P 131226Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8808
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA 
AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L  LIBREVILLE 000109 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
KINSHASA PASS BRAZZAVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV GB
SUBJECT: ALLIES OF PRESIDENT'S SON GAIN KEY POSTS IN NEW 
CABINET 
 
REF: A. LIBREVILLE 49 
     ¶B. 05 LIBREVILLE 0329 
     ¶C. 98 LIBREVILLE 2474 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER GLENN FEDZER FOR REASON 
1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  The new cabinet announced by Prime 
Minister Eyeghe Ndong on January 23 rewarded all the factions 
which had contributed to President Bongo's reelection.  The 
faction most favored appears to be that associated with 
Minister of Defense Ali Bongo, whose allies now control the 
national police, the conduct of elections, and oversight of 
the media.  Other hopefuls in the eventual presidential 
successon sweepstakes, however, also gained strength and the 
contest remains wide open.  End summary. 
 
2.(C) The new cabinet announced by Prime Minister Eyeghe 
Ndong on January 23 represents less of a change than most had 
expectd. It is widely viewed in Gabon as a stop-gap cabinet, 
appointed to serve until after the legislative elections due 
in November or December 2006.  In assembling the cabinet, 
Bongo sought to reward all who helped assure his re-election. 
 Those given key appointments include members of three major 
factions, referred to as "renovators," appellistes," and 
"caciques." 
 
The "Renovators" Extend Their Reach 
----------------------------------- 
¶3.  (C)  President Bongo's son Ali Bongo Ondimba is 
strengthened in the new cabinet.  Ali Bongo retains the 
Defense portfolio cabinet, but is elevated to the rank of 
State Minister.  In addition, a number of his allies now hold 
key positions.  The two most significant are Andre Mba Obame, 
elevated from Minister of Social Welfare to Minister of State 
for the Interior, and Rene Ndemezo'Obiang, who remains 
government spokesman, but shifts portfolios from 
Parliamentary Relations to Communications and 
Telecommunications.  Mba Obame now controls the National 
Police and the conduct of elections, while Ndemezo'Obiang 
controls most media outlets and a key economic sector. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Ali Bongo and his associate Mba Obame now control 
all security forces except the Republican Guard, who report 
directly to the President.  Opposition figures claim neither 
will hesitate to order security forces to suppress perceived 
threats to the regime, using violence if necessary.  Rene 
Ndemezo'Obiang (Minister of Telecommunications) reportedly 
earned his promotion thanks to his vitriolic attacks on 
opposition figures during the November election.  Others 
placed in Ali's camp include Agricultural Minister Faustin 
Goukoubi, Commerce Minister Paul Biyoughe Mba, Culture 
Minister Pierre-Marie Dong, and Family Minister Martin 
Mabala. 
 
The "Appellistes" Keep Their Hands on the Cookie Jar 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶5.  (C) Leaders of the so-called "appellistes" faction -- 
Finance Minister Paul Toungui and his ally Mines, Energy, and 
Oil Minister Richard-Auguste Onouviet -- have both retained 
their posts in the new cabinet.  They are linked with 
Presidential Advisor Jean-Pierre Lemboumba Lepandou, 
nicknamed the "strong-box" for his role overseeing the 
Presidency's expenditures.  Collectively, they reportedly 
have the power to funnel money quickly to the President, 
either to fund a favored project or to preserve domestic 
peace by financially influencing union leaders, politicians, 
or village leaders. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Lemboumba Lepandou is considered the king maker by 
many Gabonese analysts, and remains an implacable enemy of 
Ali Bongo (Lemboumba believes Ali Bongo tried to assassinate 
him in 1992).  Tangui owes his current position to 
Lemboumba's patronage, but his marriage to Presidential 
daughter and Chief of Staff Pascaline Bongo provides him with 
an independent power base.  Pascaline is reportedly the only 
person with the complete trust of the President, and also 
keeps a close eye on the budget of the Presidency. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Tangui's camp reportedly include Emmanuel Ondo 
Methogo, a Vice Prime Minister who holds the Relations with 
Parliament portfolio, Minister of Small and Medium 
Enterprises Senturel Ngoma Madoungou, and Sports, Youth, and 
Leisure Minister Egide Boundono Simangoye. 
 
The Caciques: Not Ready to Step Aside 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Backing some of the younger ministers, and holding 
important positions in their own right, are the "Caciques" 
(big shots), the old guard of Bongo's PDG (Gabonese 
Democratic Party).  Their power and influence date from the 
early years of the Gabonese Republic.  They are survivors of 
decades of political infighting, and have built their own 
empires within the system, sometimes in collaboration, but 
frequently in competition, with each other.  They held power 
while Ali Bongo was still in grade school (Idriss Ngari, see 
para 10, has said as much publicly), and are not inclined to 
surrender power to a younger generation of Gabonese.   Many 
Caciques maintain strong connections with France, and France 
is thought to share their opposition to the prospect of Ali 
Bongo's assumption of power (President Bongo once told 
Ambassador Walkley,"The French don't like my son"). 
 
