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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 000336 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2016 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ELAB BL
SUBJECT: SIGNS OF EVO'S AUTOCRATIC BENT 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 240 
     ¶B. LA PAX 229 
 
Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The MAS government has moved to control a 
range of institutions, including nominally independent ones, 
and many observers believe President Morales plans to use the 
Constituent Assembly (CA) to consolidate this control.  Other 
worrying signs include the substantial halting of forced 
eradication of illegal coca and reports of increasing 
Venezuelan and Cuban activity in Bolivia.  Morales' first two 
weeks in office reveal an autocratic bent, and the early 
invocation of phantom conspiracies, to consolidate power in 
the face of internal opposition.  End summary. 
 
Consolidating Control 
--------------------- 
¶2. (C) In his first two weeks in office, President Morales 
has moved to consolidate his control over a range of 
institutions.  The MAS's unprecedented victory on December 18 
enabled it to take over the executive branch of government 
wholesale, bypassing the traditional backroom bargaining with 
other parties.  To some analysts, Morales has gone further, 
exerting a more direct "personal" control by appointing 
ministers exclusively for their loyalty to him rather than 
for their links to powerful constituencies or for their 
technical expertise.  Many observers also believe that 
Morales has pushed for lower government salaries, including 
in the judicial and legislative branches, in order to purge 
MAS rivals from those institutions (see reftel).  One 
opposition congressman told us that his MAS colleagues would 
receive "other" financial compensation to offset salary 
reductions, while those from other parties would not.  An 
opposition senator also told us that the MAS steamrolled the 
opposition and seized control of key congressional committees 
in violation of internal regulations.  Some in the 
congressional opposition have told us their concern is 
compounded by the fact that Morales won't take their calls. 
 
¶3.  (C) The MAS government has also moved to take over 
autonomous social sector organizations.  Contacts in the 
Santa Cruz regional labor confederation (COD) told us 
recently that a number of sitting regional labor leaders, 
accused of favoring "Podemos" during the electoral campaign, 
have been the object of a MAS-led smear campaign for 
"representing the interests of the multinationals, not the 
people" and targeted for purging from their posts.  These 
leaders were legitimately elected according to their 
organization's internal statutes and are only several months 
into what is supposed to be a two-year term.  There have been 
sketchier reports of similar (presumably) MAS-led pressures 
in a broad range of organizations, including the original 
Sole Confederation of Campesino Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) 
led by Morales rival Felipe Quispe. 
 
Constituent Assembly 
-------------------- 
¶4. (C) Morales appears to be gearing up to use the 
Constituent Assembly (CA) to secure MAS power for the long 
term.  On February 7, Morales presented to Congress the 
executive's legislative proposal for the CA.  The proposal 
provides for three assembly representatives per legislative 
district, two for the party of the top vote-getter and one 
for the second place finisher (assuming no party wins an 
outright majority).  The potentially significant caveat is 
that the "winner takes all" three seats if the first place 
finisher wins by more than 50 percent.  Analysts and social 
sectors speculate that the government is banking on winning 
an outright majority in the key western departments (La Paz, 
Oruro, Potosi, Cochabamba and Chuquisaca), and thereby 
gaining absolute representation in the CA for those areas, 
while also grabbing representation from the remaining 
departments.  Should this happen, the government would have 
far more than the two-thirds majority needed to control the 
process and to "refound" Bolivia as it sees fit, while the 
minority would have virtually no representation or influence 
 
LA PAZ 00000336  002 OF 003 
 
 
at all. 
 
