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FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5148
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0538
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000281 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KDEM KCOR NU
SUBJECT: "BOILING THE FROG": HOW THE SANDINISTAS HAVE 
COOKED THE CSE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: A former top official in Nicaragua's Supreme 
Electoral Council (CSE) recently described to Emboffs the 
seamier side of the CSE -- an organization he claims is 
riddled with corruption and fraudulent partisan influence 
from top to bottom.  In addition to blatant financial fraud 
and mismanagement, ex-Director of Cedulation (issuance of 
national/voter ID's) Dionisio Palacios reported illegal and 
selective issuance of cedulas, problems with multiple voting, 
and the effective subordination of the CSE to the Sandinista 
Front (FSLN).  In a separate meeting, current CSE senior 
civil servant Rodrigo Barreto asserted that Palacios' claims 
are not credible and explained CSE strategies for issuing 
cedulas and registering voters.  While Palacios clearly has a 
bone to pick with the CSE, many of his accusations confirm 
reports from other contacts and depict an institution that 
has abandoned virtually all independence and credibility. 
End Summary. 
 
BOILING THE FROG 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (C) One way to cook a frog is to place it in a pot of 
cool, comfortable water.  To avoid having the frog jump to 
safety, the water must heat slowly, without the frog 
realizing the increasing mortal danger -- until it is cooked 
and ready to eat.  On February 1, former CSE Director of 
Cedulation Dionisio Palacios reported a very similar scenario 
at the CSE, with the FSLN in the role of the chef; the PLC, 
the frog.  Palacios informed us that he had worked for the 
CSE in various positions since 1994 and observed a trend of 
increasing partisanship and politicization.  He claimed that, 
despite the theoretically even division of positions between 
the PLC and FSLN, virtually all technical-level functionaries 
at the CSE are FSLN militants, while Liberal employees have 
been gradually sidelined and very few continue to have any 
real function or control (but continue to receive a salary). 
When asked point blank if there are any honest people left at 
the CSE, Palacios responded, "Honestly, no." 
 
¶3. (C) We asked Palacios why CSE president Roberto Rivas, 
supposedly a Liberal magistrate, has allowed this Sandinista 
take-over and continues to side with FSLN magistrates against 
the Liberals on many issues.  Palacios explained that Rivas 
is implicated in several cases of financial malfeasance from 
his time at the CSE (this is his third consecutive term) and 
before, about which the Sandinistas are aware and are ready 
to exploit through the Sandinista-controlled courts should 
Rivas displease them.  According to Palacios, PLC leader 
Arnoldo Aleman recognized Rivas' increasingly compromised 
situation and plotted to have him replaced when Rivas' term 
expired in 2005.  However, Rivas' mentor (and rumored father) 
Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo intervened with Aleman to save 
Rivas' position.  The FSLN also lobbied Aleman to retain 
Rivas as part of the PLC-FSLN pact to divide the spoils in 
pact-controlled government institutions. 
 
CSE BUDGET WOES CAUSED BY RIVAS' MISMANAGEMENT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4. (C) The CSE once operated offices in all 152 
municipalities and issued cedulas in a relatively timely 
manner.  In 2003, the budget of the Cedulation office was 
cut, and the office was no longer able to purchase sufficient 
materials to issue cedulas efficiently -- a problem that has 
only worsened over time.  In 2004, the CSE closed most of the 
municipal offices, again for budget reasons, leaving only the 
central offices and 18 outposts in the departmental/regional 
capitals open to serve the public.  Rivas complains that the 
Bolanos Administration is starving the CSE of funds for 
political reasons, but according to Palacios, Rivas has 
diverted massive amounts of money to increase benefits for 
magistrates, including drivers, bodyguards, and lavish 
expense accounts.  Palacios also claims Rivas has allotted 
chief CSE functionary Rodrigo Barreto an "emergency fund" 
that Barreto supposedly abuses.  When asked about financial 
responsibility, Palacios said that Rivas bribes the external 
auditors to accept internal audit reports without question. 
The executive cannot force the CSE to open its books because 
it is an independent branch of government, allowing Rivas to 
allocate funds as he pleases. 
 
FSLN USES CONTROL OF CSE TO MANIPULATE CEDULA ISSUANCE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (C) Palacios confirmed reports that Sandinista employees 
at the CSE are issuing cedulas for under-age (under 16) 
Nicaraguans and foreigners based on falsified birth 
certificates.  He said this type of fraud is also 
facilitating trafficking in persons and drugs.  Palacios 
stated that both the FSLN and PLC use whatever control they 
have in the municipalities and electoral councils to 
facilitate cedulas for their own party militants and delay or 
block cedula issuance for others.  He noted that the mayors 
are in charge of the civil registries in the municipalities, 
and therefore control the issuance of birth certificates, 
required to obtain cedulas.  The CSE in general does nothing 
to encourage or facilitate the registration of 16-year olds 
(112,000 Nicaraguans come of age each year), Palacios 
claimed; rather, the political parties play that role. 
 
¶6. (C) Palacios explained that, in addition to the new 
registrants, 250,000 Nicaraguans file claims for damaged or 
lost cedulas each year.  He said that 150,000 cedulas have 
been produced, but not distributed, and the CSE will probably 
not make any effort to do so.  The FSLN magistrates will 
absolutely oppose any "plan mochila" proposed by NGOs to 
distribute cedulas in remote areas because they recognize 
that these efforts enfranchised primarily Liberal and 
independent voters in past elections, Palacios claimed. 
 
