This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 000738 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM RS UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: TALES OF SEVASTOPOL, A HERO CITY 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Aubrey A. Carlson for reasons 1.4(b, 
d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet 
pervades the historic Crimean city of Sevastopol, which is 
one of two municipalities in Ukraine directly administered by 
the central government.  Relations between President 
Yushchenko-appointed city administrator Serhiy Ivanov and the 
locally elected Party of Regions-dominated city assembly are 
tense.  The assembly has passed resolutions of no-confidence 
against Ivanov at least twice.  On the national level, 
Yushchenko has twice vetoed laws that would give Ukrainian 
citizen resident in Sevastopol the right to directly elect 
their mayor, a result that would be certain to cede political 
control of Sevastopol (which voted overwhelmingly for then-PM 
Yanukovych in the 2004 presidential race) entirely to 
pro-Russia, pro-Yanukovych political forces.  Most of our 
local contacts regarded agitation to make Russian a second 
state language (in addition to Ukrainian) to be an artificial 
issue of no particular relevance to residents.  They 
highlighted potential problems with the conduct of the March 
parliamentary elections arising not from fraud but from poor 
organization and confusing new procedures.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) During a February 16 visit to Sevastopol, we met with 
Timofei Nikityuk of the independent, pro-democracy NGO 
Committee of Voters of Ukraine, Yuri Prokhorenko of 
pro-Presidential People's Union Our Ukraine's (PUOU) Leninsky 
municipal district party branch, Vadim Kolesnichenko of the 
opposition Party of Regions local headquarters, Arkady 
Filimonov of the Socialist Party local headquarters, Serhiy 
Kulik of the local Tymoshenko Bloc office (BYuT), and BBC 
stringer Alby Shudrya. 
 
Sevastopol -- A Place Apart 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Tsarina Catherine II founded Sevastopol after the 
Russian annexation of Crimea, but the city is located on the 
site of the earlier Tatar city of Akhtiar while, even 
earlier, the Greek colony of Kherson, founded in 421 BC, 
utilized the deep natural harbor.  Sevastopol's year-round 
access to the Black Sea led to its use as a naval base, 
beginning with the Russian Black Sea fleet in 1804.  In the 
Crimean War in the mid-1800s, Sevastopol was subjected to a 
British siege and eventually was the site of the notorious 
(for the British ) Charge of the Light Brigade.  Sevastopol 
was designated a "hero city" of the Soviet Union for its 
resistance to a German invasion from 1941-42 during World War 
II.  In 1954, Soviet leader Khrushchev transferred 
administrative control over Sevastopol, along with the rest 
of the Crimean Peninsula, from the Russian Soviet Socialist 
Republic to the Ukrainian SSR. 
 
¶4. (C) When we told Nikityuk that we were in Sevastopol to 
obtain a reading of the political climate on the Crimean 
Peninsula, he rejoined that Sevastopol was as different from 
Crimea as Crimea was from the rest of Ukraine.  His point was 
that the presence of the Black Sea Fleet has been a unique 
burden and asset for Sevastopol.  Until late in the Soviet 
period, Sevastopol was a closed city, requiring Sevastopol 
residents to obtain special permits to receive out-of-town 
visitors.  Sevastopol's symbiotic relationship with the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet meant the city has strong ties to 
Russia.  The head of PUOU's local chapter revealed, for 
example, that his brother was an officer in Russia's Black 
Sea Fleet; both were born in Sevastopol.  Several contacts 
estimated that 20-30,000 of Sevastopol's 330,000 residents 
(2004 data) relied economically on the Black Sea Fleet's 
presence.  The Socialist Party representative claimed 70 
percent of Sevastopol's population wished that Crimea would 
return to Russian rule.  He asserted that 10-15 percent of 
Sevastopol's population possessed both Ukrainian and Russian 
passports, with many retired military using their Russian 
passports to return annually to Russia to collect higher 
Russian pensions. 
 
