track or No 
Track for Others:  Although Sergio Rayo, the new director of 
the CSE's cedulation office, is a PLC appointee, he has no 
control over cedula issuance, explained Herrera.  After 
Rayo's office compiles cedula applications, they are 
forwarded to the CSE's information section - controlled by 
Sandinista employee Schmidt - who determines which 
applications to process and which to "shelve."  Further, CSE 
President Rivas controls the cedula paper supply, a supply 
readily available for printing cedulas of Sandinista 
affiliates and scarce when it comes to applicants with 
Liberal sympathies.  The Sandinistas also control the cedula 
printing shop and they accord priority to FSLN voters. 
 
--Musical JRVs and the Raton Loco:  The Sandinistas, who 
control the CSE's information office, enjoy -- along with the 
CSE president and VP -- exclusive access to altering the 
voter registry (padron).  Information office director Schmidt 
employs his authority to move around non-Sandinista voters to 
voting stations (JRVs) other than their usual voting 
location.  And, since access to the padron is limited 
(Herrera claimed the PLC has not yet received a copy of the 
2005 padron), on election day many non-Sandinista voters will 
be unable to find their "new" JRV because they will not know 
in advance that they have been moved.  If, as the Sandinistas 
insist, articles 41 and 116 of the Electoral Law (allowing 
Nicaraguans with cedulas or other documents to vote at a JRV 
even if they are not registered there so long as their ID 
shows they reside in the area) are suspended, many of these 
citizens will not be allowed to vote. 
 
PLC Will Participate with Pre-established Agenda 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (SBU) Herrera shared that the PLC deputies will 
participate in the CSE's February 7 session on the condition 
that the only agenda points are the invitation of the 
 
international community and discussion of Eduardo 
Montealegre's request to change his party's name and emblem. 
To Herrera, the participation of the international community, 
including the OAS and IFES, is the only way to possibly stem 
Sandinistas efforts to steal the elections.  Herrera promised 
to support IFES' presence in the electoral process, adding 
that EFES must have access to CSE's internal workings to make 
any difference.  He remarked that at first he had confused 
IFES with the Mexican electoral body IFE) but now he 
understands the nature and importance of IFES.  (Note: 
Indeed, PLC magistrates attended the February 7 session.  As 
expected, they voted for the invitation of the international 
community (OAS, Carter Center, IRI, NDI, and IRI, the EU, and 
the UN were specified by name; IFES was not, however).  And, 
also as expected, the PLC magistrates voted against Eduardo 
Montealegre's request to change his party name and emblem.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) On the subject of Eduardo Montealegre's proposed 
party and emblematic name change, Herrera insisted that the 
Montealegre had acted in bad faith and bad taste by 
attempting to usurp PLC's "Alianza Liberal" (AL) "trademark." 
 A smug Herrera explained that the matter now rests with the 
Supreme Court; he was confident that the courts will rule in 
favor of the PLC on the issue.  Notwithstanding his 
intransigence on Montealegre's attempt to "usurp" the PLC 
name, Herrera claimed that he holds no personal animosity 
towards Montealegre and will oppose any attempt by the CSE to 
disqualify Montealegre or any other candidate from running 
for office. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Not that Montealegre is a viable presidential 
candidate, continued Herrera, who claimed that Montealegre 
lacks charisma and the political spark needed to attract and 
inspire Nicaraguan voters.  Montealegre's rhetoric that 
favors the IMF and World Bank over the needs of the 
Nicaraguan people is also unhelpful.  True, once elected, a 
president must cooperate with the IMF and World Bank, but one 
does not win an election by telling voters there is no money 
for jobs, health care, and education, argued Herrera. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Herrera acknowledged that PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman 
has lost about 1/3 of his support, qualifying however that 
this shift is neither firm nor entirely pro-Montealegre.  He 
shared that Aleman himself has recognized he was engaged in 
corruption.  However he and most other PLC followers do not 
believe Aleman's corruption was nothing close to what the 
accusations claim.  Herrera also commented that Aleman 
maintains ambitions to run for president if he is granted 
amnesty.  This is one reason Aleman has dragged out the 
selection of the PLC presidential candidate, explained 
Herrera, who claimed he has urged Aleman to allow someone 
else to run. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶7.  (C) That many PLC leaders outside of Managua have started 
to break with the PLC is evidenced by the PLC's recent 
decision to revamp its departmental and municipal leadership. 
 The PLC is replacing leaders whose loyalties are dubious 
with firm Aleman militants.  Many of these PLC "turncoats" 
have joined Montealegre. 
 
TRIVELLI 
TRIVELLI