This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  KINSHASA 000170 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KPKO CG
SUBJECT: NORTH KIVU TENSIONS UNDERSCORE NEED FOR SYSTEM 
 
REFORMS 
 
REF: KINSHASA 0153 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) Actions by "insurgent" FARDC troops over the weekend 
of January 21, reported in reftel and previous cables, 
represent a major setback to efforts to establish stability 
in the province.  There are continuing clashes in the 
province between "insurgent" troops and primarily MONUC 
forces.  The immediate security crisis has largely passed, 
however, thanks to MONUC intervention.  More worrisome in 
terms of long-term risks is that existing prejudices, 
insecurities, and divisions have again been brought to the 
fore.  Fed by sometimes inflammatory and often misleading 
domestic and international press reports of the problems, old 
passions have been stirred up, including a new wave of 
anti-Rwandan sentiment in Kinshasa and the east that is 
clearly unhelpful in the domestic context, as well as to 
efforts to normalize regional relations.  A deliberate effort 
by the GDRC's top leaders to discount popular allegations of 
GOR misconduct, stating for example that there was no 
evidence of GOR involvement, helped keep official policy on 
an even and reasoned basis through the initial hours of the 
crisis, but public opinion about Rwandans and their perceived 
allies in the DRC is less easily assuaged.  (Note: There has 
been no/no evidence that the GOR was involved in any way in 
the January 21 - 22 events.  End note.) 
 
¶2. (C) By most accounts, the action of the disastrously-bad 
former 5th Integrated Brigade Commander, Colonel Kasikili, a 
former Mai Mai officer, was a significant contributor to the 
problem.  During his relatively brief command, Kasikili 
reportedly undertook actions based on strong prejudices 
against Kinyarwanda-speaking people, seeking to expel them 
from the Brigade and generally denigrating the civilian 
population.  Soldiers in "ex-ANC" brigades (former armed wing 
of the RCD-Goma party) and those of Governor Serufuli's 
former militia already feared entering into the national 
integration process, correctly reasoning that once part of 
new integrated brigades, the former units would be broken up 
and the new integrated units susceptible to deployment 
anywhere in the country.  With little confidence in the 
national government to protect Tutsi or Hutu populations in 
the east, many soldiers were reluctant to go to "brassage" 
centers or leave their home areas - and by implication leave 
their families and communities relatively unprotected. 
Kasikili's actions and policies directly fed these fears, 
leading disgruntled units to stage their "takeover" of 
various North Kivu towns. 
 
¶3. (C) Kasikili's removal (and possible future prosecution) 
and relatively rapid MONUC action largely contained the 
immediate crisis, and MONUC's continuing presence and 
operations in Rutshuru and the surrounding area are serving 
to restore the security environment, such as it exists in 
North Kivu.  As Vice President Ruberwa (RCD-Goma president) 
told the Ambassador last week, however, the unhappy soldiers 
are now more resistant than ever to the integration process. 
They are asking what happens if another Kasikili is sent to 
the area once they are gone and nobody is left to protect 
their families at home.  Rebel general Laurent Nkunda and 
other troublemakers, likely including some Kinshasa-based 
politicians and possibly the remnant leaders of Ituri 
militias, are all too happy to exploit such fears, arguing 
for example that Kinshasa can never be trusted to protect 
"Rwandophones." 
 
¶4. (C) On the other side of the divide, lurid press accounts 
of the supposed Nkunda- or Rwandan-led new insurgency have 
brought forth renewed overt expressions of suspicion of 
Rwandans, never far from the surface in much of the DRC, and 
of the Rwandans' perceived Congolese allies.  In a meeting of 
the Essential Legislation Mixed Commission last week, for 
example, involving the senior officers of the Senate and 
National Assembly and chiefs of diplomatic missions, some 
comments regarding the situation in North Kivu brought forth 
from the parliamentarians waves of rhetoric and charges as to 
what renewed havoc this supposed terrible alliance, 
symbolized by Nkunda, is now planning to wreak on true 
Congolese.  While Nkunda's ability to create a major security 
threat to the province is limited absent significant support 
from some source, he and similar spoilers can keep the pot 
boiling in the areas where they operate.  Nkunda in 
particular evokes near-panic among many Congolese which does 
not lend to the most reasoned or most productive government 
actions. 
 
