VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0364/01 0451518
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141518Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1447

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000364 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2016 
TAGS: MASS MCAP PREL SU
SUBJECT: SLA COMANDERS CALL FOR A SINGLE LEADER 
 
REF: 05 KHARTOUM 01654 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) (Note:  this is a re-transmission of 05 Khartoum 01654 
to reflect redrafting and reclassification of para 4 per 
AF/SPG request.  End note.)  Summary:  The lack of a clearly 
defined leader at the top of the SLA has left field 
commanders with divided loyalties, hungry forces, and time on 
their hands.  Without an identifiable and decisive leader, 
many SLA units have reverted to being clan and tribal 
militias that rob convoys for food and loot.  The military 
leadership has not led, and subordinate commanders are 
beginning to grumble.  Field commanders lack clear guidance 
on how to run the areas under their control; local governance 
is spotty. Despite Abdul Wahid's long absence from Darfur, 
Mini Minawi has not yet been able to fully consolidate 
control under his lead.  Still, Mini appears to us to be the 
front-runner in the SLA leadership sweepstakes.  End Summary. 
 
------------------ 
Divisions Widening 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Poloff spoke with field commanders and staff officers 
at all levels in early October.  Commanders from all three 
regional commands said the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) was 
divided, and that the divisions were widening.  The primary 
division, between groups loyal to Secretary General Mini 
Minawi and Chairman Abdel Wahid al Nur, run more or less 
straight along tribal lines and divide the SLA vertically 
between Zaghawa and Fur/Massalit.  But several leaders said 
there is also a growing divide between field commanders and 
the political leadership.  This rift has widened in the past 
few months, dividing the SLA horizontally between fighters 
and expatriate supporters.  There is a tribal dimension here, 
too.  Many SLA field commanders are Zaghawa.  One North 
Darfur commander explained to us that he and his men take the 
risks fighting for freedom while the expatriates and the 
politicians live well in Europe and in Abuja.  The fighters, 
he said, have so far seen no reward for their sacrifice. 
This divide is mirrored at the senior levels of the SLA, but 
taking a few commanders to Abuja may have helped to mend that 
rift. 
 
¶3. (C) The lack of a clearly defined leader at the top of the 
SLA has left field commanders with divided loyalties, hungry 
forces, and time on their hands.  In recent months, the 
absence of large-scale fighting means that regional 
commanders have only limited control of subordinate forces, 
many of which have reverted to the control of their tribal 
and clan leaders.  In the relative calm of the past few 
months, the SLA concentrated on consolidating its position 
vis-a-vis the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in South 
Darfur and moving its general headquarters back to Jebel 
Marra from Berengil (South Darfur), but done precious little 
rebuilding or training. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Political and Structural Questions 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Hassan Salah, chief of intelligence for the SLA 
General Command, discussed his senior commanders at the 
regional and sub-regional level, and referred to Chief of 
Staff Jedou Izza (aka Thagir) as a valiant fighter. 
 
¶5. (C) Bokhit Abdul Karim, a Southern Area commander who may 
now be deputy to Juma Hagar, said that the political 
leadership has not explained how the SLA should manage 
commerce and governance in the areas its controls.  This 
leaves lower-level commanders to make these decisions on 
their own, often with mixed results.  With no standardized 
governance policy, there is no uniformity among areas 
controlled by different clans. 
 
---------------- 
"The Cat's Away" 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Across Darfur, field commanders continue to raid 
humanitarian and commercial convoys for food and loot.  This 
is gradually becoming a commercial activity replacing 
traditional forms of livelihood.  A Zaghawa commander in 
South Darfur told us that if Mini called the SLA to war, all 
of the clans would follow him.  But with no clear leader and 
little guidance, control of the tribal and clan militias has 
reverted to traditional leaders.  Government of Sudan 
security forces have closed many commercial routes into SLA 
held areas, so the people, both civilian and rebel forces, 
are hungry. 
¶7. (C) Commander Omaru, the senior SLA commander in the Jebel 
Marra, said that until Mini and Abdel Wahid solve their 
problems and one of them takes charge, commanders would 
continue to run amok.  "When the cat's away..." he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Comment:  Most Commanders Appear To Support Mini 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶8. (C) The complaints from the field cross tribal and 
regional lines.  The commanders with whom we spoke said that 
they want and need a decisive leader.  Cease Fire Commission 
member Colonel Abdou Abdallah Ismail told us that the field 
commanders would not follow a political leader they cannot 
trust.  Abdou is Fur and would, according to the conventional 
wisdom, align himself with Abdel Wahid.  However, he said 
that Abdel Wahid is considered by many to be militarily weak. 
 A Zaghawa staff officer said that Abdel Wahid "ran like a 
girl" in the early days of the fighting.  Abdel Wahid's 
extended absence from Darfur and poor reputation among field 
commanders would seem an onerous handicap.  So, if we were 
handicapping the race, we would have to say that Minawi seems 
to be the front-runner.  Nonetheless, Mini has thus far 
proven unable to unite the SLA under his leadership even with 
Abdel Wahid out of the country.  Abdel Wahid was scheduled to 
return to Darfur on October 20 and immediately begin 
consultations with his supporters.  Minawi's SLA leadership 
conference in Darfur, tentatively scheduled for 
October 26-28 could be a decisive event, perhaps even a 
showdown between the two. 
HUME