VZCZCXRO4263
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLP #0451/01 0522135
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 212135Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8160
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5620
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2888
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6759
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3981
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1329
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1230
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3581
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3964
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8483
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LA PAZ 000451 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA A/S T.SHANNON AND PDAS C.SHAPIRO 
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND P.FRENCH AND L.PETRONI 
MCC FOR A.ROSSIN AND J.HEWKO 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
TREASURY FOR S.GOOCH AND R.TOLOUI 
NSC FOR D.FISK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR ECON PINR EAID BL
SUBJECT: FIRST MEETING WITH EVO AS PRESIDENT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  During a nearly two hour conversation with 
the Ambassador at the Presidential Palace on February 18, Evo 
Morales would not be pinned down on details of eradication 
but showed interest in at least limited cooperation on 
broader counternarcotics and anti-corruption issues.  The 
Ambassador admonished Morales to keep in check gratuitous 
slaps at the USG for local political gain, pushed hard for 
clarification on eradication, interdiction and alternative 
development policies, and laid the blame for declining 
military support on the GOB's grandstanding on Article 98. 
The chemistry between Morales and his Vice President, Alvaro 
Garcia Linera (also at the meeting) seemed cooler than in 
previous encounters.  Garcia Linera closed the meeting by 
saying he hoped to attend the Microsoft-sponsored Government 
Leaders Forum in Washington March 14-15.  The Ambassador 
advised him to apply for a visa via diplomatic note.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------- 
THE POTUS-MORALES PHONE CALL 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, Econ/Pol 
Counselor, and the Embassy's declared intelligence chief met 
at our request with President Evo Morales for almost two 
hours at the Presidential Palace on February 18.  Vice 
President Alvaro Garcia Linera and Minister of the Presidency 
Juan Ramon de la Quintana were also present.  Morales opened 
by thanking the Ambassador for the congratulatory phone call 
received from President Bush on February 1, but worried that 
a translator error left the impression that his regime was 
moving toward socialism rather than clarifying that "Movement 
Toward Socialism" was the name of the governing party.  The 
Ambassador assured Morales that he had clarified any 
misunderstanding, but noted that it appeared to be a 
distinction without a difference as some form of socialism 
appeared, in fact, to be the guiding ideology of the 
president's party.  Morales did not reply. 
 
-------------------------------- 
COUNTERNARCOTICS--A USG PRIORITY 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The Ambassador underscored the USG's commitment to 
democracy in Bolivia, our interest in Morales succeeding 
within that framework, and our willingness to work 
collaboratively where possible.  Morales broke in almost 
immediately to suggest that he and the Ambassador make a 
joint trip to the Chapare--ground zero in the drug war--an 
idea the Ambassador acknowledged might be interesting, but 
only after we reached agreement on the broad counternarcotics 
agenda, including continued aggressive eradication, and a 
coordinated set of talking points.  The Ambassador went on to 
remind Morales that the drug agenda had consequences in 
almost every area of our cooperation and that it was 
important for the GOB to be clear in its policies.  He 
reiterated our confusion over cocalero demands, apparently 
supported by the presidential spokesman, that all USG 
agencies and their counterparts leave the Chapare, and said 
that we could pull all of our multi-million dollar programs 
from the country immediately.  The Ambassador also warned 
Morales that his strident rhetoric ( "..twisting the arms of 
the Yankees on the cato of coca...")  may score points in the 
Chapare, but did not play well in Washington, and that, if it 
came to it, we knew something about arm-twisting.  Finally, 
the Ambassador noted that we had discussed earlier the 
cocalero declaration with Quintana and had received his 
assurances that eradication would continue, that the GOB 
would respect the 3200 hectare limit for coca in the Chapare 
 
LA PAZ 00000451  002 OF 005 
 
 
enshrined in the cocalero-Mesa Government agreement pending 
the results of the EU-financed demand study, and that the DEA 
would continue working in Bolivia. 
 
------------ 
EVO RESPONDS 
------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) After thanking the Ambassador for his good wishes and 
declaring the importance of a cooperative relationship with 
the USG, Morales said he was baffled by the cocalero 
declaration, noting that it was never discussed in his 
presence and admitting that the GOB was having trouble 
controlling its message.   At the same time, he side stepped 
the 3200 hectare limit in the Chapare and launched into a 
false debate (made publicly on recent occasions) in favor of 
allowing one cato (sixth of a hectare) of coca per federation 
affiliate rather than per family as a means to reduce 
cultivation in the region.  Morales recounted that he had 
wanted the original agreement with the Mesa government to 
allow 4,000 hectares, but GOB had revised the number 
downward.  When the Ambassador asked if the current 
administration intended to continue with the 3,200 hectare 
limit, Morales replied that this was the goal but that the 
final number following negotiations with cocaleros could be 
more flexible.  The Ambassador reminded Morales that, 
although the U.S. was not a party to the agreement, Morales' 
signature was on it and that we did not care about cocaleros' 
internal debates -- what mattered was the bottom line and we 
would watch with consequential interest for the eventual 
outcome. 
 
