VZCZCXRO9111
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0316/01 0401609
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 091609Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1365
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000316 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/RSA, SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL KPKO AU SU
SUBJECT: ROUND ABOUT IN EL FASHER: CDA HUME GETS 
ON-THE-GROUND REALITY CHECK WITH THE TROOPS 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 00281 
     ¶B. KHARTOUM 00282 
 
KHARTOUM 00000316  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  CDA Hume traveled to El Fasher, Darfur, on 
February 4-5 to meet with the new AMIS Force Commander and 
his staff, and to gain their views on peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations.  The trip also sought to review 
resources in El Fasher available for hosting high-level 
delegations (Ref A).  All interlocutors cited security as 
their main concern; issues focused on the need for increased 
civilian protection and improved humanitarian access.  CDA 
Hume encouraged NGO representatives to brief the new AU Force 
Commander as to the location of "hot spots where humanitarian 
access is imperiled."  The two-day trip produced many updates 
on the complex situation in Darfur, while permitting the 
establishment of bonds with military observers, NGOs, AMIS, 
and UNMIS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Meeting with Maj Gen Ihekare & A/Head of Delegation Gibril 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) CDA Hume met with AMIS Force Commander M/G Ihekare 
and with A/Head of Delegation Hassan Gibril.  He noted the 
apparent deterioration of stability and command and control 
among the rebel forces in Darfur.  While force on force 
violence had decreased, CDA commented that AMIS efforts had 
not become any easier since increased fragmentation continued 
to give rise to new problems.  Both Ihekare and Gibril said 
the areas of Gereida and Sheiria continued to be the most 
problematic because fighters formerly and/or currently tied 
to the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) were "running wild" there. 
 Gibril offered complaints over the frequent turnover of 
land, which fueled more instability.  He also cited the 
Sudanese government,s effort to push SLA forces from parts 
of Sheiria town, which created a vacuum of which JEM forces 
took advantage.  This, in turn, required AMIS forces to 
remove the JEM.  Ihekare and Gibril said that Sudanese 
negotiators meeting in Abuja had "no 
idea" of the situation on the ground in Darfur, and, as a 
result, were in no position to be effective negotiators.  All 
agreed that the problems were becoming more complex and 
complicated, but they remained confident that the current 
forces could prevent the outbreak of sustained fighting. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Commander expressed his intentions to dominate 
militarily the area of operations (AOR), as  increased 
outbreaks of violence threatened overall stability in Darfur 
and the work of NGOs, even if a sustained hot war never 
materialized.  He noted that banditry, not military 
movements, was the most pressing threat in Darfur; civpol 
forces were not capable of protecting the towns, he added. 
Charge agreed that there was a growing sense of unrest and 
apprehension in Darfur, and offered his strong support for 
the General,s plan to change tactics, as doing so stood a 
chance of limiting the sporadic outbreaks of violence.  When 
asked to discuss his needs, the General commented that 
additional military observers would be helpful and that he 
would welcome such assignments to his force. 
 
Meeting with the Wali:  No to UN Re-Hatting 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) CDA Hume thanked Wali Kibbir (the state governor) 
for his welcome and explained the purpose of his visit.  He 
mentioned the visit of Rebecca Garang to Washington and the 
participation of the SPLM in the Abuja peace talks on Darfur. 
 The Wali, speaking in Arabic and occasionally correcting his 
translator, stated that he welcomed outgoing AMIS Force 
Commander Okonkwo's replacement and would cooperate with him. 
 He said that the proposed change from a AU force to one of 
the UN, however, would be refused by the people.  "What is 
the failing of the AU that you are  going to change?," he 
asked.  He indicated that joint UNMIS with SAF, SPLA, and 
movement troops would be a good idea, but that it is 
important to identify the places where troops should be 
deployed.  He expressed positive feelings about the U.S., 
noting it is a "big donor" for WFP, and that the people of 
Darfur received "lots from USAID."  Humanitarian aid needs 
are rising, and it is important also to plan for future needs 
of the people. 
 