¶5. (U) While located in Ukraine's sole autonomous republic 
(of Crimea), Sevastopol is a "directly governed" city of 
Ukraine with its "mayor" (head of city administration) 
appointed by the central government.  (Note:  The city of 
Kiev also enjoys special status under Ukraine's 
constitution.)  On June 23, 2005, the Ukrainian parliament 
(Verkhovna Rada) passed a bill sponsored by Sevastopol deputy 
Viktor Zayichko that, inter alia, would empower Sevastopol's 
Ukrainian citizen residents to elect their mayor directly. 
After President Yushchenko vetoed the law, the Rada passed a 
law on Sevastopol a second time December 22, 2005.  In 
addition to direct election of the mayor, the law would 
authorize the city administration to retain all tax and other 
revenues that it collects, rather than transferring any share 
to the central government.  Yushchenko again vetoed the law 
and returned it to the Rada with two proposed modifications 
that would make it easier for the central government to 
dismiss the elected mayor.  At the heart of the current 
political tussle is the fact that Sevastopol is a stronghold 
of opposition to Yushchenko, with 80 percent of votes 
recorded in favor of Viktor Yanukovych in the 2004 
presidential election.  This presidential prerogative also 
provides Kiev useful counterbalance to Moscow's influence via 
its Black Sea Fleet.  (Note:  The Rada passed the law, with 
Yushchenko's modifications, February 23, but it is not known 
whether Yushchenko will sign it or not.) 
 
Local Politics 
-------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Despite his minority status as an Orange 
representative in a solidly Blue city, Sevastopol city 
administration head Serhiy Ivanov has earned high marks for 
political leadership since his appointment by Yushchenko on 
February 4, 2005.  Several contacts credited him with selling 
off city property ("land privatization") in a transparent 
manner that resulted in additional income for city coffers, 
rather than private pockets.  As a result, he has a 
relatively high approval rating with the public.  This 
popularity, however, has not been a bulwark against attacks 
from the opposition-dominated City Assembly, which has voted 
twice to remove him from office (to no avail, since only 
President Yushchenko has the power to do so under current 
legislation).  In a sign of PUOU's weakness in the city, 
Ivanov abandoned his party in January to run his own 
eponymous bloc for the City Assembly races, allying with 
ex-PM Pustovoitenko's National Democratic Party and National 
Security and Defense Council Secretary Kinakh's Party of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.  The Ivanov bloc would 
support PUOU in the national parliamentary elections.  Our 
contacts noted that Ivanov hoped to get better cooperation 
from the City Assembly if he controlled some of his own seats. 
 
The Power of Incumbency 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The power of incumbency seemed evident in the contrast 
between the Our Ukraine and Party of Regions offices.  Our 
Ukraine's office was located near the harbor in a spanking 
new and gleaming white office building.  The Party of 
Regions, in contrast, was ensconced in a shabby building that 
perhaps doubled as Kolesnichenko's law office.  When we 
arrived, Kolesnichenko urged us to keep our coats on, since 
he had no heat, and, upon our departure, he pressed his Party 
of Regions desk calendar on us when he noticed that we were 
carrying an Our Ukraine gift bag (with orange flag, scarf, 
and knit cap). 
 
The Artificial Russian Language Issue 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) In addition to arguing strongly in favor of direct 
election of Sevastopol's mayor, Kolesnichenko highlighted 
Party of Regions' championing of the Russian language.  He 
alleged the central government was aggressively promoting the 
use of the Ukrainian language in Sevastopol, even though the 
Constitution required the authorities to respect the language 
spoken by the majority of residents in any area.  Television 
and radio stations were being forced to up the hours of 
Ukrainian language programming and, Kolesnichenko claimed, 
the Gagarin district council had decreed that all official 
documents had to be in the Ukrainian language.  This had 
required a local psychiatric hospital to reregister, as its 
original documentation had been in Russian.  In another 
example, the central budget authorized 9 million hryvnyas for 
the establishment of special kindergartens in which the 
Ukrainian language would be used exclusively.  This, 
Kolesnichenko charged, contravened a Constitutional 
requirement to maintain balance in the support of language 
use. 
 