¶9.  (C)  Senate President Joseph Rawiri -- along with Omar 
Bongo a close protg of Gabon's first President Leon Mba -- 
is likely the most powerful in this group.  Under the 
constitution he inherits interim power upon the death of the 
President, but his health is rumored to be poor, and he is 
widely believed to be happy in his current role.  He is not 
known to harbor any Presidential ambitions, but has the 
institutional and personal influence to hold back those who 
do. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Another key Cacique is Minister of Public Works 
Idriss Ngari, a retired General and one-time Minister of the 
Interior.  Ngari and Ali Bongo are reportedly bitter rivals, 
and Ngari appears able to draw support from senior military 
officers and the President's own Beteke ethnic group.  Ngari 
traveled to South Africa for medical treatment after his 
demotion from the Interior Ministry to Public Works in 2004, 
and at the time was considered too ill to be a serious rival 
for power.  He was, alongside Ali Bongo, promoted to 
"Minister of State" in the new cabinet, and his health, along 
with his political fortunes, seems to have improved. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Other Caciques in the Cabinet include Foreign 
Minister Jean Ping, Vice Prime Minister Louis-Gaston Mayila, 
Planning Minister Casimir Oye Mba, and Minister for Public 
Administration and State Modernization Jean-Boniface Assele. 
(Assele is described by several Embassy contacts as likely to 
be "the first to die" should violent regime change occur 
because of the long trail of aggrieved enemies he's left in 
his wake.) 
 
Mba Abessole and Bitougat Also Unpopular But Elevated 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶12.  (C)  Former opposition leader and widely unpopular 
turncoat Paul Mba Abessole has gained a promotion in the new 
cabinet to Vice Prime Minister, while keeping the 
Transportation portfolio.  He has already come under fire 
within his own party (RBN, National Rally of Woodcutters) for 
failing to take his remaining supporters up with him in his 
climb to power.  Alain-Claude Billie bi Nze, allegedly an 
illegitimate son of Mba Abessole, was elevated to Minister 
Delegue of Communication, but may be the only support 
Abessole can count on in the cabinet.  Abessole convinced his 
former opposition ally Pierre-Andre Kombila to support, or at 
least not oppose, Omar Bongo in the last Presidential 
election.  Kombila is now Minister of Technical Education, 
but is unlikely to be a reliable ally of Mba Abessole. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Labor Minister Christiane Bitougat may be the most 
criticized choice in the current cabinet.  Bitougat was 
President of the Teacher's Union before her elevation to the 
cabinet, and was widely thought to have been President 
Bongo's "Trojan Horse" in the labor movement.  Some 
independent union leaders openly detest her, which will be 
less than helpful if the proposed privatization of Air Gabon, 
Gabon Telecom, and Gabon Post spark labor unrest.  At a time 
when labor negotiations may depend on patience, mutual trust, 
and respect, some commentators believe that the outspoken and 
acerbic Bitougat is being set up for a fall by President 
Bongo, who will then sweep in with envelopes of money and 
remedy the situation. 
 
"Geopolitics" and the Bongo System 
---------------------------------- 
¶14.  (C)  President Bongo has preserved Gabonese stability 
over his long time in office in part by reaching out to and 
 
including representatives  of different regions and ethnic 
groups; the new cabinet continues this tradition.  The new 
Minister for the Prevention of Natural Calamities, Jean 
Massima, allegedly used large sums of money stolen while in 
government service to invest in local enterprises and 
building projects in his native Koulamoutou, the capital of 
Ogooue-Lolo province.  Consequently, he is highly popular at 
home, explaining Bongo's decision to include him in the new 
cabinet. 
 
¶15.  (C)  Other cabinet ministers checking regional or ethnic 
boxes include Housing and Urbanism State Minister Jacques 
Adiahenot, Vice Prime Minister Georgette Koko, Minister of 
Education Albert Ondo Ossa, and Prime Minister Jean Eyeghe 
Ndong.  Eyedhe Ndong is a nephew of first President Leon Mba 
and, like all Prime Ministers under Bongo, comes from the 
Fang ethnic group, the largest in Gabon.  Another member of 
the cabinet from the Leon Mba clan (by marriage) is 
Christiane Bitougat (para 13). 
 
It's not that simple 
-------------------- 
¶16.  (C)  This attribution of the allegiances of different 
ministers obscures the ever-changing ties of family and 
organization binding the Gabonese elite.  Many of the 
bitterest rivals are related by blood or have children or 
grandchildren in common (opposition figure Zacharie Myboto is 
the grandfather of two of President Bongo's many children), 
or are tied together ethnically or in organizations such as 
the Freemasons.  Abessole and Kombila's reconciliation after 
eight years of bitter animosity is not unusual, nor is 
Bongo's reaching out to and including two of his most 
outspoken rivals. 
 
¶17.  (C)  Comment:  The most important question in Gabonese 
politics remains: Who will succeed President Bongo?  The 
composition of the new cabinet does not provide many hints at 
the answer.  Ali Bongo has been strengthened, but not at the 
expense of his rivals.  The system still spreads power and 
resources throughout the elite, preserving stability.  While 
Bongo's health holds, the system should hold, but jockeying 
for position over the next few years will increase and 
introduce strains. 
 
¶18. (C)  Comment cont: In discussions of succession, Ali 
Bongo's name is generally the first one mentioned.  Along 
with his name, however, come many reasons why he could not or 
should not succeed his father.  The "disqualifications" 
include relatively impersonal assertions that he lacks a 
connection to the grassroots (he does not, for example, speak 
his own village language) or that France would never stand 
for a President Ali Bongo (he speaks excellent English and is 
seen by the French as too close to the US). There are also 
bizarre slanders circulating, including allegations that he 
is really Nigerian rather than Gabonese, or that he is 
homosexual.  That no other possible candidates attract 
anywhere near as much "mud" is testimony to Ali Bongo's 
initial prominence in the succession sweepstakes. 
 
WALKLEY 
 
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