UNMIS/OCHA Meeting:  Humanitarian Aid, Security Both Key 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 
PolChief in Darfur, cooperation between the AU and UNMIS is 
quite good.  This was demonstrated by the recent West Darfur 
incident when a UN helicopter crashed during an 
evacuation of NGO staff; the AU sent in armed escorts, 
 
KHARTOUM 00000316  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
permitting the rescue of those injured and departure of the 
NGO staff.  He noted that there are now more than 14,000 
humanitarian workers in Darfur.  The past year has been 
marked by incidents occurring more or less systematically; 
overall, the level of violence was unchanged, although the 
town of Kutum was attacked, which involved air attacks by 
Sudanese Armed Forces.  Darfur is now an even more complex 
situation, as the framework agreement is ignored by the 
combatants.  It is equally important to look at two factors: 
humanitarian aspects and security conditions.  The latter 
might force a mass movement of people into 
larger urban areas; people also may be trapped due to a lack 
of security and access to essential services.  Darfur's "hot 
spots" now include Sheiria and Jebel Mara, with roughly 
50,000 persons displaced. 
 
¶6. (SBU) CDA Hume expressed his disappointment in the lack of 
progress in the Abuja peace talks; this reflected the absence 
of willpower to negotiate in food faith on behalf of the 
people of Darfur.  The UNMIS PolChief emphasized the role of 
dialogue and the development of civil society in addressing 
long-term solutions to Dafur; an effective small arms 
initiative would also be needed to reduce the tendency to 
resort to violence.  One example he cited was that of the 
participation of women's groups in the Abuja peace talks on 
Darfur.  Discussion continued on the evolution toward a role 
for the UN in Darfur peacekeeping, and the need to Sudan to 
cooperate to ensure that an imposed solution benefits it. 
Introducing additional international forces would be a 
sensitive matter, and would need to be target "hot spots" for 
civilian protection. 
 
Mil Obs:  Training AMIS Peacekeepers an Important USG Goal 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) CDA Hume held a roundtable discussion with 12 
military observers assigned to AMIS units in Darfur.  The 
highly qualified observers (many with Special Forces 
backgrounds) discussed the importance of their mission and 
viewed themselves as the eyes and ears of AMIS.  Noting that 
many of the troops they worked with seemed willing and able 
to fulfill their mission, the military observers expressed 
their frustration with what they consider to be a severe lack 
of leadership at both the mid-level and upper-level officer 
ranks.  As a result, virtually all of the U.S. observers have 
had to assume 
unofficial leadership roles and provide a great deal of 
training and guidance to these units.  This enhanced role 
frequently places them in harm's way, as they have yet to be 
issued body armor and are not allowed to carry weapons, 
even when accompanying their troops on missions.   Morale 
among the U.S. observer remains high, however, and they are 
unanimous in their belief that more U.S. observers are needed 
to enhance the effectiveness of AMIS. 
 
NGO Roundtable:  Security Important, Anxiety Levels Higher 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) CDA Hume asked a group of NGO representatives to 
share their concerns over the current situation as well as 
what they need to operate safely and effectively in Darfur. 
All the participants agreed that the situation was 
deteriorating in several areas, particularly Jebal Mara in 
Western Darfur and in Sheiria, Mershing, and Gereida in South 
Darfur.  Anxiety levels have risen, and several NGOs 
mentioned their increased attention to evacuation plans. 
 
¶9. (SBU) GOAL, the Irish NGO, has an effective evacuation 
plan, as was demonstrated during the January 23 skirmish in 
the Golo area.  GOAL found it difficult to extend its 
activities, however, due to increased tension levels and 
Sudanese government policy changes that render NGO operations 
more complicated.  The NGO believes that AMIS as currently 
functioning is not capable of maintaining a sufficient level 
of security; the notion of augmenting it toward a more robust 
UN-backed peacekeeping force is seen as positive.  Some 
areas, GOAL representatives said, have been "compromised by 
the AU," with AMIS seen as "taking sides."  A more effective 
way of protecting civilians must be found, they declared. 
AMIS is like a "paper tiger," and UN forces must come soon, 
as more serious conflict is expected to come over the next 
two months. 
HUME