¶5. (C) In the short term, efforts by Governor Serufuli, as 
 
 
well as by a Ministerial-level team representing various 
ethnicities and political groups scheduled to travel from 
Kinshasa, are helpful to reduce immediate tensions (note: 
although the latter is in fairly typical fashion late getting 
under way.  End note).  Redeployment of at least some of the 
problem military units and replacement by other integrated 
units can be helpful as well.  These activities, while 
needed, represent litle more than short-term palliatives 
absent visibe progress that addresses underlying structural 
roblems.  The frustration expressed by Governor Seufuli 
(reported reftel) presumably reflects his wareness that his 
heretofore successful maneuverig among the various factions 
and groups in the povince is inadequate to address the core 
problem. 
 
¶6. (C)  Real solutions to the North Kivu probems lie in 
various tracks, all of them representng long-term efforts 
with no easy or quick answers.  At the core is the effort to 
build a reasonably competent FARDC military.  This involves 
substantial further progress in the integration/DDR program, 
reforms to provide at least minimally adequate regular salary 
payments and other support, establishing a logistics support 
capability, and general professional training and equipment 
programs.  A minimally competent and supported military is 
the only way to mitigate internal FARDC discontent, and to 
address in a sustained manner security threats posed by 
various domestic and foreign armed groups operating in the 
area (e.g., Nkunda forces, FDLR, ADF/NALU, Mai Mai).  Foreign 
armed forces, including those of MONUC, can only provide 
short-term security absent a Congolese capability that can be 
sustained.  New interventions by Rwandan or Ugandan forces in 
DRC territory would further destabilize the situation in the 
rest of the DRC as well as North Kivu, rolling the situation 
back to that of several years ago.  In terms of the general 
population, continued and sustained efforts to reduce overall 
tension levels in the province and to decrease polarization 
of Kivu society must also be pushed forward.  Incremental 
progress in these areas was being achieved (albeit too 
slowly) in North Kivu, as elsewhere.  By any measure, the 
overall security environment in the province is substantially 
better than it was a year ago, much less several years ago. 
Clearly, however, the situation is far from satisfactory, and 
the January 21 - 22 events certainly have set efforts back 
and underscored the fragility of the situation. 
 
¶7. (C) Economic progress is also essential to stability in 
the Kivus.  Again, substantial progress was being made, 
reflected in efforts to rebuild Kivu livestock herds and 
restart agricultural production, and in substantially 
expanded commerce and general economic activity seen in Goma 
and elsewhere in the region.  Needed further progress, 
however, obviously depends on a reasonably stable overall 
political and security context. 
 
¶8. (C) There are substantial efforts underway by the European 
Union and its member states, Angola, and South Africa to 
address the central military structural reform issues. 
(Note: The USG does not have significant resources committed 
to DRC security sector reform programs.  End note.)  While 
representing major commitments, whether these efforts are 
adequate to achieve the needed results in a timely manner is 
still an open question, and the North Kivu events have 
highlighted once more the importance and urgency of the 
central reform program. 
 
¶9. (C) There is a basis for solutions.  The remarkable 
success of the voter registration efforts in the Kivus and 
the extraordinary turnout rates in the December 
constitutional referendum underscore the massive popular 
desire for peace.  Certainly, immediate efforts must be 
maintained to reduce as much as possible the threats to 
security posed by the armed groups in the area.  The key to 
long-term success, however, is to tap into that overwhelming 
popular sentiment to reinforce the links among various groups 
(i.e, reconciliation and peaceful cohabitation) and long-term 
peace.  This must be accompanied by visible and real 
political progress to establish coherent GDRC authority and 
operations in North Kivu and elsewhere (i.e., the Transition 
political process, elections, and post-election continued 
reforms), and structural improvements in the security sector. 
 All these represent large, complicated programs that will 
require major resources and sustained commitments from donors 
and responsible Congolese leaders extending well beyond 
elections and the Transition period. 
MEECE 
 
 
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