¶5.  (C) Morales responded by delving into the details of his 
Chapare strategy, including sending Vice Minister of Social 
Defense Felipe Caceres to fly over the Carrazco National Park 
to finally demarcate its boundaries.  Morales said the 
cocaleros had agreed the previous day to prohibit cultivation 
in the park and to cooperate with military conscripts to 
eradicate coca already there.  Morales repeated that the 
federations themselves would enforce the one cato per 
affiliate limit and kick out any farmer that exceeded it. 
Reving back a bit, Morales added, "That is where I want to 
get in our negotiations, though as yet I do not have their 
agreement for this proposal.  But when these federations make 
an agreement, they are honored."  Again, the Ambassador 
reminded Morales that the USG would conduct its annual 
certification review and that paltry eradication numbers, so 
far around just 5% of previous results, would not be 
understood.  He reiterated that the challenge was to arrive 
at a coordinated strategy which assured that eradication 
continued at a satisfactory pace. 
 
¶6.  (C) On a lighter note, and by way of explaining why DEA 
needed to change its tactics, Morales said that in 1997, on a 
bus ride back to the Chapare after a day of beer drinking, he 
asked the driver to pull over so Morales could relieve 
himself.  In mid-stream, two burly DEA agents grabbed him by 
the shoulders and spun him around, apparently thinking they 
were stopping him from running away with narcotics. 
Chuckling as he told the story, Morales said he had no 
problem with the DEA remaining in the Chapare, as long as 
there were some (unspecified) adjustments in the way they 
worked.  He alluded as well to an incident several years ago 
in which a DEA agent allegedly supplanted local police at a 
checkpoint -- commenting at the same time that such an action 
might have been a necessary counter to endemic police 
corruption. 
 
---------- 
ARTICLE 98 
---------- 
 
LA PAZ 00000451  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Responding to local news articles citing a New York 
Times piece erroneously characterizing a cut in 
military-to-military assistance as a slap at the Morales 
administration, the Ambassador sounded a strong note of 
caution.  He reminded Morales that the Embassy had been 
silent on Article 98 for some time and accepted the new 
regime's opposition to an agreement.  At the same time, he 
warned that continued inflammatory statements from Morales 
and GOB officials claiming the U.S. wanted impunity through 
Article 98 for its troops to commit wanton murder--especially 
when we had troops actively at war in other regions--were 
damaging to our relatioship and completely ignored our own 
integrity and dignity (favorite one-way themes for the 
Morales team).  The Ambassador suggested Morales seek a 
higher plane, and one based on facts, from which to launch 
criticisms. 
 
¶8.  (C) The Vice President interjected to lament the Bolivian 
armed forces' professional disarray and asked if we could 
reconsider cutting our military assistance.  The Ambassador 
said the decision to sacrifice aid to what we considered 
misguided principle was the GOB's.  He reiterated that, 
absent ratification of an Article 98 agreement, Bolivia would 
lose about USD 33 million in military assistance over the 
next three years and suggested the GOB revisit the issue. 
(Comment:  Garcia Linera's aversion to U.S. military presence 
in Bolivia is well known.  His urging for more help may 
reflect direct armed forces' concern or that Venezuelan and 
Cuban assistance may not be in immediate prospect.  End 
comment.) 
 
---------------------------------- 
POSSIBLE INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIP 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Introduced by the Ambassador, the Embassy's declared 
intelligence chief offered Morales an agency coin (which 
Morales at first regarded with puzzlement, but later with 
considerable interest) and offered a rudimentary explanation 
of our cooperation with intelligence units in the National 
Police, focusing on international terrorism, crime and drug 
trafficking.  The intelligence chief noted that military 
intelligence units were poor, but that the Directorate for 
National intelligence under the Police had competent 
professionals.  He added, however, that these units had not 
been exploited by the Morales administration perhaps because 
of perceived "gringo" influence. 
 
¶10.  (C) After initial skepticism, Morales warmed to the idea 
of cooperating on at least some intelligence matters--mainly 
corruption and commercial issues--and quipped that, while he 
did not understand well the workings of intelligence 
agencies, he was accustomed to being followed by them.  He 
added that he discounted the GOB's intelligence units. 
relying instead on "comrades ("companeros") all over Bolivia 
who give me information."  Quintana added that the GOB wanted 
to create a civilian intelligence service that worked for the 
state, and not for the police, and acknowledged Morales' 
direction to discuss areas of cooperation with the 
intelligence chief. (Comment:  Quintana has avoided contact 
with the Embassy's declared intelligence officer since taking 
office and did not follow up after the meeting.  Garcia 
Linera also remained cool to overtures on intelligence 
cooperation.  End comment.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
DEVELOPING A WORKING RELATIONSHIP 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) When asked how to develop a bilateral 
 