¶5. (C) Some observers believe that Morales abandoned his 
previous proposal, which included a set number of 
representatives for "indigenous" groups, because the MAS's 
unexpectedly decisive victory on December 18 led him to 
believe he would be better off with a strict "one person - 
one vote" approach.  Still, a 2/3 majority of the combined 
congress is needed to pass the CA proposal into law, and the 
MAS falls short of that number by 21 representatives.  Aware 
of this, Morales has threatened that "if congress doesn't 
pass his law, the social sectors will."  Morales has also 
indicated he wants his bill passed "as is," but many 
congressional insiders believe that that won't be easy. 
According to several opposition legislators, non-MAS 
representatives will push for a law that better reflects the 
interests of Bolivia's political minority, and none are 
likely to vote to give the MAS a "blank check."  Civic 
committees of the "media luna" (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and 
Pando) have already publicly rejected the Morales proposal. 
This early balking at the executive's proposal will lead to 
an inevitable give and take, and probably include the 
consideration of other CA proposals as well.  Labor leaders 
in Cochabamba for example, told us they didn't support the 
MAS proposal because it would exclude the very people the 
government purports to represent.  Several indigenous leaders 
and former MAS (dissident) deputies told us Morales aimed to 
control the selection of assembly representatives outright. 
Congressional debate is scheduled to begin on February 10 and 
is likely to last at least one month.  The election of 
representatives is slated for July 2, and the GOB plans to 
convene the CA on August 6. 
 
Eradication Halted 
------------------- 
¶6. (C) Another disturbing trend is the suspension since 
January 24 of most forced eradication of illegal coca (ref 
B).  While the new Minister of Government Alicia Munoz and 
her Vice-Minister Felipe Caceres (septel) have affirmed the 
GOB's commitment to our three-pronged approach -- 
interdiction, eradication and alternative development -- 
substantive eradication has only partially resumed.  We 
received reports that a small amount of eradication occurred 
February 9, but faced considerable community resistance. 
President Morales is scheduled to meet with the Chapare 
cocalero federations this weekend (February 11-12), 
reportedly to formalize the "cato" agreement and to reach 
consensus on the resumption of eradication of coca exceeding 
that one cato per family limit.  Several Embassy contacts 
worried that if the current policy confusion continues 
unresolved, the Chapare could soon become a "no man's land." 
 
 
Venezuela and Cuba 
------------------ 
¶7. (C) Additionally, there are reports of increasing 
Venezuelan and Cuban activity in Bolivia.  Embassy contacts 
have noted the continued presence of Venezuelan security 
forces in and around the presidential palace and in the 
Ministry of Defense.  Venezuelan TV station "Telesur" has a 
dedicated channel on Bolivian television, and Telesur 
reporters are now an integral part of Bolivia's media swarm. 
Venezuelan state oil company (PDVSA) officials are becoming 
increasingly involved in Bolivian oil matters, with a PDVSA 
office recently opened in downtown La Paz.  Under the 
umbrella of disaster relief, Cuba sent a team of close to 150 
"doctors" to help Bolivians in need, particularly in rural 
areas, and promised that there were more where those came 
from.  Cochabamba Prefect Manfred Reyes Villa told us that 
the MAS offered his department Cuban teachers and doctors, 
but that he had declined the offer. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: President Morales' first two weeks in office 
appear to reveal a more autocratic bent, or at least a plan 
to consolidate power before the early momentum slips away. 
To this end, the MAS government is focusing on the 
Constituent Assembly, to the apparent exclusion of other 
 
LA PAZ 00000336  003 OF 003 
 
 
priorities such as changing the neoliberal economic model, 
reforming Law 1008 (Bolivia's centerpiece anti-drug law) or 
redesigning the mining code.  Many observers believe this is 
because the MAS government believes it will have free reign 
on these and other issues once it has the CA in the bag.  In 
seeking to clear the ground toward its kind of assembly, 
Morales has threatened to mobilize social sectors to pressure 
the congress.  More recently, the president and 
vice-president have upped the ante, publicly raising the 
specter of a conspiracy by "transnational companies" to 
destabilize the government.   Most observers see this as a 
phantom outside threat, used by the government (somewhat 
sooner than most had expected it would) as a political tool 
to rally its forces and to forge national unity in the face 
of the inevitable internal opposition.  These are not good 
signs.  On the other hand, Morales, beset by a disruptive 
airline strike, disastrous nation-wide floods, and discontent 
over unmet campaign pledges, is beginning to find governance 
an increasingly hard slog. 
GREENLEE