¶9. (C) Our other local party leader contacts, however, 
downplayed the impact of the language issue.  They claimed 
pro-Russian parties periodically sought to exploit the issue 
and fan fears to increase their support, but averred that 
Sevastopol residents in fact were not particularly exercised 
about the issue.  Our observations during our short visit 
seemed to confirm that the Russian language was holding its 
own.  Although our contacts noted the gradual spread of 
Ukrainian -- especially among a younger generation adapting 
to current realities -- signage, billboards, and advertising 
were invariably in Russian.  The Socialist Party's Filimonov 
said that national television broadcasting should allow 
greater use of Russian.  In Sevastopol, he said, Russian 
language speakers immediately changed the channel if they 
heard Ukrainian, forcing them to rely on television 
broadcasting originating from Russia and strengthening their 
ties to the country.  (Perhaps in one sign of how Sevastopol 
exists in a unique informational space, BYuT's Kulik claimed 
that, in a 2005 street survey, 42 percent of respondents did 
not recognize Tymoshenko when shown her picture.) 
 
¶10. (U) Activism over the Russian language does continue, 
however.  After the Party of Regions Crimean branch collected 
300,000 signatures in favor of a referendum on the status of 
the Russian language, the Crimean Autonomous Republic's 
parliament passed a resolution February 22 scheduling a March 
26 non-binding referendum asking Crimeans whether they 
favored making Russian a second official language.  Back in 
Kiev, Presidential Secretariat Deputy Head Anatoliy 
Matviyenko urged the Autonomous Republic not to hold what he 
termed "an unconstitutional and unlawful initiative," and 
Crimean Prosecutor Shemchuk urged the referendum's 
cancellation on the same grounds.  The media also reported 
that the For Union, "Soyuz," party gathered about 1,000 
people in Simferopol February 21 demonstrating in favor of 
giving official status to the Russian language. 
 
Sevastopol's National Vote 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) As for how parties will fare with Sevastopol's votes 
in the March 26 Rada election, BYuT's Kulik cited a February 
3 poll that showed Regions getting 47.3 percent; radical 
leftist Nataliya Vitrenko's bloc getting 8 percent; the 
Communists, 6.5 percent; Speaker Lytvyn's bloc, 4.7 percent; 
BYuT, 4.3 percent; and President Yushchenko's PUOU, 2.7 
percent.  IRI's poll watcher, however, extrapolated a 
different outcome for us based on past results, with "blue" 
parties obtaining a commanding majority.  He predicted 
Regions would get 65 percent; the For Union ("Soyuz"), 12 
percent; Communists, 10 percent; the SDPU(o)-led Ne Tak bloc 
perhaps 3 percent; PUOU in the 2-3 percent range; and Lytvyn 
close to zero.  (Note:  Both forecasts predict the 
pro-presidential PUOU will have difficulty in Sevastopol 
getting over the three-percent threshold into the local 
legislature.) 
 
Likely Electoral Problems 
------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Various contacts highlighted likely electoral 
problems largely originating not in fraudulent intent but 
unfamiliarity with new procedures and requirements. 
Political parties seemed to be aggressively double-checking 
voter lists and finding numerous discrepancies.  The 
Socialist Party's Filimonov, for example, said 20-25 percent 
of the list was inaccurate with respect to Socialist Party 
members; his party would urge its members to verify their 
registrations once the lists became publicly available. 
Regions' Kolesnichenko said 6,000 voters were missing from 
newly generated lists.  He also said computer translations of 
Russian surnames into their Ukrainian equivalents were 
creating a problem.  He gave an example of the name, 
"Pushkin," which derives from the Russian word for "cannon," 
and becomes entirely different when employing the equivalent 
Ukrainian word, "harmata."  Kolesnichenko alleged that the 
problems originated from a government conspiracy to reduce 
voter turn-out in eastern and southern Ukraine.  His 
accusation that the city administration was manipulating the 
Territorial Electoral Commissions (TECs) appeared to be 
canceled out by CVU rep Nikityuk's claim that current and 
previous Regions members were, in fact, in charge of 
Sevastopol's TECs. 
 
¶13. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. 
HERBST