¶7. (U) During an earlier meeting, Barreto told us that the 
CSE is planning projects to speed up the cedulation process 
and allow voters to register at the polling place of their 
choice.  According to Barreto, the CSE will open new centers 
in Managua and cut down the cedula processing time to 24 
hours, as well as make a greater effort to issue cedulas in 
other municipalities. He complained that the GON procurement 
system is ridiculously bureaucratic and contributed to the 
delay in cedula issuance.  He also claimed that the cedula 
problem "is greatly inflated" by the CSE,s political rivals. 
 
MULTIPLE VOTING NOT DIFFICULT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (C) Personally, Palacios believes that the CSE does not 
have the right to suspend or reform Article 41 of the 
electoral law, which allows citizens to vote at any location 
if they have a valid cedula that shows they live in the area. 
 (Note: Article 41 is currently the subject of an intense 
debate, with the Liberal parties protesting 
CSE/FSLN-sponsored poll regulations that state that a voter 
must appear on the list allocated to a specific voting 
station.  End Note.)  However, he acknowledged that this law 
more easily allows people to vote multiple times.  Palacios 
explained that a person could simply obtain a second birth 
certificate by using his father's last name in addition to or 
instead of his mother's, and then use the birth certificate 
to apply for a second cedula.  Regarding the ink used to 
stain the fingers of voters to prevent this type of fraud, 
Palacios asserted that a person can put grease or a similar 
substance on his finger to block the absorption of the ink. 
Poll workers are supposed to clean the finger before applying 
the ink, but most are poorly trained and wipe the finger 
after the ink is applied, he explained. 
 
¶9. (U) To alleviate the potential displacement caused by the 
suspension of Article 41, Barreto reported that the CSE will 
open voting tables on five Sundays in three different phases 
before November to allow citizens to register at the voting 
location of their choice.  He explained that voters will be 
able to get a "verification document" from the CSE that will 
allow them to vote at their preferred location even if, for 
some reason, they do not appear in the pardon on voting day 
-- thus avoiding the "raton loco" of the 2004 municipal 
elections.  The CSE will initiate a media campaign, in 
conjunction with the NGO community, to inform voters of the 
registration process.  When queried about the large number of 
deceased or absent voters on the padron and the possibility 
for fraud, Barreto demurred, claiming that the strong ink 
placed on voters, thumbs on election day would prevent the 
same person from voting twice (unless, of course, they grease 
their thumbs first). 
 
EXPAT VOTING NOT IN THE CARDS THIS YEAR 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (SBU) Barreto reported that casting votes from abroad 
would not be possible this year, though he personally 
supports the project.  He claimed that the CSE's budget 
cannot support such an effort, nor is the civil registry 
 
sufficiently organized to permit consular officers to verify 
applications.  Barreto commented that the CSE has held 
several meetings with the MFA to discuss this issue, but that 
the MFA has yet to produce a true consular registry.  In any 
case, Barreto argued that most eligible voters abroad already 
have a cedula and may return to Nicaragua to exercise their 
suffrage. 
 
BARRETO AND PALACIOS MUTUALLY SUSPICIOUS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11. (C) When asked about the CSE's firing of Palacios last 
October, Barreto replied that Palacios and his office were 
under investigation for illegally "expediting" cedulas for a 
fee.  At first, Barreto said that he wasn't sure if Palacios 
was personally involved in the scandal, but later added that 
Palacios was frustrated because he did not feel the PLC 
magistrates were supporting him and he stood to lose his 
"business."  Regarding the veracity of Palacios, allegations 
against the CSE, Barreto admitted that he has ignored 
Palacios, charges, but would not afford them much 
credibility in any case.  Barreto did admit, however, that 
Palacios "knew what was going on in Cedulation."  Barreto 
told us that the new Director of Cedulation, Sergio Rayo, was 
sponsored by PLC magistrate Rene Herrera.  He termed Rayo a 
"conscientious worker." 
 
¶12. (C) To Palacios, Barreto is "a servant of Roberto Rivas" 
who has his sticky fingers in Rivas' CSE budget-engorged 
pockets.  He advised us not to trust Barreto.  Palacios 
informed us that Sergio Rayo is related to Rene Herrera, but 
was also part of the Sandinista intelligence apparatus during 
the 1980s.  He said he could not confirm the current 
inclination of Rayo's loyalties. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶13. (C) The CSE magistrates' stubborn resistance to allowing 
IFES technical advisors to enter their shadowy domain lends 
credence to Palacios accusations of budgetary opacity and 
mismanagement.  The Ambassador called Rivas on February 3 to 
discuss the CSE's intransigence, and Rivas assured him that 
IFES will receive a letter next week outlining what type of 
assistance the CSE requires from IFES, noting that voter 
education and communications are among the priorities.  Rivas 
claimed he is also amenable to technical support.  The 
Ambassador reiterated our commitment to helping him, the CSE 
and the electoral process, observing that it would be a 
tragedy if Rivas were the first CSE head to preside over a 
seriously flawed election. 
TRIVELLI