LA PAZ 00000451  004 OF 005 
 
 
counternarcotics relationship, Morales suggested that the 
Embassy continue meeting with Vice Minister Caceres.  He also 
recommended that we meet other ministers and vice-ministers 
on other issues.  The President stated a desire to work with 
us on controlling precursor chemicals and developing a zero 
cocaine strategy, "which is really the best way to eliminate 
excess coca."  Interestingly, he acknowledged that cocaine 
trafficking propped up the price of coca leaf.  He also said 
he hoped to develop voluntary reduction programs in the 
Yungas (Caranavi).  At the same time, he lamented that 
Bolivia had lost to Peru the opportunity to export coca 
leaves legally to the United States.  (Note: We understand 
the only company in the United States legally allowed to 
import coca leaves is Stepan Company in Maywood New Jersey 
which produces cocaine for medical uses.  End Note.)  The 
Ambassador replied that Bolivia's cocaleros were the 
country's greatest neo-liberals, always looking for new 
export markets.  Morales smiled. 
 
¶12.  (C) Morales went on to say he wanted to optimize the 
efficiency of the alternative development (AD) in the 
Chapare, suggesting that a soccer field that can be built by 
the mayors for 30,000 bolivianos would cost 90,000 bolivianos 
as part of an AD program.  Morales believed that road 
infrastructure program was the most effective AD program in 
the Chapare. 
 
¶13.  (C) Finally, upon hearing of the Ambassador's upcoming 
trip to Washington, Morales asked to convey his best regards 
to President Bush and to Secretary Rice, carefully 
pronouncing her first name. 
 
--------------------------------- 
THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S INTERVENTION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) After 75 minutes, and with the conversation winding 
down, Garcia Linera asked Morales for permission to speak. 
The Vice President then embarked on a twenty-minute 
monologue, starting by saying that this GOB had not declared 
itself an enemy of the USG.  "We don't want to create 
problems.  We agree on much but differ on some things." 
Areas of agreement included democracy, counter-terrorism, 
anti-corruption, and counternarcotics.  The Ambassador 
observed that we could offer model legislation on money 
laundering, precursor chemicals and conspiracy that the GOB 
might find helpful.  Garcia Linera thought such input would 
be useful. 
 
¶15.  (C) On the other hand, the Vice President acknowledged 
that coca would remain an irritant.  "You ask for exact 
numbers (about coca cultivation and eradication)," he said, 
"but we are a very ambiguous society."  He assured that the 
GOB would proceed with its coca strategy, making adjustments 
as needed.  Garcia Linera recognized that addressing the coca 
issue in the Yungas would be especially complicated. 
 
¶16.  (C) The Ambassador commented that he understood that the 
Vice President had taken some shots at the USG the previous 
day at an economic forum on free trade agreements (see 
septel).  Garcia Linera vehemently denied the charge, stating 
that his remarks had evidently been mischaracterized to the 
Ambassador.  "I carefully avoided mentioning any countries, 
and any implicit criticisms were meant for the Europeans," he 
said.  (Comment: At the economic forum, the Vice-President's 
attacks were clearly directed against U.S. trade policy.  His 
unusually defensive reaction-never seen before-may be due to 
the fact that this issue was raised in the presence of 
Morales.  End Comment.) 
 
¶17.  (C) Garcia Linera mentioned that he would like to go to 
 
LA PAZ 00000451  005 OF 005 
 
 
the Microsoft-sponsored Government Leaders Forum in 
Washington March 14-15 but claimed not to know if he had a 
visa.  The Ambassador suggested that the Foreign Ministry 
send a formal request and that the Embassy would proceed with 
processing his visa application with the Department. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶18.  (C) Following the sometimes tense discussions about coca 
and Article 98, Morales began to relax and show an engaging 
sense of humor.  Clearly more at ease telling stories than 
discussing policy, he jumped from topic to topic and was most 
comfortable when talking about the subject he understands 
best--coca in the Chapare.  As the Vice President stated 
during the meeting, the President is spending a lot of his 
time personally trying to negotiate with the cocaleros.  For 
Morales, this is one of his most difficult 
challenges--walking the tightrope between succumbing to U.S. 
demands and upsetting his key political power base in the 
Chapare. 
 
¶19.  (C) There seemed to be tension between Morales and 
Garcia Linera during the meeting.  The two rarely looked at 
each other or supported the other's points.  The Vice 
President's intervention at the end of the  meeting seemed 
unnecessary and forced, almost as if he believed his job was 
to put an intellectual sheen on Morales's statements, or, 
more ominously, insert himself as a buffer to a direct 
relationship between the Ambassador and the President. 
Morales paid little attention to Garcia Linera's words. 
 
¶20.  (C) Once again, most of what Morales said could be 
interpreted as reassuring.  But one month into his 
administration, his capacity for doublespeak, or else his 
incapacity to forge internal consensus, is as disturbing as 
it is impressive. 
GREENLEE