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PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0494 0580738
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270738Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1634
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0040

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000494 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE FIRST VICE PRESIDENT,S TRIP TO ERITREA 
 
 
Classified By: Charge Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) On February 23 Sudanese First Vice President Salva 
Kiir traveled to Eritrea with a delegation that included 
Director of the National Intelligence and Security Services 
Salah Gosh, MFA Under Secretary Mutriff Saddiq, and SPLM-bloc 
parliamentary leader Yassir Arman.  Eritrean President Isaias 
Afewerki insisted that he meet one-on-one with Kiir and 
refused any participation by other delegation members. 
 
¶2. (C) According to Saddiq and Arman, this trip was part of a 
concerted effort to improve Sudan,s relations with Eritrea. 
Because of the SPLM,s long-term relationship with Eritrea, 
Kiir agreed to undertake the mission on behalf of the 
Government of National Unity.  Kiir,s talking points were 
that Sudan was ready to raise its representation in Eritrea 
to the ambassadorial level immediately; Sudan wanted good 
relations with both Eritrea and Ethiopia, and it would not 
allow its relations with one to disadvantage the other. 
Sudan agreed that Eritrea (rather than Libya) could take the 
lead on mediating between the Government of National Unity 
and the Eastern Front.  Kiir added that Sudan was committed 
to a negotiated solution to the Darfur crisis and wanted 
Eritrea to use its influence with the Darfur 
rebels to that end. 
 
¶3. (C) Comment:  The Sudanese are now waiting for a response 
on these points. This was Kiir's second trip to Asmara since 
December 2005, and is important for several reasons: it shows 
the partners in the Government of National Unity working 
together for the first time on national and security policy; 
it parallels other moves the government is making to secure a 
negotiated solution for Darfur; and, it shows new flexibility 
on the path to a solution with the Eastern Front.  End 
comment. 
 
¶4. (U) Tripoli minimized considered. 
HUME